

## Dokumentation

JÜRGEN HEIDEKING UND CHRISTOF MAUCH

### DAS HERMAN-DOSSIER

#### HELMUTH JAMES GRAF VON MOLTKE, DIE DEUTSCHE EMIGRATION IN ISTANBUL UND DER AMERIKANISCHE GEHEIMDIENST OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)<sup>1</sup>

##### *Das Herman-Dossier des amerikanischen Geheimdiensts OSS und die Überlieferung der Dokumente*

Helmuth James Graf von Moltke (1907–1945) ist vor allem als führendes Mitglied des Kreisauer Kreises und als Theoretiker des Widerstands bekannt<sup>2</sup>. Daß er als Verbindungsmann der innerdeutschen Opposition zu den Westalliierten eine wichtige Rolle spielte, wurde von der Forschung nur am Rande berücksichtigt. Nicht zuletzt fehlten Dokumente zu den Istanbulreisen im Juli und Dezember 1943<sup>3</sup>. In den Briefen an seine Frau Freya hat er den geheimen Anlaß dieser Reisen mit keinem Wort erwähnt, und von der Dezemberreise ist kein Brief an Freya überliefert<sup>4</sup>. Zwar ist bekannt, daß ein von Moltke inspiriertes Memorandum Ende 1943 über Istanbul nach Washington gelangte; über die Hintergründe seiner Entstehung, vor allem aber über die amerikanische Reaktion auf das Dokument gibt es bislang lediglich Spekulationen und einander widersprechende Erklärungsversuche. Die vor kurzem freigegebenen Akten des Office of Strategic Services (OSS) erlauben erstmals Einblick in die Debatte, die Moltkes Vorschläge zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Westalliierten und der innerdeutschen Opposition in

<sup>1</sup> Die folgende Dokumentation ist die erste Veröffentlichung im Rahmen eines am Tübinger Seminar für Zeitgeschichte durchgeführten Projekts der Stiftung Volkswagenwerk zum Thema „Hintergründe und Vordergründe der Opposition gegen den Nationalsozialismus“.

<sup>2</sup> Hierzu insbesondere die umfassende Darstellung von Ger van Roon, *Neuordnung im Widerstand. Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung*, München 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. hierzu und zum folgenden Freya von Moltke/Michael Balfour/Julian Frisby, *Helmuth James von Moltke 1907–1945. Anwalt der Zukunft*, Stuttgart 1975, S. 260 ff. sowie Peter Hoffmann, *Widerstand-Staatsstreich-Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler*, München/Zürich 1985. In seiner Monographie über die Operationen verschiedener Geheimdienste in Istanbul erwähnt auch Barry Rubin Moltkes Istanbulreise und dessen Versuche, mit den Amerikanern zu verhandeln. Rubin datiert allerdings die erste Moltkereihe irrtümlich auf April 1943 und gibt keinerlei Belege für seine Darstellung. Vgl. Barry Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues. A True-Life Casablanca*, New York/Tokyo/Toronto 1989, S. 172–175.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. die Briefe Helmuth von Moltkes an Freya, 6.7. und 7.7. 1943, in: Helmuth James von Moltke, *Briefe an Freya 1939–1945*, hrsg. von Beate Ruhm von Oppen, München 1988, S. 498–505.

Washingtoner Regierungskreisen auslöste. Das OSS gab dem Moltke-Memorandum den Code-Namen „Herman-Plan“ – wobei Herman vermutlich eine sprachliche Kontamination von Helmuth und German ist – und ließ dazu eine eigene Akte anfertigen. Aus den einzelnen Dokumenten dieses „Herman-Dossiers“, das im folgenden in seinen wichtigsten Ausschnitten abgedruckt ist, geht paradigmatisch hervor, mit welcher Intensität und welchen Argumenten die Diskussionen um deutsche Friedensführer im Vorfeld des 20. Juli und unter den heiklen Bedingungen der Allianz mit der Sowjetunion geführt wurden.

Die Mehrzahl der abgedruckten Dokumente befindet sich in den Beständen der 1990 vom CIA freigegebenen und seit wenigen Monaten auch auf Mikrofilm verfügbaren OSS Headquarters Records in den National Archives, Washington, D. C.<sup>5</sup> Ein kleinerer Teil existiert lediglich als Reproduktion auf dem historischen „Donovan Microfilm“, den OSS-Direktor William J. Donovan im September 1945 von Fotoamateuren hat anfertigen lassen. Infolge der großen Eile, die bei der Aktion angesichts der unmittelbar bevorstehenden Auflösung des OSS nötig war, ist die Qualität dieser Reproduktionen extrem schlecht, manche Textpassagen sind sogar unleserlich. Wo immer möglich, wurden Textverbesserungen vorgenommen. Diese sind mit eckigen Klammern gekennzeichnet.

#### *Moltkes Friedensführer in Istanbul*

Sowohl im Juli (5.–10. 7.) als auch im Dezember (11.–16. 12.) des Jahres 1943 reiste Helmuth James Graf von Moltke in offizieller Mission nach Istanbul. Anlaß dieser Reisen waren Verhandlungen über eine von der Türkei im Marmarameer internierte französische Flotte, deren Herausgabe die Pariser Schifffahrtsgesellschaft mit Unterstützung der deutschen Regierung erwirken wollte. Insgeheim jedoch sondierte Moltke als Repräsentant ‚einer einflußreichen innerdeutschen Oppositionsgruppe‘ (Dok. 3) die Möglichkeit geheimer Verhandlungen mit den Westalliierten. Als Mittelsmann hoffte er, den US-Botschafter in Kairo, Alexander Comstock Kirk, einschalten zu können, den er aus dessen Zeit als Geschäftsträger in Berlin gut kannte<sup>6</sup>. Im Juli und Dezember 1943 scheiterten die Kontaktversuche jedoch. Moltke war aber an einem Gespräch mit

<sup>5</sup> National Archives (NA), Washington, D. C., Record Group (RG) 226, Entry 190 (Microfilm M 1642/Roll 52). Von dem für die OSS-Akten zuständigen National Archives-Archivar wurde die Übergabe der Dokumente als „acquisition of unprecedented significance“ bezeichnet, denn „never before have the records of a national intelligence agency been released for research (. . .) The National Archives have already received more than 4000 cubic feet of OSS records and opened them for scholarly investigation“. Lawrence MacDonald, *The Office of Strategic Services. America's First National Intelligence Agency*, in: *Prologue* 23 (1991), S. 7–24.

<sup>6</sup> Moltke hatte sich zwischen Mai 1939 und Oktober 1940, als George F. Kennan die Nachfolge Kirks antrat, häufig zu diskreten Aussprachen über politische und militärische Fragen mit Alexander Kirk getroffen. Kennan berichtete über mehrere geheime Zusammentreffen mit Moltke, Deuel und Kirk: „He [Moltke] met many times secretly, at great risk to his life, with Alexander Kirk, Wally Deuel and myself. We used to visit him at night in the blackout in a little falt which he had over a garage in the center of town“; Kennan an Robert D. Murphy, 10. 5. 1945, in: Princeton University Archives (PUA) Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Kennan Papers, box 28. Zu Deuel, siehe Anm. 31.

Kirk so sehr gelegen, daß er für Anfang 1944 eine weitere Reise nach Istanbul plante (Dok. 1). Dazu kam es nicht mehr, da er am 19. Januar verhaftet wurde<sup>7</sup>.

Anders als Kirk, der zwar von Moltkes Integrität überzeugt war, aber politische Komplikationen mit der Sowjetunion und eine Aufweichung des Prinzips der bedingungslosen Kapitulation befürchtete (Dok. 4 a), war der amerikanische Geheimdienst Office of Strategic Services (OSS) prinzipiell an der Pflege des Kontakts mit Moltke interessiert. Als Mittelsmänner zwischen Moltke und dem von Lanning Macfarland geleiteten OSS-Außenposten in Istanbul fungierten der Ende 1934 in die Türkei ausgewanderte Wirtschaftsexperte Dr. Hans Wilbrandt<sup>8</sup>, den Moltke bereits im Zusammenhang mit der Sanierung des Hofguts Kreisau kennengelernt hatte, sowie der 1933 auf den Istanbuler Lehrstuhl für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte berufene Soziologe Alexander Rüstow<sup>9</sup>. Beide, Wilbrandt wie Rüstow, gehörten unter den Decknamen „Hyazinth“ und „Magnolia“ dem mit dem OSS kooperierenden subversiven German Freedom Movement (Deutscher Freiheitsbund) an, das seine Zentrale in der türkischen Hauptstadt hatte<sup>10</sup>; außerdem waren sie Mitglieder eines weitreichenden U.S.-amerikanischen Spionagerings in Europa, des Dogwood-Cereus-Circle<sup>11</sup>. Rüstows Haus auf einer der Istanbul vorgela-

<sup>7</sup> Zum Zeitpunkt seiner Verhaftung wohnte Moltke, wie auch Eugen Gerstenmaier, in der Wohnung der Yorcks in Berlin-Lichterfelde. Vgl. hierzu Marion Yorck von Wartenburg, *Die Stärke der Stille. Erzählung eines Lebens aus dem deutschen Widerstand*, Köln 1984, S. 58 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Wilbrandt, am 4. 1. 1903 in Berlin geboren, trat im Jahr 1930 nach agrarwissenschaftlichem Studium und Promotion an der Universität Göttingen als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und Stellvertreter des Direktors Karl Brandt in das Institut für landwirtschaftliche Marktforschung ein. Ende 1934 folgte er dem „Ruf der Türkischen Regierung als Sachverständiger für agrarwissenschaftliche Fragen im Türkischen Wirtschaftsministerium“, 1940 wurde er aufgrund der kriegswirtschaftlichen Relevanz seiner Tätigkeit aus dem türkischen Staatsdienst entlassen „und ging ins Geschäftsleben.“ Vgl. Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, Nachlaß (NL) Rüstow 13/35 f.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Rüstow (1885–1963), als Schüler Euckens dem Neoliberalismus verpflichtet, war vor seiner Emigration Syndikus beim ‚Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten‘ in Berlin. In Istanbul las er neben Wirtschaftswissenschaften auch Philosophie. Später beteiligte er sich unter anderem am Aufbau von Flüchtlingshilfeorganisationen (zusammen mit Ernst Reuter und Friedrich Breusch). Vgl. Horst Widmann, *Exil und Bildungshilfe. Die deutschsprachige akademische Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933*, Bern/Frankfurt a. M. 1973, S. 124 f. und 285 f.

<sup>10</sup> Wie gut das OSS über die Mitglieder des im August in Istanbul gegründeten Deutschen Freiheitsbundes informiert war, geht aus einer Liste über „Personal Particulars of some Members of the German Freedom Movement (DFB)“ hervor, in der neben den Namen Wilbrandt und Rüstow auch diejenigen von Gerhard Kessler und Ernst Reuter erscheinen. Vgl. den Anhang I zu einem am 8. 9. 1943 von Archibald Coleman („Cereus“) und Alfred Schwarz („Dogwood“) verfaßten „Report concerning the Foundation of a Free German Movement in the Service of the Allied War Effort“, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 190, Box 72, folder 14. Bezeichnenderweise benutzten Wilbrandt und Rüstow noch nach dem Krieg den OSS-Codenamen „Herman“ für Helmuth James von Moltke. Brief Rüstows an Wilbrandt vom 1. 11. 1945, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 53/106. Darin heißt es: „Daß Herman hingerichtet wurde, berichtete mir persönlich eine sehr zuverlässige Berliner, die zu seinem Kreis gehörte.“

<sup>11</sup> Vgl. zu den einzelnen Operationen dieses in Österreich, Deutschland, Ungarn und Bulgarien operierenden Rings um den tschechischen Geschäftsmann Alfred Schwarz (OSS Code-Name „Dogwood“): Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues*, S. 163 ff.; außerdem *The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS*, Vol. 2, hrsg. von Kermit Roosevelt, New York 1976, S. 269 ff., 296–302, sowie Nigel West, MI 6.

gerten Inseln diente amerikanischen und deutschen Unterhändlern mehrfach als Treffpunkt<sup>12</sup>; Wilbrandt stellte dem amerikanischen Geheimdienst seine wirtschaftlichen Verbindungen für nachrichtendienstliche Zwecke zur Verfügung<sup>13</sup>.

Die beiden Deutschen halfen auch Moltke, amerikanische Ansprechpartner in Istanbul, darunter Militärattaché Brigadegeneral R. G. Tindall, zu finden. Nachdem das erhoffte Treffen mit Kirk im Dezember nicht zustande gekommen war, erarbeiteten Wilbrandt und Rüstow ein die Moltkeschen Gedanken und Vorschläge zusammenfassendes Exposé (Dok. 3), das auf dem Weg über das OSS an die amerikanische Regierung weitergeleitet werden sollte.

### *Zeitgeschichtliche Hintergründe*

Im Verlauf des Jahres 1943 hatten sich die außenpolitischen Konstellationen prekär zugespitzt: Einerseits standen die Kriegsanstrengungen Deutschlands nach den schweren Niederlagen von Stalingrad und Tunesien im Zeichen der Defensive. Andererseits traten im Verhältnis der Sowjetunion zu den Westalliierten subtile Spannungen zutage. So markierten die Gründung des „Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland“ im Juli und des „Bundes deutscher Offiziere“ im September 1943 einen propagandistischen Schritt in Richtung auf eine eigenständige sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik, die in Kontrast zum anglo-amerikanischen Prinzip des „unconditional surrender“ stand, auf die innerdeutsche Opposition anziehend wirken sollte und zugleich die Verhandlungsposition Stalins verbesserte<sup>14</sup>. In Italien war es der Gruppe um Marschall Badoglio zwar gelungen,

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British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–45, London 1983, S. 226 ff. Im OSS War Report heißt es: „Cereus consisted of the president of an Istanbul firm, an Austrian businessman (in radio), a rich and idle Austrian with many social connections in his home country, a German professor of economics [Rüstow, Codename „Magnolia“] – friend of Franz von Papen [German ambassador to Turkey], another German professor [Wilbrandt, Codename „Hyazinth“] with widespread connections among German Junker families, and a Hungarian nobleman – manager of an American oil firm in Istanbul. It established contacts in four Nazi-dominated countries – Austria, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria.“ Vgl. War Report of the OSS, S. 269 f. Der Cereus-Dogwood-Ring wurde allerdings von Doppelagenten infiltriert und flog im Juli 1944 auf, woraufhin Macfarland seinen Istanbul Posten verlor. Vgl. Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues, S. 200 f.

<sup>12</sup> Vgl. hierzu die Erinnerungen des in die Türkei ausgewanderten Mediziners Rudolf Nissen, *Helle Blätter – dunkle Blätter. Erinnerungen eines Chirurgen*, Stuttgart 1969, S. 213.

<sup>13</sup> Brief Alexander Rüstows an Richard E. Gnade (Amerikanische Botschaft Ankara) vom 12. 8. 1945: „As Mr. Alfred Schwarz will have informed you, he [Wilbrandt] has, during the war against Hitler, used his commercial connections with Germany in order to provide the U. S. Secret Service with very valuable information and furthermore to render to the Allied Cause other services of extreme importance.“ Rüstows Erklärung trug apologetischen Charakter, da Wilbrandt offensichtlich auch Geschäfte mit den Achsenmächten getätigt hatte. Vgl. BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 36/230 f., Zitat S. 230.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. zum letzten Punkt Michael Balfour, *Another Look at „Unconditional Surrender“*, in: *International Affairs* 46 (1970), S. 719–736 sowie ausführlich (zu Teheran) Keith Sainsbury, *The Turning Point. Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943. The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences*, Oxford/New York 1985; übergreifend zur Haltung der Sowjetunion: Alexander Fischer, *Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1941–1945*, Stuttgart 1975; zum NKFD:

den Faschismus zu stürzen und ins westliche Lager auszuscheren, doch entwickelte sich der alliierte Vormarsch zu einem aufreibenden, blutigen Tauziehen mit den Deutschen. Angesichts des Anrückens der Roten Armee im Osten war Ende des Jahres 1943, als der Istanbuler Herman-Plan konzipiert wurde, eine westalliierte Besetzung Deutschlands kaum zu erwarten, da mit einer Landung von Briten und Amerikanern in Frankreich nicht vor dem Frühsommer 1944 gerechnet werden konnte.

Der angespannten außenpolitischen Lage entsprach eine zunehmende Unsicherheit der Verhältnisse im Innern Deutschlands. In der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 1943 wurde die Situation insbesondere durch massive Bombenangriffe der Briten und Amerikaner angeheizt. Zahlreiche Behörden, darunter die Zentrale der Abwehr, hatte man von Berlin nach Zossen verlegt. Gleichzeitig zeichnete sich hinter den Kulissen der Kampf des Sicherheitsdienstes (SD) gegen die Abwehr ab. Mit der Hinrichtung von Angehörigen unterschiedlicher Widerstandskreise seit Februar 1943 zog sich das tödliche Netz der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung immer enger zusammen. Nachrichten über Deportationen von Juden aus allen von Deutschland besetzten Gebieten, von Massenerschießungen und der Existenz von Vernichtungslagern begannen sich zu verdichten<sup>15</sup>; sie ließen für zahlreiche Angehörige der Opposition keinen Zweifel am wahren Charakter des nationalsozialistischen Regimes.

In dieser Situation hielt Helmuth James von Moltke eine Revolution für unerlässlich, nicht einen Staatsstreich, da dieser die Gefahr einer Dolchstoßlegende impliziere<sup>16</sup>. Für eine dauerhafte Nachkriegsordnung war demnach eine eindeutige militärische Niederlage Deutschlands unabdingbar. Entsprechend wurden im Sommer 1943 im sogenannten „Kreisauer Kreis“ konkrete Grundsätze „für die sittliche und religiöse Erneue-

Bodo Scheurig, *Freies Deutschland. Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion 1943–1945*, München 1960.

<sup>15</sup> Im Oktober 1942 war Moltke „authentisch über den „SS-Hochofen“ berichtet worden, vgl. Moltke, Briefe, S. 420 (Brief vom 10.10. 1942). Am 25. 3. 1943 schrieb er an Lionel Curtis, „daß wir Hunderttausende von Juden umgebracht haben“, wengleich vermutlich „mindestens neun Zehntel der Bevölkerung“ noch nichts davon weiß. (Vgl. Moltke/Balfour/Frisby, *Anwalt der Zukunft*, S. 250); und am 4. 5. 1943 sah Moltke Rauchwolken in Warschau, die von einem mehrtägigen Kampf herrührten. Vgl. Moltke, Briefe, S. 477. Ulrich von Hassell, um ein weiteres Beispiel zu nennen, hatte Mitte Mai 1943 notiert, daß die SS in Polen „in unvorstellbar beschämendster Weise“ Massenvergasungen an Juden vornahm. Vgl. *Die Hassell-Tagebücher 1938–1944. Aufzeichnungen vom Andern Deutschland*, hrsg. von Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Berlin 1988, S. 365.

<sup>16</sup> So ist beispielsweise die „Sonderweisung“ vom 9. 8. 1943 im Sinne der Vermeidung einer neuen Dolchstoßlegende zu interpretieren, vgl. van Roon, *Neuordnung*, S. 570f. Inwieweit Moltke in früheren Jahren auf eine Aktion der Generäle gesetzt hatte, bleibt fraglich. Es scheint, daß Moltke bereits vor dem Krieg überzeugt war, daß man aktiv in den Ablauf der Ereignisse eingreifen müsse, freilich ohne genau zu wissen, in welche Richtung die Aktion zielen sollte. In einem unveröffentlichten Brief vom 11. 11. 1937 an Lionel Curtis kommt dies in der Metapher vom „artillery-man“ zum Ausdruck, mit dem sich Moltke identifiziert: He „sees the necessity of shooting and therefore placing the near target in front of his gun, and further realises, that it is impossible to calculate without having one known point“. Vgl. *Bodleian Library Archives (BLA) Oxford, Lionel Curtis Papers 99/3 ff.*

„den Neuaufbau der europäischen Völkergemeinschaft“ erarbeitet<sup>17</sup>. Diese Pläne erforderten die Kontaktaufnahme, Koordination und Herstellung ständiger Verbindungen zu den Westalliierten. Hierzu waren in der neutralen, aber seit Anfang 1943 zum Westen tendierenden Türkei<sup>18</sup> nahezu ideale Voraussetzungen gegeben. In Istanbul und Ankara lebten zahlreiche renommierte deutsche Emigranten, viele von ihnen Hochschulprofessoren<sup>19</sup>. Sie waren dem Ruf Kemal Atatürks gefolgt, der sich in seinen Bestrebungen um eine Modernisierung des Landes als Erneuerer des wirtschaftlichen, politischen und kulturellen Lebens der Türkei engagierte<sup>20</sup>. Mehr noch als Stockholm oder Bern<sup>21</sup> bot Istanbul, die „Spionagehauptstadt des Zweiten Weltkriegs“ (B. Rubin), ausgezeichnete Möglichkeiten zur Fühlungnahme mit den Alliierten. Bereits Anfang Januar 1943 war es dort zu einem Gespräch zwischen Admiral Canaris und dem US-Marineattaché George H. Earle gekommen<sup>22</sup>, im April trat Earle an den örtlichen Abwehr-Chef Paul Leverkuehn heran<sup>23</sup>. Außerdem hatte der New Yorker Erzbischof Spellman versucht, mit dem deutschen Botschafter Franz von Papen in Verbindung zu treten<sup>24</sup>; im Juni nahm Adam von Trott Kontakte mit deutschen Emigranten in Istanbul sowie mit von Papen<sup>25</sup> und Leverkuehn auf<sup>26</sup>, und im Oktober unternahm der amerikanische Journalist Theodore Morde mit Rückendeckung des OSS und Unterstützung Rüstows den Versuch, von Papen für eine Umsturzaktion gegen Hitler zu gewinnen<sup>27</sup>. Alle diese Versuche scheiterten am Desinteresse der amerikani-

<sup>17</sup> Vgl. die Moltke-Notiz „Grundsätze für die Neuordnung“ vom 8. 8. 1943, abgedruckt bei van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 561–567, Zitat S. 561.

<sup>18</sup> Am 30. 1. 1943 hatte in der türkisch-syrischen Grenzstadt Adana eine geheime Unterredung zwischen türkischen Regierungsvertretern und Churchill stattgefunden. Vgl. Winston S. Churchill, Der Zweite Weltkrieg IV/2, Bern 1952, S. 324 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Unter ihnen Ernst Reuter, Friedrich Dessauer, Paul Hindemith und Leo Spitzer.

<sup>20</sup> Vgl. hierzu die Memoiren von Fritz Neumark, Zuflucht am Bosphorus. Deutsche Gelehrte, Politiker und Künstler in der Emigration 1933–1953, Frankfurt a. M. 1980.

<sup>21</sup> Vgl. zur Schweiz: Jürgen Heideking, Die „Schweizer Straßen“ des europäischen Widerstands, in: Gerhard Schulz (Hrsg.), Geheimdienste und Widerstandsbewegungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 1982, S. 143–187.

<sup>22</sup> Vgl. Albert C. Wedemayer, Wedemayer Reports!, New York 1958, S. 416 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Der Vorgang war jedoch, wie Leverkuehn energisch betonte, sogleich an das OKW gemeldet worden. Handschriftlicher Entwurf eines Berichts von Paul Leverkuehn an die Gestapo, o. D. (ca. Mitte 1944), in: BA Koblenz, NL Leverkuehn, Bd. 19. Earle stand auch mit von Papens Bekanntem, Kurt Freiherr von Lersner, in Verbindung. Die Einsichten, die von Papen über Earle und die US-amerikanische Haltung im Krieg erhielt, gab er, zumindest teilweise, an das Reichsaußenministerium weiter. Papen an Reichsaußenminister, 1. 7. 1944, in: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (AA), Akten Abwehr, R. 101 882.

<sup>24</sup> Handschriftlicher Entwurf eines Berichts von Paul Leverkuehn an die Gestapo, o. D. (ca. Mitte 1944), in: BA Koblenz, NL Leverkuehn, Bd. 19.

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. die auf schriftlichen Mitteilungen beruhende Rekonstruktion der Ereignisse bei van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 318 ff.; von Papen erwähnt den Trott-Besuch in seinem Memoiren lediglich en passant und datiert ihn fälschlich auf Juli, vgl. Franz von Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse, München 1952, S. 573.

<sup>26</sup> Christopher Sykes, Adam von Trott. Eine deutsche Tragödie, Düsseldorf/Köln 1969, S. 371.

<sup>27</sup> Die entsprechenden Dokumente vom Oktober und November 1943 finden sich in der F. D. Roose-

schen Regierung, an der abenteuerlichen Verstiegenheit der Vorschläge oder am Opportunismus und der Unentschlossenheit Franz von Papens.

Im Gegensatz zu den Sondierungsversuchen seiner Vorgänger standen Moltkes Unternehmungen im Dezember 1943 unter verhältnismäßig günstigen Prämissen. Er kannte den Schauplatz Istanbul von seinem ersten Türkei-besuch her<sup>28</sup>; auch mit Paul Leverkuehn, in dessen Berliner Anwaltsfirma er vor dem Krieg gearbeitet hatte, sowie mit Wilbrandt und Rüstow verbanden ihn alte Bekanntschaften<sup>29</sup>. Auf alliierter Seite waren es die Journalisten Dorothy Thompson<sup>30</sup> und Wallace Deuel<sup>31</sup>, daneben Botschafter Kirk und General Smuts<sup>32</sup>, bei denen Moltke hohes Vertrauen genoß.

### *Der Herman-Plan und seine Verfasser*

Die Ansichten, die Moltke im Dezember 1943 in Istanbul vertrat, wurden von Hans Wilbrandt und Alexander Rüstow im „Herman-Plan“ (Dok. 3) fixiert, wobei Rüstow aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach federführend war<sup>33</sup>. Inwieweit das Memorandum die Vorstellungen Moltkes, der zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung nicht mehr präsent war<sup>34</sup>, authentisch wiedergibt, läßt sich nicht exakt rekonstruieren. Im wesentlichen konver-

velt Library (FDRL) in Hyde Park, N. Y., Personal Papers of the President, President's Secretary Files (PSF), 167 OSS, Donovan, 1941–1943. Vgl. außerdem Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues, S. 175 ff.; von Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse, S. 573 f.; van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 320 f.

<sup>28</sup> Vgl. zur ersten Türkei-reise die Briefe vom 6. 7. und 7. 7. 1943, in: Moltke, Briefe, S. 498 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Vgl. Moltkes Brief an Freya vom 2. 9. 1939, in: ebenda, S. 60f.; sowie Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, Völkerrecht im Dienste des Menschen. Dokumente, hrsg. und eingel. von Ger van Roon, Berlin 1986, S. 121. Inwieweit Leverkuehn vom Herman-Plan Bescheid wußte, kann nicht definitiv geklärt werden. Die im Nachlaß Leverkuehn befindlichen Briefe Moltkes vom 12. und 17. 2. 1943 betreffen lediglich dienstliche Belange, in: BA Koblenz, NL Leverkuehn, Bd. 19.

<sup>30</sup> Dorothy Thompson (1893–1961), amerikanische Journalistin. Mit Moltke war Dorothy Thompson erstmals im Wiener Salon von Eugenia Schwarzwald zusammengetroffen; zu Moltkes Zeit in Wien und zur Bekanntschaft mit Hermann Schwarzwald, handschriftliches Memorandum, gez. S. M., NA, RG 226, Entry 180, Donovan Microfilm (A 3304), Roll 68.

<sup>31</sup> Wallace Deuel, der ab 1926 Internationales Recht an der American University in Beirut lehrte, wurde 1929 Mitarbeiter der „Chicago Daily News“. Nach Stationen im New York Cable Office, in Washington und Rom, wurde er Edgar Mowrers Nachfolger als Berlinkorrespondent. Mit den Moltkes pflegten die Deuels regen freundschaftlichen Kontakt; über sie kam auch die Bekanntschaft Moltkes mit Alexander Kirk zustande. 1941 wurde Deuel Mitarbeiter des Coordinator of Information (COI) und später Special Assistant von OSS-Direktor William J. Donovan. Nach dem Krieg erhielt er als erster den Auftrag, die offizielle Geschichte des OSS zu verfassen. Vgl. G. J. A. O'Toole, The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage. From the Revolutionary War to the Present, New York/Oxford 1988, S. 160f.; van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 68; Moltke, Briefe, S. 57 f.; zur Einschätzung Moltkes durch Wallace Deuel, siehe Dok. 16.

<sup>32</sup> In den Kreis der Familie Smuts war Moltke durch seinen Großvater James Rose Innes eingeführt worden. Vgl. Leslie Blackwell, Murder, Mystery and the Law, Cape Town 1963, S. 194.

<sup>33</sup> In einem Brief vom 28. 11. 1949 an Karl Brandt bezieht sich Rüstow mit der Wendung „meine Moltke-Denkschrift“ auf das Memorandum. Vgl. BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 31/278 ff. Zu Brandt siehe Anm. 122.

<sup>34</sup> Im Brief von Alfred Schwarz an General Tindall heißt es, „the enclosed memorandum (...) has been prepared by Herman's friends“ (Dok. 2).

gieren die Vorstellungen des Herman-Plans sowohl mit den Gedanken Helmuth von Moltkes als auch mit den von Rüstow und Wilbrandt formulierten Grundanschauungen des im August 1943 gegründeten Deutschen Freiheitsbundes (German Freedom Movement)<sup>35</sup>. So wurde die Koordination der deutschen demokratischen Oppositionskräfte und die Zusammenarbeit mit den Alliierten zum erstrangigen Ziel erklärt. Darüber hinaus greift das Istanbuler Memorandum den von Moltke mehrmals – selbst in Perioden großer Kriegserfolge – artikulierten Gedanken auf, daß eine deutsche Niederlage und territoriale Opfer unausweichlich, ja notwendig für die Zukunft Deutschlands seien<sup>36</sup> – gewissermaßen als Voraussetzung für eine moralische und politische Erneuerung. Wie Moltke im Brief an Kirk (Dok. 1), so verwahren sich auch die Autoren des Herman-Plans gegen eine alliierte Invasion, falls diese im Tempo des Italien-Feldzuges abrollen würde. Auch das von Moltke bereits 1942 formulierte Prinzip, daß er und seine Freunde den Alliierten helfen würden, den Frieden – nicht nur den Krieg! – zu gewinnen<sup>37</sup>, entspricht dem Grundanliegen des Herman-Plans. Mit Sicherheit ist der Plan das Ergebnis von Diskussionen zwischen Moltke, Rüstow und Wilbrandt; ob in das Dokument auch Vorstellungen von Canaris eingeflossen sind<sup>38</sup> und ob Moltke zunächst die Zurücknahme der Formel des „unconditional surrender“ gefordert hatte, wie Rüstow dies ex eventu behauptet hat, muß dahingestellt bleiben<sup>39</sup>.

Bezeichnend für die Argumentation des Herman-Plans ist jedenfalls die Hervorhebung einer weitreichenden Affinität mit den geistigen und politischen Grundanschauungen der westlichen Demokratien. Die auf der Basis solcher Übereinstimmung vorgeschlagene Kooperation mit den Westalliierten stellte unverkennbar einen Rettungsversuch vor der befürchteten kommunistisch-bolschewistischen Entwicklung in Ost- und Mitteleuropa dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der Hinweis des Plans auf einen starken pro-russischen Flügel der deutschen Opposition zu sehen. Das war zum einen als Reaktion auf die sowjetische Propagandastrategie zu verstehen<sup>40</sup>, vor

<sup>35</sup> Vgl. Anm. 10.

<sup>36</sup> Brief George F. Kennan an Robert D. Murphy, 10. 5. 1945: „Even as early as 1939, and throughout the period of greatest German successes, he held that German defeat was not only inevitable but necessary for the future of Germany and acted accordingly“, in: PUA Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Kennan Papers, box 28. Vgl. außerdem die Denkschrift vom 24. 4. 1941, in der Moltke die Niederlage Deutschlands als Voraussetzung für die Zukunft Europas ansieht, in: van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 507 ff., insbesondere S. 511.

<sup>37</sup> „Wir hoffen, daß Ihr Euch klar darüber seid, daß wir bereit sind, Euch zu helfen, den Krieg und den Frieden zu gewinnen.“ Brief von 1942 (ohne genaues Datum), Moltke an Lionel Curtis, in: Helmuth James von Moltke, Letzte Briefe, Berlin <sup>8</sup>1959, S. 17–24, Zitat S. 22. Der Brief ist im Nachlaß Curtis, in: BLA Oxford nicht erhalten.

<sup>38</sup> Es erscheint plausibel, daß Moltke seine Istanbulreisen mit Rückendeckung von Admiral Canaris unternahm; möglicherweise geht auch die Formel des Herman-Plans – Kapitulation und Kooperation nach Westen hin – auf Canaris zurück; für beide Vermutungen gibt es jedoch keine stichhaltigen Belege. Vgl. hierzu die knappe Bezugnahme auf Canaris' Vorstellungen bei Heinz Höhne, Canaris. Patriot im Zwielicht, München 1976, S. 461.

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 319 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Insbesondere die Gründung des Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland respektive des Bundes deut-

allem aber als argumentatives Druckmittel, mit dem man den Amerikanern die Gefahr eines nach Osten ausgerichteten Nachkriegsdeutschland signalisierte<sup>41</sup>.

#### *Amerikanische Reaktionen auf die Herman-Initiative*

Im Unterschied zu Moltke, der seine Vorschläge durch diplomatische Kanäle übermitteln wollte, unterhielten Wilbrandt und Rüstow Verbindungen zum amerikanischen Geheimdienst OSS. Alfred Schwarz und Archibald Coleman, „Dogwood“ und „Cereus“, die für Geheimkontakte mit europäischen Widerstandsgruppen zuständigen Agenten, traten mit Vehemenz für die Ziele des Deutschen Freiheitsbundes ein; und sie leiteten den Herman-Plan an die OSS-Zentrale in Washington weiter. Hätte Moltke allein auf die diplomatische Karte gesetzt, wäre sein Plan vermutlich nie über den Atlantik gelangt. Botschafter Alexander Kirk ließ ihn in einer knappen, handschriftlichen Notiz wissen, daß seiner Überzeugung nach die bedingungslose Kapitulation der deutschen Truppen vorbehaltlos zu gelten habe (Dok. 4 b)<sup>42</sup>. Die Rigidität von Kirks Äußerung wird verständlich, wenn sie vor dem Hintergrund der geheimen Vereinbarungen in Teheran gesehen wird, in der sich Briten, Amerikaner und Sowjets im Dezember 1943 zur gegenseitigen Information über Friedensfühler und zu deren prinzipieller Ablehnung verpflichtet hatten<sup>43</sup>. Moltke ist die Lektüre von Kirks abschlägiger Antwort erspart geblieben; womöglich hat er nicht einmal erfahren, daß sein Plan vom amerikanischen Geheimdienst, der unter den diffizilen Bedingungen des Krieges die Kontaktaufnahme mit der Opposition übernahm, nach Washington befördert wurde.

Eine erste Stellungnahme zum Herman-Plan stammt von Alfred Schwarz (Dok. 2), einem tschechischen Geschäftsmann, der, getarnt als Mitarbeiter des US-Konsulats in Istanbul, Kontakte zu den Widerstandsbewegungen der Achsenmächte unterhielt. Schwarz betonte, man dürfe bei der Weiterleitung des Plans keine Zeit verlieren; Präsident Roosevelt, Generalstabschef Marshall und OSS-Direktor Donovan müßten sich unter Umgehung des bürokratischen Instanzenwegs auf einer Konferenz so schnell wie möglich auf Leitlinien für eine Zusammenarbeit mit dem deutschen Generalstab einigen. Der Herman-Plan eröffne eine einzigartige Chance, den Krieg im Westen mit einem Schlag zu

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scher Offiziere wurde von den Autoren des Herman-Plans als besorgniserregend eingestuft. Zur Ablehnung des Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland durch die deutsche Opposition, vgl. Scheurig, *Freies Deutschland*, S. 143 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Bezeichnenderweise berichtete Allen Dulles, der Berner OSS-Chef, im Januar 1944 ähnliches: Die von ihm als „Breakers“ bezeichneten Verschwörer seien zwar westlich orientiert, fürchteten jedoch, daß die Nation zunehmend unter den ideologischen Einfluß des Ostens gerate: „Western orientation is preferred by the Breakers over Eastern orientation, but they fear that their nation is being directed by events toward the influence of the East.“ Dulles an OSS-Washington, 27. 1. 1944, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 134, box 228, folder 1368.

<sup>42</sup> Kirks Botschaft sollte auf dem Weg über Militärattaché Tindall, OSS-Istanbul und Rüstow an Moltke geschickt werden.

<sup>43</sup> Vgl. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Chance des Sonderfriedens. Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945*, Berlin 1986, S. 221 ff.

beenden und dadurch möglicherweise Hunderttausende von Menschenleben zu retten. Vergleichbare Projekte in deutschen Satellitenstaaten seien – wie Schwarz als Unterhändler zahlreicher Widerstandsbewegungen resümierend urteilte – bereits weit fortgeschritten; dies trage zusätzlich zur Verbesserung der Erfolgsaussichten des Herman-Plans bei.

Unterschiedliche Versionen des Schwarzschen Kommentars gelangten an Militärattaché General Tindall (Dok. 2) und an den Istanbul OSS-Chef Lanning Macfarland<sup>44</sup>. Er leitete das Schwarz-Dokument zusammen mit Moltkes Brief an Kirk (Dok. 1), dem Herman-Plan (Dok. 3) und einer eigenen Stellungnahme (Dok. 5) am 12. Januar 1944 an OSS-Direktor William J. Donovan weiter. Zu der von Schwarz vorgeschlagenen Konferenz auf höchster Ebene kam es allerdings nie. Donovan hielt es für unerlässlich, zunächst die Integrität der von „Herman“ repräsentierten Gruppe sowie die technische Durchführbarkeit des Plans zu überprüfen. Macfarland suchte unterdessen nach Ersatz für Alexander Kirk als Gesprächspartner Moltkes (Dok. 6). Er fand ihn in Hugh Wilson, dem ehemaligen amerikanischen Botschafter in Berlin<sup>45</sup>, der seit 1942 dem OSS angehörte. Als Mitarbeiter des Geheimdiensts war Wilsons Handlungsspielraum zum damaligen Zeitpunkt größer als der des Diplomaten Kirk. Daß die amerikanische Kontaktaufnahme mit einem deutschen Unterhändler unter den Bedingungen des Krieges äußerste Vorsicht verlangte, war allen Beteiligten bewußt. Dementsprechend versicherte Lanning Macfarland Donovan gegenüber, er habe weder die Befugnis noch das Bedürfnis, die politischen Implikationen des Herman-Plans zu diskutieren (Dok. 6). Im übrigen gingen die aus Istanbul nach Washington gelangten Kommentare zum Herman-Plan nicht auf das OSS, sondern auf dessen „foreign negotiators“, das heißt auf Schwarz, Coleman und Rüstow als informelle Mitarbeiter zurück (Dok. 7).

Daß auch Paul Leverkuehn, der Chef der Istanbul Dienststelle der Abwehr, mit der deutschen Oppositionsbewegung in Verbindung stand, erfuhr General Donovan Ende Februar 1944 von Macfarland. Obwohl Leverkuehn bereits einige Tage zuvor – unmittelbar nach dem Überlaufen von drei Istanbul Abwehr-Agenten zu den Engländern – in die deutsche Hauptstadt zurückberufen worden war<sup>46</sup>, hielt Macfarland

<sup>44</sup> Der im folgenden nicht abgedruckte, an Macfarland adressierte Bericht findet sich in: NA, RG 226, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68. Vgl. Anm. 86.

<sup>45</sup> Vgl. hierzu dessen Memoiren: Hugh Wilson, *Diplomat between the Wars*, New York 1941 sowie ders., *A Career Diplomat*, New York 1960. Zu Hugh Wilsons Arbeit im OSS vgl. R. Harris Smith, *OSS. The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1972, S. 204 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Vgl. zu den Hintergründen des Überlaufens deutscher Agenten (Vermehren, Hamburger, Kleczkowski) und zur Diskussion, wie auf die Affäre zu reagieren sei, Frohwein an Botschafter Ritter, 21. 2. 1944, in: AA, Akten Abwehr, R 101 882; Aufzeichnung Frohweins vom 20. 2. und Bericht von Papens vom 6. 7. 1944, in: ebenda, R 101 883. Vgl. außerdem die Memoiren Paul Leverkuehns, *Der geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehrmacht im Kriege*, Frankfurt a. M. 3 1960, S. 175; Luran Paine, *The Abwehr. German Military Intelligence in World War II*, London 1984, S. 16 f., 183 f. In seinen Erinnerungen erwähnt Leverkuehn die Episode nur beiläufig. Details der Affäre sowie die Namen der Beteiligten wurden erst Jahre nach der Veröffentlichung von Leverkuehns Memoiren bekannt. Vgl. hierzu Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, New York/Evanston/San Francisco u. a. 1975, S. 401, 455 f.

den Draht zu Leverkuehn auch weiterhin für wichtig. In Istanbuler OSS-Kreisen galt es als ausgemacht, daß Leverkuehns Bereitschaft zur Rückkehr nach Berlin die Gefahr einer Kompromittierung deutscher Oppositioneller heraufbeschwor (Dok. 8). Auch bei Donovan dürfte die Nachricht von Leverkuehns Zugehörigkeit zur Herman-Gruppe auf Interesse gestoßen sein. In ihrer Eigenschaft als Experten für internationales Recht hatten sich die Anwälte Paul Leverkuehn und William J. Donovan bereits nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in der für private Kriegsschadensansprüche zuständigen „Mixed Claims Commission“ in Washington, D. C. kennengelernt<sup>47</sup>. Unter völlig veränderten Bedingungen wurde Leverkuehn im Februar 1944 ein weiteres Treffen mit Donovan in Aussicht gestellt (Dok. 8), zu dem es jedoch nicht mehr kam.

Als sich der deutsche Emigrant Professor Karl Brandt von der Stanford University in Kalifornien<sup>48</sup> am 28. Februar 1944 geschäftlich in New York aufhielt<sup>49</sup>, übergab ihm Donovan, mit dem er seit einigen Jahren bekannt war<sup>50</sup>, den Herman-Plan<sup>51</sup>. Noch am gleichen Tag verfaßte er einen umfangreichen Kommentar, in dem er die Authentizität der Dokumente bestätigte und Empfehlungen für ein mögliches weiteres Vorgehen abgab (Dok. 9). Brandt bezeichnete die von „Herman“ repräsentierte Bewegung, deren Mitglieder er teilweise persönlich kannte<sup>52</sup>, ohne jedoch Namen preiszugeben, als die angesehenste Oppositionsgruppe innerhalb Deutschlands. Die Mentalität der Oppositionellen sei von der Idee einer Rettung der abendländischen Kultur auf der Grundlage christlicher Ethik geprägt. Nach dieser Interpretation trug die antirussische Stoßrichtung des Herman-Plans keine aggressive Spitze; Brandt sah sie vielmehr in Zusammenhang mit der kulturellen Westorientierung der Moltke-Gruppe. Seiner Ansicht nach gab es keine tragfähigen Alternativen zum Herman-Plan. Allenfalls sei die Durchführung separater Friedensverhandlungen mit Angehörigen des Generalstabs in Erwägung zu ziehen. Solche Verhandlungen verlangten jedoch eine Strategie aufeinanderfolgender Drohungen und Ultimaten sowie die Zusicherung einer einseitigen, anglo-amerikanischen Besetzung Deutschlands. Da man sich dabei zum einen auf die ausgesprochen uneinheitliche Gruppe deutscher Kommandeure als Verhandlungspartner einlasse und zum zweiten das Bündnis mit der Sowjetunion aufs Spiel setze, sei der Herman-Plan eine geniale Option und zugleich die allerletzte Möglichkeit, parallel zur

<sup>47</sup> Vgl. Höhne, Canaris, S. 461; Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence, London 1951, S. 181; Hoffmann, Widerstand, S. 282.

<sup>48</sup> Vgl. zu Brandt Anm. 122.

<sup>49</sup> Vgl. Hoffmann, Widerstand, S. 282, der allerdings kein Datum nennt.

<sup>50</sup> In einem Brief an Hamilton Fish Armstrong vom 18. 9. 1942 schreibt Donovan: „I had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Brandt last winter and was much impressed by him. I am told that he is probably the ablest expert of European food conditions in this country (. . .) [Brandts] memorandum on bombing attacks against Germany impresses me as penetrating and thoughtful.“ Vgl. PUA Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, box 10, folder Karl Brandt 1941–45.

<sup>51</sup> Daß es sich bei dem Brandt vorgelegten Dokument tatsächlich um den Herman-Plan gehandelt hat und nicht um ein auf Canaris und von Papen zurückgehendes Kapitulationsangebot, ist bisher nicht zweifelsfrei behauptet worden. Peter Hoffmann hatte dies bereits vermutet; ihm fehlte jedoch ein definitiver Beleg. Vgl. hierzu Hoffmann, Widerstand, S. 737.

<sup>52</sup> Vgl. zur Begegnung von Adam von Trott und Karl Brandt, Sykes, Adam von Trott, S. 259 ff.

Invasion im Westen die nationalsozialistische „Festung“ von innen her aufzuweichen. Sobald man sich entschieden habe, den Plan weiterzuverfolgen, seien Erkundigungen über Stärke und geographische Verteilung der Gruppe einzuziehen, Informationen über die zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen zu beschaffen, die Namen von Schlüsselpersonen in Erfahrung zu bringen sowie Vorkehrungen zur Verhinderung eines Zusammenbruchs der Ostfront zu treffen. Des weiteren gelte es, Strategien gegen das Eingreifen von SS und Gestapo zu entwickeln. Unter der Voraussetzung, daß die genannten Fragen zur Zufriedenheit der Stabschefs beantwortet werden könnten, solle man den Plan zur Durchführung bringen. Das müsse es nicht zur Beeinträchtigung militärischer Operationen führen; vielmehr könnten die alliierten Generäle ganz so handeln, als wären die Aktionen der Herman-Gruppe von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt; zugleich sollten sie aber jede sich bietende Möglichkeit einer konstruktiven Zusammenarbeit mit der Gruppe voll ausschöpfen (Dok. 9).

Unmittelbar nach der Begutachtung des Plans durch Brandt wurden die OSS-Mitarbeiter Whitney H. Shepardson und Hugh R. Wilson von Donovan gebeten, sowohl zum Herman-Plan als auch zum Brandt-Gutachten Stellung zu nehmen. Shepardson, der bis 1942 Chef der Secret Intelligence-Abteilung (SI) des OSS in London gewesen war und seither die entsprechende Position in Washington bekleidete, war zwar von der Urteilsfähigkeit und der antinationalsozialistischen Gesinnung Karl Brandts überzeugt, hatte jedoch Vorbehalte gegen Moltke. Ohne diesem begegnet zu sein, projizierte er offensichtlich Aversionen, die er gegen Adam von Trott hegte<sup>53</sup>, auf den Urheber des Herman-Plans, den er im übrigen fälschlich für einen langjährigen Mitarbeiter des Auswärtigen Amtes hielt. Im Gegensatz zu Shepardson, der seinen Kommentar auf biographische Beobachtungen beschränkte, zeigte sich Hugh R. Wilson von den Möglichkeiten des Herman-Plans tief beeindruckt. Er schlug Raymond Geist, den ehemaligen amerikanischen Generalkonsul in Berlin, und Colonel Truman Smith als amerikanische Kontaktleute zum deutschen Widerstand vor und befürwortete weitere Sondierungen des Plans (Dok. 11).

Nach der Begutachtung durch Wilson wurde das mittlerweile stark angewachsene Herman-Dossier an Irving H. Sherman weitergeleitet, einen New Yorker Bankier, der Kontakte zu einflußreichen deutschen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkreisen unterhielt und während des Krieges für das OSS-Büro in New York tätig war<sup>54</sup>. Sherman erhob gravierende Bedenken bezüglich der substantiellen Stärke der innerdeutschen Opposition: Eine Revolution könne nur dann erfolgreich sein, wenn die Unterstützung durch weite Kreise der Armee und der Partei gesichert sei. Die genannten Verbindungsleute auf englischer und amerikanischer Seite – Kirk, Smuts und Thompson – seien keine Garantie für das Gelingen des Plans, viel eher ein Indiz für den Dilettantismus des Projekts. Ganz im Gegensatz zu Karl Brandt, der der Überzeugung war, ein Eingehen auf den Herman-Plan brächte nur Vorteile, befürchtete Sherman, man könne alles verlieren, falls es sich

<sup>53</sup> In einer Diskussion mit dem Trott-Biographen Sykes hat Shepardson bestätigt, ihn habe eine „heftige Abneigung gegen Adam“ erfaßt; vgl. Sykes, Adam von Trott, S. 250, 409.

<sup>54</sup> Vgl. zu Sherman: Walter Lacqueur/Richard Breitman, *Breaking the Silence*, New York 1986, S. 207.

um ein fingiertes Angebot mit dem Ziel handle, einen Keil zwischen die Alliierten zu treiben. Wolle man den Plan weiterverfolgen, so müsse man deshalb die Sowjets unter allen Umständen ins Vertrauen ziehen (Dok. 13 b). Auch Harvard-Professor William Langer, der Leiter der Research & Analysis Branch (R&A) des OSS (Dok. 14), der in seiner Abteilung seit September 1943 Studien zum deutschen Widerstand hatte anfertigen lassen<sup>55</sup>, sowie der aus Deutschland emigrierte OSS-Mitarbeiter Felix Errera Oppenheim hielten es für ratsam, die Russen vom Herman-Plan in Kenntnis zu setzen. Oppenheim schlug vor, im Gegenzug Informationen über den „Bund deutscher Offiziere“ anzufordern (Dok. 15). Obwohl der Herman-Plan keinerlei konkrete Vorschläge über Verlauf und Formen eines alliierten Vormarsches beinhaltete, plädierte Oppenheim aus drei Gründen dafür, den Kontakt mit der Moltke-Gruppe aufrechtzuerhalten: Erstens könne man wertvolle Informationen gewinnen; zweitens schwäche man mit einer Unterstützung der Opposition das NS-Regime, und drittens liefere der Plan ein Konzept, das den alliierten Sieg beschleunigen und Menschenleben retten könne.

Zwar beabsichtigte OSS-Direktor William J. Donovan, die Istanbul Angelegenheit an die Joint Chiefs of Staff weiterzuleiten; zuvor bat er jedoch noch einen seiner Mitarbeiter, den Freund Helmuth von Moltkes und ehemaligen Korrespondenten der Chicago Daily News, Wallace R. Deuel, um eine kritische Stellungnahme zum Herman-Plan. Seit der Begutachtung durch Alfred Schwarz in Istanbul, der auf die sofortige Einberufung einer Konferenz führender Entscheidungsträger gedrängt hatte, waren annähernd drei Monate vergangen, in denen das OSS eine Fülle von Informationen über Moltke, die deutsche Opposition und ein mögliches Vorgehen in der Herman-Sache angesammelt hatte. Deuel steuerte dem Herman-Dossier ein weiteres Memorandum bei, das in zwei Teile gegliedert war. Im ersten hob er die Gefahr einer neuen Dolchstoßlegende hervor, warnte vor einem hegemonialen Sendungsbewusstsein der deutschen Opposition und gab zu bedenken, daß der Herman-Plan den Sowjets mit aller Wahrscheinlichkeit zu Ohren kommen werde, was verheerende Folgen haben könne. Im zweiten Teil betonte er, daß das Ehepaar Moltke zu den teuersten Freunden gehörte, die er und seine Frau je gehabt hätten. In einer – im folgenden nur partiell abgedruckten – Eloge ließ er keinen Zweifel an Moltkes antinationalsozialistischer Haltung sowie an dessen Intelligenz, Mut und moralischer Integrität (Dok. 15)<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> Vgl. Barry F. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence. Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942–1945*, Cambridge/London 1989, sowie die bislang unveröffentlichte Arbeit von Petra Marquardt-Bigman, *Die Deutschlandanalysen des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit (1941–1949). Eine Untersuchung zur Tätigkeit der Research and Analysis Branch des Office of Strategic Services und ihrer Nachfolgeorganisationen im State Department*, phil. Diss. Tübingen 1991.

<sup>56</sup> Ähnlich äußerte sich 1945 der mit Deuel befreundete George F. Kennan über Moltke: „I think there can have been no doubt about his sincerity and courage (. . .) A protestant by confession, he was deeply religious himself. The quality of his political views can be gauged from the fact that on the night when I came to see him I found him engaged in a study of the Federalist Papers, looking for possible guidance in working out a future political program for Germany.“ Kennan an Robert D. Murphy, 10. 5. 1945, in: PUA Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Kennan Papers, box 28.

Bis zum 2. April hatte William J. Donovan ein an die Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) adressiertes, alle OSS-Gutachten resümierendes Memorandum erarbeitet, in dem er empfahl, sowohl die Engländer als auch die Russen „aus Gründen der Fairness“ in den Plan einzuweißen; im Austausch wollte er „aus Gründen der Klugheit“ von den Russen in Erfahrung bringen, welche Vorschläge von der prorussischen deutschen Opposition bereits an die Sowjets herangetragen worden waren (Dok. 17b). Bevor Donovan das Gutachten abschickte, bat er Whitney Shepardson als geschäftsführenden Vorsitzenden der OSS Planning Group um eventuelle Verbesserungsvorschläge seiner Vorlage. Dabei drängte Donovan darauf, daß das Herman-Memorandum noch vor seiner unmittelbar anstehenden Auslandsreise an die Stabschefs weitergeleitet werde. Dazu sollte es jedoch nicht mehr kommen. Im Beisein Donovans beschloß die hochrangige Planning Group am 3. April 1944 unter Heranziehung des Istanbuler OSS-Chefs Macfarland, den Herman-Plan weder an die Joint Chiefs of Staff noch ans State Department weiterzuleiten. Das Herman-Dossier könne in seiner jetzigen Form unmöglich an die höchsten Militär- und Regierungsstellen weitergereicht werden, weil die einzelnen Gutachten zusätzlicher Erklärungen bedürften; auch müßten sämtliche Hinweise auf Alexander Kirk getilgt werden, da dieser nicht wünschte, mit Hermans Plänen in Verbindung gebracht zu werden. Ebenso wenig sollten die Sowjets in Kenntnis gesetzt werden. Macfarland wurde von der Planning Group instruiert, die Kontakte auf informeller Ebene fortzusetzen. Die Mitglieder der von „Herman“ repräsentierten Opposition sollten so weit wie möglich – als unterstützende Kräfte oder als Doppelagenten – in die Durchführung der alliierten Invasion miteinbezogen werden. Dabei dürfe auf persönliche Verbindungen, die Sicherheit der deutschen Oppositionellen und auf Aspekte der Nachkriegsplanung für Deutschland oder Europa keine Rücksicht genommen werden. Neben der vermutlich echten Sorge um Kirks Erwähnung dürfte das Argument zugleich als Vorwand gedient haben, den geheimdienstlichen Aufgabenbereich der Zusammenarbeit mit Widerstandsbewegungen für das OSS zu reservieren<sup>57</sup>. Ausschlaggebend war der Wunsch, den Widerstand für eine erfolgreiche Invasion zu instrumentalisieren. Interventionen von höheren politischen oder militärischen Stellen hätten die von Macfarland gedeckten, subversiven Aktionen Archibald Colemans und Alfred Schwarz' sowie deren Verbindung zu Rüstow und Wilbrandt mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit gefährdet. Donovan fügte sich diesem Votum der OSS-Planning Group, worauf die übrigen europäischen OSS-Außenstellen im gleichen Sinne instruiert wurden. Der Herman-Plan gelangte also nicht, wie verschiedentlich behauptet wurde, an Präsident Roosevelt<sup>58</sup>.

<sup>57</sup> Seit der Gründung im Jahr 1941 suchte man in der US-amerikanischen Geheimdienstzentrale nach Feldern selbständiger Betätigung. Vgl. hierzu die einschlägige Literatur über das OSS, insbesondere War Report of the OSS; Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors. O. S. S. and the Origins of the C. I. A.*, New York 1983; Smith, OSS.

<sup>58</sup> Vgl. Moltke/Balfour/Frisby, *Anwalt der Zukunft*, S. 268. Bei Peter Hoffmann findet sich der auf einer Mitteilung Karl Brandts beruhende Hinweis, die OSS-Mitarbeiterin Emmy Rado habe das Brandtsche Gutachten unmittelbar nach der Niederschrift „noch in der Nacht (...) unter scharfer Bewachung nach Washington gebracht (...), aber Präsident Roosevelt habe es glatt abgelehnt, mit, diesen

*Verschwörung des Schweigens nach 1945*

Jahrzehntelang lag ein Bann des Schweigens über den geheimen Istanbuler Treffen zwischen Alexander Rüstow, Hans Wilbrandt und Helmuth James von Moltke im Jahr 1943. Paul Leverkuehns Memoiren erwähnen Moltke mit keinem Wort<sup>59</sup>, und Karl Brandt dementierte, wann immer er gefragt wurde, das eigentliche Istanbuler Memorandum je eingesehen zu haben. Einmal behauptete er, ihm habe nur eine knappe Denkschrift vorgelegen, die „keinerlei Bedingungen“ enthielt<sup>60</sup>. Ein andermal wollte er ein unsigniertes Memorandum auf deutschem Botschaftspapier zu Gesicht bekommen haben<sup>61</sup>. Ein drittes Mal war die Rede von einem Dokument, das die Unterschrift Paul Leverkuehns trug<sup>62</sup>. Auch Wilbrandt und Rüstow brachten ihre Erinnerungen an die Istanbuler Moltke-Episode nie zu Papier, obgleich Wilbrandt seinen politischen Standort nach 1945 explizit in Hinblick auf die von Moltke und den „Kreisauern“ vorgegebene politische Tradition definierte<sup>63</sup>. Eine Verschwörung des Schweigens? Aus dem im Bundesarchiv Koblenz einsehbaren, umfangreichen Briefwechsel Alexander Rüstows läßt sich entnehmen, daß dieser bereits im April 1946 die Absicht hatte, „baldmöglichst an die Niederschrift derjenigen Dinge“ zu gehen, die in Istanbul über ihn und Wilbrandt „gelaufen sind“. Er regte an, „die Veröffentlichungen über die Deutsche Widerstandsbewegung nach Möglichkeit zu organisieren“ und „die Publikation der wesentlichsten Materialien in einer möglichst einwandfreien und eindrucksvollen Form nach Kräften zu beschleunigen“. Brieflich hatte Rüstow schon mehrfach seine Auffassung vom Widerstand dargelegt und deutlich

ostdeutschen Junkern' zu verhandeln“; vgl. Hoffmann, *Widerstand*, S. 283. In Wirklichkeit informierte Donovan Roosevelt erst am 29. 7. 1944 über den Istanbuler Herman-Kontakt. Vgl. Memorandum for the President, 29. 7. 1944, in: FDRL Hyde Park, N. Y., PSF, box 168, folder OSS July 15–29, 1944.

- <sup>59</sup> Vgl. Leverkuehn, *Der geheime Nachrichtendienst*. Auch in Leverkuehns unveröffentlichtem Typoskript „Orient 1940–1944“, abgefaßt im Oktober 1945, findet sich lediglich ein kurzer Hinweis auf den Besuch Adam von Trotts, den er irrtümlich auf Juli 1943 datiert, vgl. BA Koblenz, NL Leverkuehn, Bd. 13 Orient 1940–1944, S. 49 f.
- <sup>60</sup> Brief Brandt an Rüstow, 10. 5. 1949, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 31/285. Rüstow hatte Brandt einige Wochen zuvor offensichtlich eine Version des Herman-Plans zugeschickt, worauf Brandt antwortete: „Die Denkschrift ist nicht diejenige, die mir vorlag. Was ich hatte war knapper, enthielt keinerlei Bedingungen, offerierte sehr klar und nüchtern was geleistet werden koennte. Es waren keine Namen genannt. Es war auch keinerlei ideologische Begründung gegeben.“ In: Ebenda.
- <sup>61</sup> Brandt an Rüstow, 8. 12. 1949, in: ebenda, S. 279 f.
- <sup>62</sup> Vgl. Hoffmann, *Widerstand*, S. 282, 737. Hoffmann bezieht sich auf Karl Brandt, Gedenkrede zum Gedächtnis der Toten des 20. Juli 1944, gehalten anlässlich der Feier am 20. Juli 1965 . . . zu Berlin, mimeogr., Frankfurt a. M. 1965, S. 9.
- <sup>63</sup> In einem Brief an Ernst Reuter heißt es: „Ich glaube, dass meine Grundlagen sowohl ins sozialistische, wie auch ins christliche Lager fuehren koennten. Eine Arbeitsgemeinschaft von Leuten dieser Richtung aus beiden Lagern war der Kreisauer Kreis, in dem mit Helmuth von Moltke (!) und Gerstenmaier u. a. auch Reichwein, Mierendorff und Haubach arbeiteten.“ Wilbrandt an Reuter, 18. 8. 1949, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 53/10.

Stellung bezogen – so etwa gegen den „vornehm-müde[n] Aristokrat[en]“ von Hassell und gegen den „verstiegenen“ Stauffenberg, der einen schon in der Anlage verfehlten Staatsstreich gewollt und in seinem „georgianischen Göttlichkeitswahn alles verdorben“ habe<sup>64</sup>. Im April 1946 bat er nunmehr den Rechtsanwalt Dr. Eduard Waetjen, der während des Krieges als Abwehr-Mitarbeiter in Zürich Verbindung zwischen der innerdeutschen Opposition und den westlichen Geheimdiensten gehalten hatte<sup>65</sup>, um „möglichst viel authentisches (sic) über Helmuth Moltke“<sup>66</sup>. Waetjen reagierte gedämpft auf Rüstows Anfrage. Zwar wollte er gerne Rüstows Wunsch erfüllen, „Material über Helmuth zu bekommen“<sup>67</sup>; von Veröffentlichungen zum Widerstand riet er jedoch vorerst ab. Damit solle man erst herauskommen, „wenn die künstlich angefachte Stimmung des Hasses in der Weltpresse mehr und mehr zum Verstummen gelangt“<sup>68</sup>. Rüstow gab den Plan zur Veröffentlichung der Istanbuler Herman-Episode nicht auf. Längst hatten er und Wilbrandt in Erfahrung gebracht, daß ihr alter Bekannter Karl Brandt während des Krieges von amerikanischer Seite mit der Istanbuler Angelegenheit betraut worden war. Möglicherweise hatte Brandt in diesem Zusammenhang die Behauptung aufgestellt, Präsident Roosevelt habe den Herman-Plan zu Gesicht bekommen und seinem Berater, dem Richter am Supreme Court Felix Frankfurter vorgelegt; daraufhin habe er Verhandlungen rundweg abgelehnt<sup>69</sup>. Jedenfalls wandte sich Rüstow im April und nochmals, dringlicher, im November 1949 an Brandt in Stanford, er möge zu den Ereignissen Anfang 1944 und zur Rolle Felix Frankfurters Stellung beziehen<sup>70</sup>. Hierauf erreichte ein in schärfster Form abgefaßter Brief Karl Brandts den noch immer in der Türkei ansässigen Rüstow. In diesem Schreiben, das vor dem politischen Hintergrund der McCarthy-Atmosphäre zu lesen ist, betonte Brandt, er werde unter keinen Umständen die Veröffentlichung seines Namens in Zusammenhang mit der Istanbuler Angelegenheit akzeptieren. Daß Felix Frankfurter als Präsidentenberater den Herman-Plan eingesehen habe, bezeichnete er als Gerücht, und alle weitergehenden Spekulationen zur amerikanischen Re-

<sup>64</sup> Alexander von Rüstow an Gerhard [Prof. Dr. Gerhard Colm, Council of Economic Advisers to the President] vom 9. 9. 1947. Über Gisevius heißt es im gleichen Brief, er gehörte „ursprünglich zu jenem frechen deutschnationalen Assessorentyp, den wir beide kennen“, habe sich aber „entwickelt“. In: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 32/141.

<sup>65</sup> Waetjen (im OSS-Code „Gorter“ oder „670“) fungierte als Kontaktmann der Abwehr und der Beck-Goerdeler-Gruppe zu Dulles in Bern. Außerdem arbeitete er mit den britischen Geheimdiensten in der Schweiz zusammen. Im September 1943 hielt er sich in Istanbul auf. OSS-Washington an Dulles 31. 3. 1944, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 134, box 341, folder 1824, und Dulles an OSS-Washington, 7. 4. 1944, in: ebenda, Entry 138, box 2.

<sup>66</sup> Brief von Rüstow an Waetjen vom 27. 4. 1946, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 52/7.

<sup>67</sup> Waetjen hob hervor, bei seiner Reise durch Deutschland habe er „leider die Gräfin Freya Moltke verfehlt“. Brief von Waetjen an Rüstow vom 24. 5. 1946, in: ebenda 52/5.

<sup>68</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>69</sup> Vgl. Anm. 60.

<sup>70</sup> Brief Rüstow an Brandt vom 28. 11. 1949, Rüstow an Brandt 21. 4. 1949 (nicht bei den Akten), Brandt an Rüstow 10. 5. 1949, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 31/278 ff.

aktion seien „im wahrsten Wortsinn tödlich“<sup>71</sup>. Eine solche Antwort, wie immer man sie zu interpretieren hat, dürfte auf Alexander Rüstows und Hans Wilbrandts Impetus zur Veröffentlichung des Herman-Plans lähmend gewirkt haben. Sie wußten zwar um Moltkes Versuche, mit den Alliierten in Kontakt zu treten, konnten aber über die Reaktion auf amerikanischer Seite nichts in Erfahrung bringen. Für Wilbrandt und Rüstow stellte das Istanbul-Treffen eine Geschichte dar, an der sie selbst teilhatten, deren Anfang und Ausgang sie jedoch nicht kannten.

Erst mit der Freigabe der OSS-Dokumente wurde zweifelsfrei deutlich, daß Karl Brandt sein Gutachten zum Herman-Plan im Auftrag des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes verfaßt hatte. Hätten Wilbrandt und Rüstow ihre Nachforschungen über Felix Frankfurters Beteiligung an der Herman-Episode weiter vorangetrieben, wäre dies vermutlich ans Licht gekommen.

Die im folgenden abgedruckten Dokumente machen deutlich, daß dem amerikanischen Geheimdienst um die Jahreswende 1943/44 ein beträchtliches Wissen über den antinationalsozialistischen Widerstand zur Verfügung stand. Die Istanbul Mission scheiterte nicht aufgrund amerikanischer Zweifel an der moralischen Integrität Moltkes. Im Gegenteil, wie zuvor schon auf englischer<sup>72</sup>, so wurde auch auf amerikanischer Seite betont, man müsse Moltke für den Wiederaufbau Deutschlands in der Nachkriegszeit retten; als man ein Jahr nach den Vorgängen in Istanbul, im Januar 1945, im OSS vom Todesurteil gegen Moltke erfuhr, gab es sogar konkrete Pläne und Bemühungen, Helmuth James von Moltke zu retten<sup>73</sup>. Lediglich die mangelnden politischen sowie technischen Konkretionen des Herman-Plans und die antirussische Ausrichtung

<sup>71</sup> Wörtlich heißt es „You will understand that this thing stirs right into the area where no quarter is given and where it is deadly in the truest sense of the word to speculate without having proof that is incorruptible“. Insbesondere wünschte Brandt „confidentially, particularly not any reference to Mr. F. F. [Felix Frankfurter], for the simple reason that this (. . .) is rumor and may be no more than gossip“. Brandt an Rüstow, 8. 12. 1949, in: ebenda, S. 279 f.

<sup>72</sup> In einer fünfseitigen „Note on Count Moltke“ schrieb Lionel Curtis am 26. 6. 1943 an Beckett: „My fear has always been that if the Russian Armies entered Germany via Silesia, upon reaching the von Moltke estates they might liquidate the whole family [. . .], so I suggested to Colonel Butler that any British Liaison officer with invading Russian forces should do his task to lay his hands on von Moltke and have him handed over as a prisoner to the British. [. . .] When we gain footing in Europe, instructions should be given to commanding officers to look out for Count Helmuth von Moltke, and send him over here as a prisoner of war, if possible with his wife and children.“ In: BLA Oxford, Lionel Curtis Papers, MS 99/14–18.

<sup>73</sup> Telegramm OSS-Bern an OSS-Washington 18./19. 1. 1945. Darin heißt es: „Helmuth Moltke condemned to death. View important role he played in Breakers circles [Codename für Widerstandsgruppe des 20. Juli], this will be serious loss. 476 [Code-Nummer für Allen Dulles' Mitarbeiter Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz] suggesting to Zulu [Codewort für den britischen Geheimdienst Special Operations Executive SOE] possibility considering some delaying action view fact Moltke's mother British or South African. While hope rather tenuous, our experience here that if some stir is created, Germans at this stage may consider person more valuable alive than dead.“ In: NA, RG 226, Entry 99, box 14, folder 58 a. Am 20. 1. verfaßte OSS Acting Director Charles S. Cheston ein „Memorandum for the Secretary of State“, in dem er die Möglichkeiten zur Rettung Moltkes zusammenfaßte, in: ebenda.

waren im Frühjahr 1944 Auslöser von Ressentiments. Indem die Planning Group – die neben dem Direktorat höchste Instanz des OSS – die Weitergabe des Herman-Plans an die Joint Chiefs of Staff zu verhindern wußte, behielt sich das OSS vor, die existierenden Kontakte zu deutschen Widerstandsgruppen in eigener Regie und im Sinne subversiver Kriegführung fortzusetzen. So konnten die Verbindungen zum deutschen Widerstand aufrechterhalten werden, ohne daß die USA *offiziell* gegen die Teheraner Abmachung verstießen. Wenn die Opposition Hitler beseitigt hätte, wäre das OSS allerdings – und damit die US-Regierung – sofort mit den neuen Autoritäten in Verbindung gewesen.

*Dokument 1*<sup>74</sup>

[Mitte Dezember] 1943: Brief Helmut James Graf von Moltke, Istanbul, an Alexander C. Kirk, Kairo

Top Secret  
Istanbul 1943

Dear Mr. Kirk,

May I in this way send you my best greetings and wishes and my most sincere compliments. Perhaps it would be best to explain first why I have stated quite definitely that I would be unable to see anybody before having seen you. You will realize that any discussion on the ways and means to end this war and to begin peace requires an enormous amount of confidence on the part of both participants: on your side because the credentials I could produce would necessarily be incomplete as they can only receive their value from and through action; on my side for reasons of security as well as of policy. – From my point of view any partner to such discussions must be able to visualize what life in my country is like, and he must have the discretion required to use anything I might say in a manner which will not be harmful to myself and to fundamental, permanent interests of peace. Therefore I must be sure of talking to somebody whose personal loyalty is beyond doubt and whose political judgement is up to the complex and tangled situation prevailing in my country and in several other countries of continental Europe. Obviously such qualifications demand at least personal acquaintance between those who are responsible for the conduct of the discussion, and personally I do not know of any American in this part of the world who would fulfil these qualifications but for you. I trust that you will understand this position and that you will excuse any inconvenience to which you may have been put in consequence.

Any discussion would have to start with an appreciation of the military and political situation. I am under the impression that all exhortations by the President and Mr. Churchill to the contrary notwithstanding, some people expect an early termination of the war in Europe. I would be interested to get your opinion on this point, which is fundamental to the possibilities of cooperation: if a speedy end were in sight cooperation would become much easier technically and much more difficult politically.

<sup>74</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 307f. Eine Fotokopie des Briefes findet sich im Moltke-Nachlaß, abgedruckt bei van Roon, Neuordnung, S.591 ff. Das Dokument ist unsigniert. Nach Angaben von Macfarland gegenüber der OSS Planning Group war das Original von Moltke signiert. Siehe Dok. 18.

On the other hand I might be able to give you an account of the German political scene. You who know Central Europe and totalitarian states in general would thereby be enabled to gauge the value of my credentials, although nobody can be exact on this point ante eventum. Such a report would furthermore show you the possibilities and limits of any military or political assistance we can render to our common cause. I am afraid that to somebody who has never lived in a totalitarian country the limits of such assistance are not understandable, while he will have great difficulties in even recognizing its chances.

The political post-armistice world would have to be touched as far at least as it constitutes part of the diagnosis of the present situation. You will understand that the example of Italy has had the most damping effect on all thought of internal change and it would have to be made clear by what means a repetition will be prevented.

Once these questions of the diagnosis of the present situation have been disposed of, the main point of cooperation arises. This must be followed into its military and political possibilities. You will realize that some unity of purpose on the political side is a condition of effective military cooperation. As to the military cooperation, I am of the opinion that for military as well as political reasons only such cooperation is feasible as will turn the tables with one stroke. This will require the patience to wait and wait and wait until effective military power on a very considerable scale can be employed, such in fact, as will undoubtedly prove overwhelming once our assistance is added.

As I see it that would be the ground to be covered and I suppose that we would agree fairly quickly. The remainder is not a question of policy but of technique and is therefore beyond my competence. But we would have to agree on ways and means to contact the technicians on both sides.

The place for any discussions can be arranged by you.

I can leave Istanbul next time I come for 48 hours. I am completely in your hands as to this point, relying on you to see that the arrangements made will keep the risk down. – As to the time: I believe that, if I hurry up with my work at home, I will be able to come here at the earliest by the middle of February, at the latest middle of April.

Please accept my best wishes for Xmas and the New Year.

#### *Dokument 2<sup>75</sup>*

29. Dezember 1943: Brief [Alfred Schwarz]<sup>76</sup>, Istanbul, an General R. G. Tindall, Ankara

<sup>75</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 314–319.

<sup>76</sup> Autorschaft erschlossen. Aus Macfarlands Schreiben vom 12. 1. 1944 (Dok. 5) geht hervor, daß es sich um einen „OSS-negotiator“ handelt. Im Auftrag des Istanbul OSS-Chefs Macfarland arbeitete Alfred Schwarz (OSS Codename „Dogwood“) unter Archibald Coleman (OSS Codename „Cereus“) für eine ins Konsulat eingegliederte Geheimagentur. Vgl. Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues, S. 167. Alfred Schwarz hatte sich seit 1933 dafür eingesetzt, daß die deutschen Emigranten nicht ausgewiesen und an Deutschland ausgeliefert wurden. Aufgrund seiner ausgezeichneten Verbindungen konnte dies, von einem einzigen Fall abgesehen, verhindert werden. Brief Alexander Rüstows an Denenberg vom 12. 9. 1944, in: BA Koblenz, NL Rüstow 32/338. Über die Rolle von Schwarz bei der Übermittlung des Herman-Plans schrieb Alexander Rüstow in einem Brief an I. A. Hirschmann vom 25. 9. 1944, er habe mit Schwarz zusammengearbeitet. Dieser trage „an dem tragischen Scheitern jener Verhandlungen (. . .) keinerlei Schuld. Er tat im Gegenteil mit Leidenschaft sein äußerstes,

Top Secret

Sir,

This is to introduce the enclosed memorandum, which has been prepared by Herman's friends<sup>77</sup> who conducted the negotiations between Herman and myself during his recent stay<sup>78</sup>, and who know intimately, and share, his plans and political aims. In this memorandum they wish to give a concise statement of the background, motives, and potential value to the Allies, as well as to democratic post-war Germany and the rest of the World, of the influential group of which Herman is the authorized emissary. It has been prepared in the light of the recent conversations held indirectly between Herman and myself, and between yourself and Herman, and may serve as an explanatory comment to Herman's letter to Kirk<sup>79</sup>, which is also appended, and which is not fully intelligible without such a brief on the facts.

I think it may be useful at this point to sketch briefly the manner in which contact was sought and established, and the reservations on the German side which prompted them to proceed as they did. Herman has been sent abroad as the emissary of a number of German anti-Nazi staff officers and high officials (associated loosely with other liberal elements and exponents of Labour), who are determined to work together for the defeat of the Nazi regime as the only way to save Germany from complete annihilation. They are daily risking their lives and the lives of their families in the effort to widen and consolidate their organization, which in view of the key positions held by most of their members in the GS [General Staff], the Army and Civil administration commands tremendous executive power when acting by a preconcerted plan. Herman has been chosen for the mission of contacting the Anglo-Saxon Allies because of his excellent personal relations to high-placed Allied politicians and prominent press people, who know and are able to appreciate his background associations, save him elaborate credentials, and in whose absolute discretion he can have confidence. Among his trusted friends are Alexander Kirk, Field Marshall Smuts<sup>80</sup>, and Dorothy Thompson<sup>81</sup>. His extreme caution is easily understood if it is realized that during

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es gelang ihm aber trotzdem nicht, die maßgebenden amerikanischen Stellen dazu zu bringen, die Sache trotz der schweren Verhandlungsfehler der Gegenseite mit derjenigen Energie zu betreiben, die ihre ungeheure Wichtigkeit erfordert hätte“; in: ebenda, 32/184 f.

<sup>77</sup> Alexander Rüstow und Hans Wilbrandt.

<sup>78</sup> Moltke hielt sich vom 11.–16. 12. 1943 in Istanbul auf.

<sup>79</sup> Dok. 1.

<sup>80</sup> Vgl. Anm. 32.

<sup>81</sup> Zur Bekanntschaft Dorothy Thompsons mit Helmuth von Moltke, vgl. Anm. 30. Vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg arbeitete Dorothy Thompson nacheinander als Berichterstatterin in Wien, Berlin – von dort wurde sie 1934 ausgewiesen –, Moskau, Budapest und London. In ihren vom Columbia Broadcasting System 1942 nach Europa ausgestrahlten Radioansprachen „Listen, Hans“ (als Buch: Boston 1942) hob Dorothy Thompson den brutalen Charakter des Nazi-Regimes und die Notwendigkeit einer totalen Niederlage der Deutschen hervor. Zugleich ermutigte sie die oppositionellen Kreise in Deutschland zum offenen Widerstand und zur Revolution. Mit dem vermeintlich fiktiven Adressaten „Hans“ in Berlin meinte Thompson Helmuth James von Moltke, was sie unter anderem in einem Brief vom 23. 12. 1953 an Mother Mary Alice Gallin OSU bestätigte: „The earlier broadcasts, especially, made before the OWI [Office of War Information] laid down ‚directives‘, were peculiarly directed to this one person, in anticipation that they would appeal to many others of similar mind“. (Die Bearbeiter danken Mother Mary Alice Gallin, daß sie ihnen Einsicht in ihre Korrespondenz zum deutschen Widerstand gewährte). Zu Moltkes Begegnungen mit Dorothy

previous overtures through official Allied channels several flagrant breaches of security occurred which jeopardized the entire organization and caused the execution of an important member for high treason<sup>82</sup>. I know the details of these occurrences, and fully appreciate the refusal of the Group to deal with anyone but persons of tried discretion, who are known to them or recommended by their trusted friends. The Group is fully aware that their trusted Allied contacts are not necessarily in a position to make decisions or discuss terms; but they are confident that they will be able not only to put them through to the authorities who are competent to handle their momentous proposals, but also to impress forcibly upon these authorities the fact that several hundred of the most valuable war and peace allies of the Anglo-Saxon powers left in key positions in Germany have their heads in the noose along with their families, and that a happy-go-lucky attitude in dealing with the matter is inappropriate.

As it turned out, it unfortunately proved impossible to secure for Herman safe passage to Cairo within the time at his disposal, let alone arrange for a meeting here with responsible Allied personages introduced by Alexander Kirk or another of Herman's trusted acquaintances. I myself could from the nature of my position, and in the absence of specific powers or credentials, not be an officially acceptable Allied negotiator; but at least I succeeded in conducting informal indirect discussions with him through our common friends, dissuading him from breaking off all contact and inducing him to agree to a meeting with you (as a personage of official standing and personal competence and integrity) which would serve to legitimize the contact.

I now wish to state my own personal attitude in this vitally important matter. At this time, when plans for the decisive attack against Germany are probably near completion, there is no time to be lost in fully informing President Roosevelt, General Marshall<sup>83</sup>, and General Donovan, Chief of the IS<sup>84</sup>, avoiding the delay entailed in normal official procedure. Written reports are quite inadequate to the occasion. A conference should be arranged with at least one of these personages during which the full extent and moment of the proposed scheme may be fully reported upon, and all arrangements for a decisive meeting with the German plenipotentiaries not later than January 1944 may be made. I cannot state emphatically enough my conviction that absolutely no effort should be spared to bring the scheme to

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Thompson und zu den Deutschlandreportagen vgl. Peter Kurth, *American Cassandra. The Life of Dorothy Thompson*, Boston/Toronto/London 1990, S. 90, 106, 360f., 522f.; außerdem Vincent Sheean, *Dorothy & Red*, London 1964.

<sup>82</sup> Möglicherweise handelt es sich um Josef (Beppo) Römer, der im Februar 1942 zusammen mit zahlreichen seiner Kontaktleute, u. a. Nikolaus Christoph von Halem, verhaftet und im September hingerichtet worden war. Vgl. Hoffmann, *Widerstand*, S. 317 f. Für die Hinrichtung von deutschen Oppositionellen wegen Hochverrats gab es noch mehr Beispiele, über die nicht nur das OSS in Bern und Washington, sondern auch Schwarz bestens informiert waren. Neben den Mitgliedern der „Weißen Rose“ sind unter anderem Schulze-Boysen und Harnack sowie Rudolf von Scheliha zu nennen. Allen Dulles an OSS-Washington, 23. und 30. 4. 1943, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 134, box 307f. In einem Schreiben an Macfarland vom 30. 12. 1943 spricht Schwarz nicht von einer einzelnen Hinrichtung, sondern von der Exekution mehrerer „key men of the organization“, in: ebenda, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68. Vgl. hierzu Anm. 86.

<sup>83</sup> General George C. Marshall (1880–1959) war Chef der amerikanischen Joint Chiefs of Staff. Im Januar 1947 wurde er Secretary of State, im Juni des gleichen Jahres setzte er sich für ein European Recovery Programm, den sogenannten „Marshall Plan“ ein.

<sup>84</sup> Gemeint ist der amerikanische Intelligence Service (IS) „Office of Strategic Services“.

fruition in the shortest possible time. No limited intelligence effort and no scheme of partial assistance by German staff members can offer even a remotely comparable chance of ending the War in the West at one stroke, and save perhaps many hundred thousand lives. I believe that no one who is informed of this unique chance, which we have been hard at work to help to materialize, can shoulder the responsibility for not having done all in his power to forward this knowledge with all possible caution and despatch to the supreme authorities in charge of the conduct of the War. Far-reaching parallel schemes involving the cooperation of Germany's present Allies are far advanced<sup>85</sup> and may be combined with the present project to heighten its prospects of success.

I am preparing an account of the scheme in a covering report<sup>86</sup> on the enclosed memorandum<sup>87</sup> and on Herman's letter to Alexander Kirk<sup>88</sup>, but we are not decided where best to direct this report. I am probably correct in assuming that you, Sir, will be reporting on the matter on your own account, enclosing the same documents. Since the matter brooks no delay or confusion of competences, I hope you will agree with me that the official steps we take in this matter had best be coordinated. To this end, I should greatly welcome an opportunity to meet you personally, or failing this, to have your written advice on how to proceed.

I am, Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

#### Dokument 3<sup>89</sup>

[Zweite Dezemberhälfte 1943<sup>90</sup>]: Herman Plan. Exposé on the readiness of a powerful German group to prepare and assist Allied Military Operations against Nazi Germany

<sup>85</sup> Zum „Cereus“-Ring vgl. Anm. 11.

<sup>86</sup> „Report of an Offer of Collaboration with the Allies made by an Oppositional Group of the German High Command and Civil Service“ o. D.; interne Evidenz legt den 29. 12. 1943 als Abfassungsdatum nahe. Eine vermutlich auf Macfarland zurückgehende Eingangsdattierung auf den 30. 12. findet sich in der Version des Donovan-Microfilms in: NA, RG 226, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68. Der Report wurde hier nicht abgedruckt, da er im wesentlichen mit Dok. 2 identisch ist. Anders als im Bericht an Tindall benutzt Schwarz freilich im Schreiben an Macfarland die OSS-Codennamen „Magnolia“ und „Hyacinth“ für Rüstow und Wilbrandt; außerdem nimmt er Bezug auf deren Zugehörigkeit zum German Freedom Movement.

<sup>87</sup> Dok. 3.

<sup>88</sup> Dok. 1.

<sup>89</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68. Im Gegensatz zu der hier abgedruckten Version handelt es sich bei der Sekundärüberlieferung aus den Headquarters Records (ebenda, Entry 190, M 1642, frames 377–386) um eine Abschrift. Dort wurden Rechtschreibfehler behutsam verbessert und einige Eigenheiten der Vorlage (z. B. „exposé“ statt „expose“, „OKW“ statt „O. K. W.“) nicht übernommen. Eine deutsche Übersetzung dieser Zweitüberlieferung findet sich bei van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 582–586 und, nochmals abgedruckt, bei Moltke/Balfour/Frisby, *Anwalt der Zukunft*, S. 264–268.

<sup>90</sup> Datum erschlossen. Der Plan wurde nach Moltkes Abreise am 16. 12. 1943 abgefaßt und am 29. 12. 1943 bereits von Alfred Schwarz kommentiert (Dok. 2).

## TOP SECRET

## EXPOSE

ON THE READINESS OF A POWERFUL GERMAN GROUP TO PREPARE  
AND ASSIST ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NAZI GERMANY

NOTE: This exposé defines the attitude and plans of an extremely influential group of the German opposition inside Germany on the subject of hastening the victory of the Allies and the abolition of Nazism. It has been prepared on the basis of frequent and searching conversations and discussions with a leading representative of this group about the political future of a free democratic Germany cleansed radically of Nazism, and about the maximum contribution that can be made immediately by determined German patriots toward making this Germany a secure reality.

The exposé is to reproduce clearly and concisely the views and intentions of this group of responsible democratic Germans within Germany.

BACKGROUND AND STANDING OF THE GERMAN OPPOSITIONAL  
GROUP

Apart from the Nazi Party hierarchy and its subordinate organs and functionaries, there are left in Germany two elements vested with political power: the officers corps of the Wehrmacht, and the upper ranks of the Civil Service, which, in their ministerial grades at least, represent a fairly closely-knit network of officials interconnected by personal acquaintance, official association, often long-standing friendship. Within the overlapping spheres of high officialdom and professional army circles, three categories of people can be distinguished:

- 1) Politically non-descript specialists who are absorbed altogether in their service duties, being either too vague or too cautious to express their views or engage in political activity. They constitute the majority, especially among the professional officers.
- 2) Confirmed National Socialists.
- 3) Decided and conscious opponents of Nazism.

The third category is again divided in two wings, of which one favours an „Eastern“ pro-Russian orientation, the other a „Western“, pro-Anglo-Saxon trend. The former is considerably stronger than the latter, particularly in the Wehrmacht; in Luftwaffe circles it rules supreme. The driving force behind the Eastern wing is the strong and traditional conviction of a community of interests between the two mutually complementary powers, Germany und Russia, which led to the historical cooperation between Prussia and the Russian monarchy, and between the German republic and Soviet Russia in the Rapallo period (1924)<sup>91</sup>, when the Reichswehr and the Red Army concluded a farreaching understanding regarding military collaboration and reciprocal training facilities. Historical bonds of this character are reinforced by the deep impression wrought by the power and resilience of the Red Army and the competence of its command. Among the Eastern wing the foundation of the German Officer's League at Moscow<sup>92</sup> has evoked a powerful echo, the more so, as the leaders

<sup>91</sup> In der deutschen Version findet sich die korrekte Jahreszahl 1922; vgl. Moltke/Balfour/Frisby, *Anwalt der Zukunft*, S. 265.

<sup>92</sup> Der Bund deutscher Offiziere (BDO) wurde am 21./22. 9. 1943 gegründet; bereits am 12./13. 7. 1943 hatten deutsche kommunistische Emigranten und Kriegsgefangene unter sowjetischer Schirmherrschaft in Krasnogorsk bei Moskau das Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD) gegründet.

of the league are recognized in the Wehrmacht as officers of outstanding ability and personal integrity (by the standards of their caste.) This group has for a long time been in direct communication, including regular wireless contact, with the Soviet Government, until a breach of security on the Russian side led to the arrest and execution of many highplaced officers and civil servants early in 1943<sup>93</sup>.

The Western group of the opposition, though numerically weaker, is represented by many key men in the military and civil service hierarchies, including officers of all ranks, and key members of the OKW. Furthermore it is in close touch with the Catholic bishops, the Protestant Confessional Church, leading circles of the former labour unions and workmen's organizations, as well as influential men of industry and intellectuals. It is this group which is seeking to establish a practical basis for effectual collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon Allies.

### CONDITIONS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ALLIES

The following are the future material factors and present political arguments which form the logical prerequisites of a successful collaboration between this Western Group of the German democratic opposition and the Allies.

1) Unequivocal military defeat and occupation of Germany is regarded by the members of the group as a moral and political necessity for the future of the nation.

2) The Group is convinced of the justification of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, and realizes the untimeliness of any discussion of peace terms before this surrender has been accomplished. Their Anglo-Saxon sympathies result from a conviction of the fundamental unity of aims regarding the future organization of human relations which exists between them and the responsible statesmen on the Allied side, and the realization that in view of the natural convergence of interests between post-Nazi Germany and the other democratic nations there must of necessity result a fruitful collaboration between them. The democratic Germans see in this unity of purpose a far safer guarantee of a status of equality and dignity after the War than any formal assurances by the Allies at the present time could give them, provided any such assurances were forthcoming.

3) An important condition for the success of the plan outlined in the following points is the continuance of an unbroken Eastern front, and simultaneously its approach to within a menacing proximity of the German borders, such as the line from TILSIT to LEMBERG. Such a situation would justify before the national consciousness radical decisions in the West as the only means of forestalling the over-powering threat from the East.

4) The Group is ready to realize a planned military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale, provided that exploitation of the military information, resources, and authority at the Group's disposal is combined with an all-out military effort by the Allies in such a manner as to make prompt and decisive success on a broad front a practical certainty. This victory over Hitler, followed by Allied occupation of all Germany in the shortest possible time, would at one stroke so transform the political situation as to set free the real voice of Germany, which would acclaim the action of the Group as a bold act of true patriotism, comparable to the Tauroggen Convention concluded by the Prussian General Yorck with the Russians 1812.

5) Should, however, the invasion of Western Europe be embarked upon the same style as the attack upon the Italian mainland, any assistance by the Group would not only fail to

<sup>93</sup> Vgl. Anm. 82.

settle the issue of the War, but would in addition help to create a new „stab-in-the-back“ legend, as well as compromise before the nation, and render ineffectual for the future, the patriots who made the attempt. There is no doubt that half-measures would damage the cause rather than promote it, and the Group is not prepared to lend a hand in any collaboration with limited aims.

6) If it is decided to create the second front in the West by an unsparing all-out effort, and follow it up with overwhelming force to the goal of total occupation of Germany, the Group is ready to support the Allied effort with all its strength and all the important resources at its disposal. To this end it would after proper agreement and preparation be ready to dispatch a high officer to a specified Allied territory by plane as their fully empowered, informed, and equipped plenipotentiary charged with coordinating the plans of collaboration with the Allied High Command.

7) The readiness of a sufficient number of intact units of the Wehrmacht to follow up the orders given under the Group's operational plan, and cooperate with the Allies, could only be counted upon with a sufficient degree of certainty if the above conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise there would be a grave danger that the orders and operations agreed upon by the commanders and staffs belonging to the Group would at the decisive moment fail to materialize for lack of support, or be executed only with great friction.

8) The Group would see to it that simultaneously with the Allied landing a provisional anti-Nazi Government would be formed which would take over all non-military tasks resulting from the collaboration with the Allies and that political upheaval that would accompany it. The composition of this provisional Government would be determined in advance.

9) The Group, which comprises personages belonging to the most diverse liberal and democratic parties and schools of thought, regards the possibility of a bolshevication of Germany through the rise of a national communism as the deadliest imminent danger to Germany and the European family of nations. It is determined to counter this threat by all possible means, and to prevent, in particular, the conclusion of the War through the victory of the Red Army, followed by a Russian occupation of Germany before the arrival of the Anglo-Saxon armies. On the other hand, no cleft must be allowed to develop between the future democratic Government and the masses of German labour. A non-communist democratic home policy will only be possible in conjunction with a whole-hearted policy of collaboration with Russia, designed to eliminate all hostility or friction with that power. In this way it should be sought not to antagonize the strong pro-Russian circles in Germany, but to rally them in a common constructive effort and win them over. Finally, what must be avoided at all cost is the development of a situation which would lay a democratic Government open to the reproach of placing foreign interests above national concerns, and unify against this Government the forces of nationalism, communism, and Russophily.

10) The envisaged democratic Government, in order to steal the thunder of left radicalism, should operate at home with a very strong left wing, and lean heavily on the Social Democrats and organized labour, even, if necessary, seek the cooperation of personally unimpeachable independent communists.

11) The initial HQ of the democratic counter-Government would under the postulated circumstances best be South Germany, perhaps Austria. It would be advisable not to subject the civilian population of this territorial basis to indiscriminate air attack, since experience teaches that bombed-out populations are exhausted and absorbed by the effort of providing for their bare survival and subsistence that they are out of play as far as revolutionary action is concerned.

Dokument 4 a<sup>94</sup>

10. Januar 1944: Brief Alexander C. Kirk, Kairo, an General R. G. Tindall, Ankara  
The Foreign Service of the United States of America

American Legation  
Cairo, January 10, 1944

Personal and Confidential

Dear General Tindall:

I have been away from Cairo for a few days and upon my return I found your letter of December 19th<sup>95</sup>. I do not believe that any harm has resulted from the delay as the individual whose message you sent me is apparently returning to Turkey only in February or later<sup>96</sup>.

I am enclosing my reply to this message which I am making on my own responsibility without consulting with anyone and I shall be glad if you will deliver it. My decision is not based on any doubt as to the sincerity of the person in question but solely on my conviction that the war must end by the military defeat of the German armed forces and not by any dickering on our part with factions within Germany which might entail greater present risks and more serious eventual complications for the United Nations than the problematical advantages would justify. Unconditional surrender is and should remain our slogan and, from my knowledge of the Germans, I fear that any talk with factions within the country will create the impression that we would be satisfied with something short of that requisite.

With best wishes, believe me

Yours very truly,

A. Kirk

Minister

Dokument 4 b<sup>97</sup>

[10. Januar 1944]: Brief Alexander C. Kirk, Kairo, an Helmut James von Moltke, Istanbul<sup>98</sup>

I would always be glad to see you but I do not see that any good purpose would be served by our meeting now as it is my personal conviction that nothing short of the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces will terminate the war in Europe.

<sup>94</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 321.

<sup>95</sup> Nicht in den Akten.

<sup>96</sup> Dok. 1.

<sup>97</sup> Handschriftliches Schreiben, undatiert. Das Datum ergibt sich aus Dok. 4 a, zu dem 4 b eine Anlage ist. Vgl. NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 320; auch in van Roon, Neuordnung, S. 322. Der Brief sollte vermutlich auf dem Weg über Tindall, Schwarz und Rüstow an Moltke weitergeleitet werden. Rüstow hat das Original behalten, eine Kopie wurde über Schwarz und Macfarland an das OSS in Washington gesandt.

<sup>98</sup> Daß es sich um eine „fingierte Antwort“ Kirks handelt, „anscheinend von dem beauftragten OSS-Vertreter Istanbul“ (so Hoffmann, Widerstand, S. 283.) ist äußerst unwahrscheinlich. Die Handschrift erscheint authentisch, die Notiz trägt jedoch, anders als Hoffmann behauptet, keine Unterschrift.

Dokument 5<sup>99</sup>

12. Januar 1944: Memorandum Lanning Macfarland, Istanbul<sup>100</sup>, an General William J. Donovan, Washington, D. C.

Top Secret

## Memorandum re German Plan:

For many months we have been in contact with Herman (. . .)<sup>101</sup>, descendant of a well-known German family, whose name is unquestionably well-known to you. He holds an important position in the German Wehrmacht and has many contacts throughout German industrial and military circles.

He has made two trips to Istanbul during the past six months both in the hope that he might contact some American well known to him in whom he might confide his broad program. The particular person he has wanted to see is Alexander Kirk, whom he knew intimately in Germany up until the time of his departure<sup>102</sup>. This matter was referred immediately to Mr. Kirk, but he showed no interest at the time. Herman returned to Berlin disappointed at this lack of interest, but hopeful that Mr. Kirk might reconsider his position.

The matter has also been referred to General Tindall, inasmuch as we were of the opinion that it is more a military than a diplomatic affair. The General, like ourselves, feels that the proposition is one that should be thoroughly explored, although at the moment we cannot judge its merits until the principals whom Herman represents, and details of the plans are revealed to us. At the moment we are daily expecting a message from Mr. Kirk signifying his willingness to meet with Herman or designating someone to meet him in his place. A reply from Mr. Kirk is expected on Friday, the 14th. We frankly doubt the wisdom, for security reasons, of Mr. Kirk's coming to Turkey. In case Mr. Kirk refuses to come we have thought of suggesting Hugh Wilson<sup>103</sup> in his stead, and may decide to make the suggestion to Herman.

Referring to the German file, the first document therein dated December 29, 1943, is a copy of a letter which was written by our negotiator to General Tindall<sup>104</sup>. As I indicated, we have kept him thoroughly informed and he is doing all he can to help us, and if everything goes well, Herman will come down here within 30 days time to meet either Mr. Kirk, someone he nominates, or Hugh Wilson, if it works out that way. Any judgment on continued negotiations will of course be based upon revelations he makes at this meeting.

In considering the „expose“ itself<sup>105</sup> (and I again call to your attention the fact that the

<sup>99</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 322 ff.

<sup>100</sup> Lanning Macfarland leitete die OSS-Außenstelle Istanbul seit Mai 1943.

<sup>101</sup> An dieser Stelle sind zwei Worte – vermutlich „Helmuth Moltke“ – im Original ausgeschwärzt.

<sup>102</sup> Alexander C. Kirk verließ Deutschland im Oktober 1940. Danach übergab er George F. Kennan seinen Kontakt zu Moltke.

<sup>103</sup> Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat und Freund von Allen W. Dulles, gehörte zu diesem Zeitpunkt der OSS Planning Group an. Bis 1938 war er amerikanischer Botschafter in Deutschland, 1942 machte ihn Donovan zu einem seiner Mitarbeiter im OSS; nach Kriegsende leitete er die Foreign Affairs Section of the Republican Committee. Vgl. hierzu Smith, OSS, S. 204–209.

<sup>104</sup> Gemeint ist Alfred Schwarz. Vgl. Dok. 2.

<sup>105</sup> Dok. 3.

wording of this document is that of one of our foreign collaborators based upon conversations with Herman), the first two paragraphs are devoted to a description of background and standing of the group. In general, we believe these statements to be true.

We should like to comment paragraph by paragraph on the statements made under the heading „Conditions of collaboration with the Allies“:

Paragraph 1: In all of our dealing with the enemy agents, military defeat and unconditional surrender have been the primary basis of discussion.

Paragraph 2: We do not feel it necessary in the informal negotiations to discuss German sympathies with the Anglo-Saxons. The only bearing on the subject in our opinion is their willingness to negotiate with us regardless of the reasons.

Paragraph 3: While stated as a condition, it is clearly realized that the continuance of an unbroken Eastern Front is a factor entirely beyond our control, and this paragraph merely expresses a hope rather than a condition.

Paragraph 4: As the matter is explained in detail, it is the belief of the group that an all-out effort on both sides is a necessity, otherwise the movement could be easily crushed.

Paragraph 5: The comments on number 4 apply to this one as well.

Paragraph 6: Worded otherwise, this is intended to imply a preliminary understanding to be arrived at with Mr. Kirk as to the sincerity and the scope of the endeavour, rather than any formal agreement.

Herman seems to feel that only through contact with someone he knows intimately can a basis of mutual confidence be arrived at. This he feels is a necessary preliminary to the dispatch of an officer or a group of officers who will carry to the Allies the full plan for the intended cooperation.

Paragraph 7: This paragraph does not have much bearing on the situation, it merely states what is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 in a different way.

Paragraph 8: This appears to us to be a little visionary and rather unimportant, although some advanced thought should be given to the setting up of some local authority during Allied occupation.

Paragraph 9: The fear of communism is of course predominant among this group and in no little way responsible for their determination to collaborate. On the other hand they are not anti-Russian and would not object to Russian participation at some point along the way.

Paragraph 10: This paragraph is again irrelevant to the actual carrying out of the military aspects of the plan.

Paragraph 11: This paragraph concerns their own internal organization, although probably it will be easier for us to keep in touch with a Headquarters in Austria than in Germany proper.

In drawing this memorandum to a conclusion, as I have indicated in my letter and above, it is most difficult to judge the possibilities of the success of such a plan, but we are convinced it should be brought to the attention of high authorities before proceeding further. None of us of course, are able to pass judgment on it until we have much greater knowledge of the extent of the program as well as the responsibility and integrity of those behind it. It is needless to say of course that we have pledged ourselves to the utmost security at this stage although we have pointed out that as the plan develops it necessarily means a great many individuals for whose security we have no control will have to give the matter consideration. We are unable to give this project our endorsement until more is known about it, but do feel that it is important the matter be brought to your attention.

Possibly before this reaches you, some word will have been received regarding Mr. Kirk's

attitude, which we will send on. If he is unwilling to come, I wish you would give me your ideas on the availability of Mr. Wilson so that we can suggest his name as an alternate.

Additional documents in the dossier include a supplementary memorandum by our negotiator<sup>106</sup> and a copy of the letter written by Herman to Mr. Kirk<sup>107</sup> to which we are now awaiting an answer.

*Packy*<sup>108</sup>

*Dokument 6*<sup>109</sup>

5. Februar 1944: Brief Lanning Macfarland, Istanbul, an General William J. Donovan, Washington, D. C.

Top Secret

Dear Bill:

I am replying to your letter of January 22<sup>110</sup>, regarding the Herman matter, in order to bring you fully up to date. Very little has developed in this matter since my memorandum to you of January 12<sup>111</sup>. Kirk, in a very non-committal manner, said he would see Herman although he doubted that anything would come of it and, quite logically, stressed his desire to avoid the impression that the American side would consider anything other than unconditional surrender. Indirectly we have sent word to Herman of this decision on Kirk's part, with the further advice that we doubted such a matter could be arranged with security; that we did not think any further meetings were worth while unless Herman was prepared to submit tentative plans that would assist in bringing about military defeat and unconditional surrender. We raised the question as to whether or not he would negotiate with another spokesman for America. In that connection, we suggested Hugh Wilson as a possible substitute. No further word has been received from Herman, although [h]is representative here is inclined to feel that he may attempt to establish contact with American groups in Stockholm, Berne, or Lisbon<sup>112</sup>.

With all of your conclusions I am completely in accord, although I get the impression here from talking with Herman's local associates that this is a sincere effort on Herman's part to bring about the complete military defeat of Germany, and that it is clearly understood by him that Russia must be a partner to any final negotiations.

Please feel assured that in my own conversations I have shown nothing but a firm attitude towards this subject. I have clearly indicated that the interests I represent have neither the

<sup>106</sup> Nicht abgedruckt, siehe Anm. 89.

<sup>107</sup> Dok. 1.

<sup>108</sup> Codename Lanning Macfarlands.

<sup>109</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 325.

<sup>110</sup> Nicht bei den Akten. Am 18. 1. hatte Donovan an Macfarland gekabelt: „In the light of the development in the political situation recently, we urge that you refrain from any action which could possibly be considered, (although without any basis) as a move in the direction of peace with Germany“; in: NA, RG 226, Entry 134, box 298, folder Istanbul.

<sup>111</sup> Dok. 5.

<sup>112</sup> Moltke war am 19. 1. 1944 verhaftet worden. In Washington erfuhr man davon erst am 5. 3. 1944; siehe Dok. 12.

authorization nor the desire to discuss any political matters, and that unless Herman is ready to disclose some concrete plan to be considered on its own merits, we have no desire to see him again.

In any further communications from Herman on this subject, we will follow your instructions regarding reference to Washington. We shall also make every effort to see that no „loose talk“ is created among any of our contacts. We have no desire whatsoever to enter into high-level negotiations and do our best at all times to keep carefully within the directives which we have received.

The chances are you may hear from me by wire again before the receipt of this letter<sup>113</sup>, but I want to get it off to you so that it will reach you as quickly as possible.

Yours very truly,  
Packy  
Lanning Macfarland

*Dokument 7*<sup>114</sup>

5. Februar 1944: Telegramm Lanning Macfarland, Istanbul, an General William J. Donovan, Washington, D. C. (Auszug)

Secret

For Information: Secretariat, *Shepardson, Scribner, Magruder*<sup>115</sup>

#134. From Macfarland for General William J. Donovan, personally.

Transmitted to Washington and London.

...

I am in complete accord with the reserved position recommended in your letter. You may be quite certain that I have been extremely cautious and reserved when speaking directly. Everything in the memo<sup>116</sup> which you received can be attributed to our foreign negotiators<sup>117</sup>, I made no such comments.

...

<sup>113</sup> Noch am gleichen Tag kabelte Macfarland das als Nr. 8 abgedruckte Telegramm nach Washington.

<sup>114</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 326 f. In einem hier nicht abgedruckten Teil des Telegramms forderte Macfarland aus Washington zwei amerikanische Agenten mit Deutschkenntnissen sowie einen Funker an.

<sup>115</sup> Whitney Shepardson, bis 1942 Vizepräsident der International Railways of Central America, war Chef der Secret Intelligence-Abteilung von OSS-Washington. Joseph Scribner, ein Investment-Bankier aus Pittsburgh, hatte leitende Positionen in der Special Operations Branch von OSS-Washington inne. John Magruder, bis 1938 US-Militärattaché in Bern und anschließend Chef der Intelligence Branch des War Department, war seit Mitte 1942 OSS Deputy director for Intelligence.

<sup>116</sup> Dok. 3.

<sup>117</sup> Alexander Rüstow und Hans Wilbrandt.

Dokument 8<sup>118</sup>

24. Februar 1944: Telegramm Lanning Macfarland, Istanbul, an General William J. Donovan, Washington, D. C.

Secret

#170. 550 to 109<sup>119</sup>

There is a possibility that Herman will make another visit to Istanbul to get in touch with us, about the middle of next month. He has been cautioned to come to Istanbul only if ready to confer on positive plans to effect a military victory over the Nazi Army, with consequent unconditional surrender. He has been told that no discussions would be held on post-war or political questions, or on fears of occupation by the Soviets. In addition he has been informed that no official representative of the United States will confer with him. Since we should be prepared for conferences with him if he does come, I am requesting that you forward me a letter granting me authority to converse with Herman himself or with representatives of his group. The authority should be framed to encompass talks on a restricted basis only, as stated above. Since Germany is not included in my present directive, a letter of this type will provide me with credentials for such a meeting. The following is for your information: Leverkushem [sic] is associated with this movement. He has been recalled to Berlin, as I notified you before, and left the 19th of February<sup>120</sup>. We dispatched a message to him just before he left. In this message we indicated that we would enable him to see you. It is taken for granted that fear that others in Herman's movement might be compromised influenced Leverkushem's decision to go back to Berlin. He is still of prospective value to us while he is in Berlin. My visit to Cairo will last from the 26th of February to the following Saturday, the 4th of March.

Dokument 9<sup>121</sup>

28. Februar 1944: Memorandum Professor Karl Brandt<sup>122</sup>, New York, an General William J. Donovan, Washington, D. C.

<sup>118</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 331.

<sup>119</sup> 550 und 109 sind die OSS-Codenummern für Macfarland respektive Donovan.

<sup>120</sup> Leverkusheims Rückberufung nach Berlin im Februar 1944 stand in Zusammenhang mit der sogenannten „Vermehren-Affäre“, dem Überlaufen von Mitgliedern der Abwehr Istanbul zu den Engländern. Besonders brisant war das Überlaufen Erich Vermehrens, dessen Frau – eine Verwandte Franz von Papens – durch die Vermittlung Adam von Trots aus Deutschland in die Türkei nachgereist war. Einzelheiten finden sich in den „Breakers“-Telegrammen des OSS-Außenpostens in Bern. OSS-Bern an OSS-Washington, 5.3. 1944, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 352f. (Ein anderer Teil dieses Telegramms ist als Dok. 12 abgedruckt.) Im Anschluß an die Vermehren-Affäre verhalten Amerikaner und Briten, wie aus der Korrespondenz des OSS-Postens Istanbul hervorgeht, weiteren Abwehroffizieren zur Flucht. Telegramm Macfarland an Donovan, 14.2. 1944, in: ebenda, Entry 134, box 298, folder Istanbul.

<sup>121</sup> Ebenda, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 333–343.

<sup>122</sup> Karl Brandt (1899–1975), Agrarwissenschaftler mit Ausbildung an den Landwirtschaftlichen Hochschulen Hohenheim/Württemberg und Berlin, emigrierte 1933 in die USA; 1933 bis 1938 lehrte er an der New School of Social Research, 1938 bis 1963 an der Stanford University. Während des Krie-

## Top Secret

## Subject: Herman Plan

Upon your request I am giving hereafter my critical evaluation of the Herman plan with which I became familiar today after perusal of the document you handed to me. As a background for what follows I want to mention that according to my continuous analysis of the economic situation inside the continental fortress I am convinced that the resources at the disposal of the enemy are despite progressive bombing still large enough for carrying on the battle until the fall of 1945 and that, consequently, with the undiminished strength of the enemy's ground forces it is the greatest probability that far in excess of 500 000 American boys will have died in battle before the fortress will fall by military assault only<sup>123</sup>. Moreover, I deem it probable that in that case a prostrate and battered continent may ultimately fall into a definitely pro-Russian orientation.

## NATURE OF THE PLAN

In my appraisal the plan represents the offer by the most respectable revolutionary group inside Germany, lodged in vital strategic positions, to assist the efforts of the Anglo-American Allies at cracking the fortress from the outside by a judicial and discriminative paralyzation of resistance from the inside with the exclusive purpose to accomplish thereby Anglo-American occupation leaving Russian forces outside.

## THE MERITS OF THE PLAN

If the Anglo-American forces have to shoot it out with the German Army to the last, there are two major alternative courses of events:

1) If all goes extremely well, the war will end either in the Fall of 1944, or, much more likely, by the Spring or Summer of 1945. However, Western Europe and Germany will in all likelihood be devastated to such an extent that by the immeasurable moral and social erosion and the material destruction alone one of the key positions of the Western World will be lost. It is already perceptible that the incessant bombing and obliteration of metropolitan areas creates huge masses of a proletariat of the bombed-out middleclass and all of labor. Inevitably the population not only in Germany but also in adjacent countries will potentially lean toward a Soviet society which offers the immense opportunity for Russia to utilize passively this tendency against Anglo-American interests. What is much worse than this deterioration under the impact of the battering of the Fortress, Himmler's Gestapo, which in due time will reach a strength exceeding 3 000 000 of the most brutal killers the world has

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ges erstellte er für das Board of Economic Warfare Memoranden, in denen er die wirtschaftliche Situation Deutschlands im Blick auf eine effektive Bombardierung analysierte. Brandts Analysen wurden von Donovan mit großer Anerkennung aufgenommen. Vgl. Memorandum „Recommended New Method of Bombing Attacks Against Germany“, 21. 8. 1942, sowie Donovan an Armstrong, 18. 9. 1942, in: PUA Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, box 10, folder Karl Brandt 1941-45. Nach dem Krieg war er in der Militärregierung als Wirtschaftsberater von General Lucius D. Clay tätig. Er setzte sich für eine radikale Abrüstung Deutschlands bei gleichzeitiger wirtschaftlicher und politischer Rehabilitation ein. Berichte vom 2. 7. und 19. 10. 1945 in den Beständen der Foreign Nationalities Branch des OSS: NA, RG 226, Entry 100, INT-13-GE-1628 und 1709.

<sup>123</sup> Die Gesamtverluste der Vereinigten Staaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg betragen 405 000 Tote.

ever seen<sup>124</sup>, will inevitably have proceeded to „liquidate“ systematically all and every Germans who by their moral stamina and personality could possibly be the nucleus of a rehabilitated future Germany which would fit into the fabric of a strong but peaceful Western World. Thus even if the American losses in lives should be relatively small, the Continent would probably be lost when it is won.

2) If, on the other hand, all does not go well with the invasion, one or several huge beach-heads with all the troops and material invested will be thrown into the sea with the natural resurgence of the resistance by the German Army. In this case, the war would be protracted, but by gradual deterioration of the material resources and the complete devastation of the substance of all the people who still own a residual of modest means of livelihood would proceed until the point of the inevitable surrender of the Army. In this slow process the political and social credo of the German people would shift like the cargo on a vessel in a hurricane. All the people who are the victims of the Nazis as well as their active collaborators will under the leadership of their generals (particularly the Russo-ophile wing) grab the opportunity of taking revenge against the naturally hated Allies who annihilated all their cities by forming an independent sovereign Soviet Republic with an army and seeking admission as a member in the Soviet Union.

In view of these alternative courses for exclusively military assault the Herman Plan offers to short-circuit the war to the necessary end, namely the defeat of the German Army and the complete military occupation of all of Germany as well as the liberation of all German-occupied territory west of a further advanced Russian front. It sets no conditions but with a cool realism begins with the acceptance of the inevitability of the military defeat, in fact it recognizes the necessity of the defeat of the German Army and the destruction of its power for the sake of a survival of Germany. The authors of the Plan visualize correctly that the vicious circle of the lust for expensive conquest inherent in this institution with its overwhelming potential power and its penetration into the political and economic fields must be broken by its conspicuous defeat.

The real test that this plan does definitely not represent a slick ruse manoeuvred by imperialists in the General Staff or Nazi chieftains lies in the absence of any such military conditions as any plan by Hitler's generals would inevitably try to stipulate. By virtue of this fact alone I give full credence to the genuineness and sincerity of the efforts evidenced by the document I have read.

### THE GROUP BEHIND THE PLAN

The origin and psychology of this group of whose existence I have been well aware<sup>125</sup> and whose activity toward tangible ends began in the Summer of 1939 dates back toward the years of agony in the latter part of World War I. The members of this group carry on in the

<sup>124</sup> Die Zahl bezieht sich auf Ordnungs- und Sicherheitspolizisten sowie auf die Wachmänner der Konzentrationslager. Nicht eingeschlossen sind die ca. 950 000 Soldaten der Waffen-SS.

<sup>125</sup> Brandt hatte schon in den dreißiger Jahren Kontakte zu oppositionellen Kreisen in Deutschland unterhalten. Durch seinen Freund Hamilton Fish Armstrong und durch Trott war er über die Aktivitäten der Kreisauer unterrichtet worden. Vgl. zur Begegnung Trott-Brandt, Sykes, Adam von Trott, S. 259 ff. Aus den Akten des Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) geht hervor, daß die Begegnung von Fritz Caspari arrangiert worden war und am 9. 1. 1940 in Stanford stattfand. Vgl. FBI, Trott-file 65-5938/6 (116-140) sowie 65-5938/7 (141-150XI). Das über tausend Seiten starke Trott-Dossier des FBI konnte von den Bearbeitern nach Anfrage auf Grund des Freedom of Information Act eingesehen werden.

tradition of many splendid men, particularly among the young generation of 1914 which fought as soldiers and young officers in the trenches of the First World War and from the profound and tragic experience derived the conviction of the necessity and the possibility of freeing Germany for the sake of Western civilization from the insane ambitions of the aggressive imperialists in the Army, the heavy industries and among the ranks of the Junkers. Most of them are men of an alert intelligence and a deep understanding of the moral foundation of the West and all of them comprise the English-speaking world most definitely under that concept. Their members are not belonging to any special class, social stratum or profession, but are found among labor leaders as well as the intelligentsia, among conservatives and socialists, Catholics and Protestants, businessmen and civil servants. What unites these people is the thorough grasp of the historical tragedy of their nation and their last desperate effort to prevent at the very risk of their and their entire families' lives the annihilation of all that to them means Germany and the heritage of generations. Since all of them stand ultimately – even those who never attend Church or confess adherence to it – on the ground of Christian ethics and thereby are tied into the West, they also want to prevent that either by trying to avert defeat or after defeat Germany will be absorbed into the Russian orbit. These men are culturally as much at home in England, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden or in general in Western Europe as they are in Germany, while Russia means to them exactly as much as Japan or China does to the people in Iowa. Thus these people have for the last twenty years been widely scattered but genuine parts of the warp and weft of the German nation. The dire peril and real agony of eleven years of tyranny and more than four years of war have screened and sifted them out, hardened them and driven them into subtle clandestine organizations. I am unable to write down a list of names, because I have not had many occasions to lift the veil of their secrecy and do not know any more who among their ranks was lost by death or other changes. In fact, it has always been one of the chief principles of protection within this group that one person never knew more than a few trusted members of the whole group, which I strongly urge to respect because it is the only conceivable way of avoiding the mass liquidation of all of them whenever, by accident or carelessness, or resourcefulness of the Gestapo, some identities are revealed. But I am thoroughly convinced that this highly select and strategically located group is incomparably more worthy of full consideration than any other so-called underground movement<sup>126</sup>, because it is neither tainted with left-wing radical conformism nor with any particle of transformed Nazi ideologies, but in contrast represents, as all democratic groups, people of widely differing shades of political ideas while they are united in the last essential convictions.

#### ALTERNATIVES TO THE HERMAN PLAN

In an attempt to determine the practical value of the Plan, it is imperative to check on potential alternative courses of action. In trying to review such alternatives, the only one that I can possibly think of would roughly be as follows: The Allies could take the initiative to contact certain members of the German General Staff who are known to represent merely professional military leadership and thought and of whom one could expect that like Ludendorff

<sup>126</sup> Der Begriff „underground“ wurde vom OSS in der Regel für einen auf breiter Basis beruhenden Widerstand mit politisch linker Orientierung verwendet, während „resistance“ und „opposition“ diese Konnotation nicht aufweisen.

in August 1918 they would try to terminate hostilities<sup>127</sup> before or at the moment when the complete deterioration of the battle position of the Germany Army becomes inevitable. Such negotiations could naturally be started in many places, such as Lisbon, Stockholm or Switzerland or elsewhere at any moment. The weakness would lie in the fact that the only strategy in such talks would consist of using threats and presenting in consecutive stages one ultimatum after the other. In order to make it tempting at all to lay down arms, the Allies would inevitably be bound to offer or to grant upon demand from the German side certain conditions. I venture to imagine the conditions which alone would, in my opinion, persuade any such emissaries of the German General Staff to consider or accept surrender. Such condition would be the unilateral Anglo-American occupation of all of Germany and the guarantee that Russian armies would be kept by Anglo-American troops as well as written American and British commitment be kept [sic] outside the German borders. Moreover, the German General Staff would want to have a binding commitment that Anglo-American Military Government would under no circumstances abuse its absolute power of policing for a period of „blood-letting“, an idea unfortunately so dear to the heart of American columnists, magazine editors (Fortune!, Life, Time!) which has been very effectively publicized throughout Germany. It is obvious that any such plan would suffer from the deadly constructive weakness that its very conception involves treachery against our great ally, the Russian people and therefore must remain still-born. On the German side the practically impossible plan has still much greater weakness due to the fact that one has to deal with a formally but not truly uniform group in which the Nazi gangsters have too tight a grip on those personalities who could possibly arrive at a sensible agreement with the Allies. Moreover, since military expediency would be the exclusive consideration for accepting surrender, the only possible timing would be so late that little would be won for either side.

Discarding this only conceivable alternative as impracticable and non-profitable, the Herman plan appears so much the more ingenious.

Hence it is my considered opinion that this plan deserves to be given most serious and immediate full consideration for political decision and forthright action:

- 1) as the only existing and very last chance to soften the Fortress progressively from the inside as the invasion is proceeding from the West,
- 2) as the only available and valid assurance that the high risk of the loss of hundreds of thousands of American lives and extreme delays of the final decision can be reduced to a bearable limit,
- 3) as the only practicable and politically permissible way to keep Russia out of Central Europe,
- 4) as the exclusive opportunity of having available as the occupation is accomplished a strong and reliable framework of German personnel inside the country which not only guarantees successful operation of military government, but at the same time represents

<sup>127</sup> In verschiedenen Abteilungen des OSS, insbesondere in der Forschungsabteilung „Research and Analysis“ (R&A), wurden seit 1943 komparative Studien erstellt, in denen man Phänomene des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Ersten Weltkrieg mit der jeweils aktuellen Kriegssituation verglich; in: NA, RG 59, R&A 1483, Possible Patterns of German Collapse, 21.9. 1943 sowie R&A 1477, The Process of German Collapse, 4.12. 1943. Ähnliche Studien entstanden auch in den militärischen Stäben in Washington, D. C. und London.; vgl. Probabilities of German collapse, 9.9. und 23.9. 1943, in: NA, RG 165, American British Cooperation (ABC 381), Germany Sec 1-A.

a victorious new leadership in Germany which has defeated the Nazis, broken the German Army and established vital cooperation with the American and British people.

If such consideration as recommended should be given this plan, it is by no means certain yet that its execution will have any real effect upon the course of military events. Being a plan for action, its value of realization must be tested at first thoroughly and with the greatest dispatch. If after that it should still be considered as practicable, everything will nevertheless depend on the competence of carrying it out on the German as well as the Allied side. Thus it is far from a sure-fire method for successful invasion and requires to be tackled with courage and full realization of the jeopardy and risk to the very end.

If it should ultimately fail the full justification for the undertaking must lie in the fact that the responsible statesmen have done the humanly possible in trying to realize the opportunity for saving their peoples the otherwise inevitable tragic sacrifices.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCEDURE

Once the decision has been reached to pursue the plan, it will be necessary to test and get assurance as to the following points.

- 1) the strength and strategic distribution of the group inside the Fortress,
- 2) the military resources including all the auxiliary and secondary resources under its reach or command.

It will not be possible nor is it advisable to attempt to obtain complete information concerning 1) and 2) for blueprints, diagrams or to get any records in detail. The contact man should, however, give the correct proportions and range of their forces. If the few key personalities which they reveal should have the proper weight and caliber and deserve the confidence their word must be trusted because it is they who put the lives of a large and immensely valuable group of people at stake at any moment. In fact it is my impression that the quality of not more than two or three leading men should be considered as sufficient guarantee because, if it is not, the compilation of any number of names will in reality not add an iota of additional security.

- 3) the question must be posed how the group contemplates to meet and avert the chief jeopardy to the plan, namely,
  - a) the collapse of the Eastern German front by weakening of the divisions and the equipment there and the possibly resulting vicious assault by the Russian armies.
  - b) the collapse of the Eastern German front upon the initiative of the Russophile group inside the General Staff and the officer corps to play the same game as the Herman group but by collaboration with the Russians instead of with the Allies,
  - c) the sudden simultaneous abandonment of resistance on all fronts, including the Russian one, after a sudden show-down inside the General Staff under the impact of a spontaneous palace revolution.

Not all these questions can possibly be answered to full satisfaction, yet the nature of the answers will indicate how realistic the leaders of the group are or at least if they should not have contemplated such eventualities the questions will force them to close the last holes in their plans.

- 4) the question should be posed how the group plans to prohibit the sudden liquidation of all potential cooperating men by Himmler.
- 5) the question should be posed what security measures are contemplated to prohibit the Gestapo from getting behind the agreements of action between the Allied General Staff

and the Herman group and the exploitation of such knowledge by the German Army without wholesale arrests of members of the group for the sake of getting more and more information and giving the Herman group more rope.

- 6) Does the group contemplate and is it determined to eliminate the key figures inside SS or regular Army officer corps or otherwise who jeopardize [sic] the entire plan either as prophylaxis or when and if the threat becomes imminent? If they do not, what are the reasons for refraining from premeditating such protective action?
- 7) What sort of major paralyzing or assisting actions are contemplated? (this question should be posed without any additional suggestive questions in order to check how elaborate and specific the plans of the group have already become.)

### CONCLUSION

Supposed that all these questions should be answered to the satisfaction of our Chiefs of Staff, it would be my recommendation that one should establish without delay secure headquarters for the liaison officers of the group, dispatch to them the necessary liaison officers on our side and start to work out with them the complete strategy for the key actions which the Herman group is committed to engineer and manage inside the Fortress. As the machinery begins to work, it would be advisable to start with certain limited and cautious test actions in various expedient theaters of war which are inconspicuous for the Gestapo but sufficiently clear-cut to find out whether the machine works or, if it does not, to spot the defects. In general, it is my conviction that even if one sets the plan fully into motion, there is no need whatsoever to endanger our military operations by it. I would recommend that no major tactical operation should ever be based completely on the assumption that the Herman group can safely deliver what is committed to it. On the contrary, the invading generals should in all cases operate under the assumption that the assisting Herman group action will fail but should be prepared to exploit in full any opportunity created by the group's action.

*Dokument 10*<sup>128</sup>

2. März 1944: Memorandum Whitney H. Shepardson, OSS (SI), an General William J. Donovan

Top Secret

Subject: Notes on Herman Plan

Pursuant to your request I make the following observations.

(1) I have not had time to read the basic document with any care at all. (2) I have read with care, however, the evaluation placed upon it by K. B. [Karl Brandt] and assuming his premises to be accurately based upon the plan itself, I consider the evaluation to be both sound and shrewd.

You asked for any knowledge which I may have on K. B. himself. I have not seen him for many years, perhaps ten in all. I saw him when he first arrived in New York in about 1933. If my memory is right he was first attached to the New School for Social Research and I sat in some consequent conferences with him then and gained a very great respect for his know-

<sup>128</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 347-350.

ledge, good judgment, common sense and complete hostility toward the Nazi government and its ideas.

He afterward went to the Food Research Institute connected with Leland Stanford University and I have never heard any word except in praise of him and his abilities and his anti-Nazi convictions. He is, as you know, one of the outstanding agricultural economists of the world, but in addition he has a broad background of general economics and an experience in statecraft based in part on official and quasi-official positions which he held in the German government prior to his coming to the United States<sup>129</sup>.

I have never met the author of the basic memorandum. I have been told that he has had for many years a responsible (and at the same time influential) post in the German Foreign Office. I have been told by informed people in confidence on two or three private occasions that this man is one of the most influential individuals of the anti-Nazi group of high placed German officials and that he has relationship with other influential individuals in Germany who are thought to constitute a strong anti-Nazi wing which has neither been liquidated nor suppressed.

This individual was well known to Philip Lothian<sup>130</sup> and before the war visited Lothian with a few other German friends at Hickling, Lothian's home. It was this visit and an examination of the pre-war situation which took place at that time (perhaps in 1937)<sup>131</sup> which is the only factual basis I know for charges against Lothian that he was at one time an appeaser<sup>132</sup>. Coupled, of course, with this factual matter is the circumstance that Lothian was a close friend of the Astors, as you know and was almost always at Cliveden for weekends<sup>133</sup>.

Lothian and friends of his had a very high opinion of the integrity and bona fides of subject and in conversation with other friends of Lothian (who were very well versed in foreign affairs) I have heard the same opinion expressed.

<sup>129</sup> Von 1925 bis 1933 war Brandt als landwirtschaftlicher Sachverständiger unter anderem an der Bank für deutsche Industrieobligationen tätig.

<sup>130</sup> Moltke hatte Philip Kerr, seit 1930 Marquess of Lothian, durch die Vermittlung von Lionel Curtis getroffen. Moltke an Curtis, 12. 7. 1935, in: BLA Oxford, Lionel Curtis Papers, MS 99/1 f. sowie „A note on Count von Moltke“, 26. 6. 1943, in: ebenda, MS 99/14–18. Lothian war zunächst Sekretär von Lloyd George, 1940 britischer Botschafter in Washington. Vgl. zu Lothian die Memoiren von Thomas Jones, *A Diary with Letters, 1931–1950*, London/New York/Toronto 1954; zu Lothians politischen Vorstellungen Rüdiger Görner, *Souveränität als Sündenfall: Zur Europa-Konzeption des britischen Föderalisten Lord Lothian (1882–1940)*, in: *Integration* 13 (1990), S. 103–110.

<sup>131</sup> Moltke und Lothian waren sich bereits im Juli 1935 begegnet. Brief Moltke an Curtis, London 12. 7. 1935, in: BLA Oxford, Lionel Curtis Papers, MS 99/1 f.

<sup>132</sup> In einem Gespräch mit Moltke hatte Lothian 1935 die Auffassung vertreten, eine englische „policy of concessions to the Nazis will help to transform them“. Moltke an Curtis 12. 7. 1935, in: ebenda. Seit Februar 1938 waren Lothian allerdings Zweifel an der Appeasement-Politik gekommen, bis er 1939 endgültig einen entgegengesetzten politischen Kurs einschlug. Vgl. James R.M. Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr)*, London 1960.

<sup>133</sup> Lord Astor war Vorsitzender des Royal Institute of International Affairs und Eigentümer des „Observer“. Im herrschaftlichen Wohnsitz der Astors, dem Cliveden Manor an der Themse bei London, hielt sich Lothian seit 1915 fast an jedem Wochenende auf. Der Name Cliveden machte Ende der dreißiger Jahre unter dem Stichwort „Cliveden Set“ Schlagzeilen; man warf dem „Round Table“, einem informellen Kreis um Lord Astor, deutschfreundliche Tendenzen vor. Vgl. Butler, *Lord Lothian*, insbesondere S. 250 f.

The subject has a brother who came to this country possibly in 1936<sup>134</sup> and from such people as I have mentioned above (including Lothian) brought letters of introduction to me and my wife. We saw him two or three times. He engaged himself to a rather bizarre Philadelphia architect for some schooling in American architecture. He then proposed to go to some Latin American country from which he hoped to return to the United States with a permanent quota visa. In connection with this matter, however, he told me one story when he sought my advice. He told Philip Lothian another and after we had compared notes, I felt obliged to report to Sumner Welles<sup>135</sup> that I had seen something in a social way of this brother of the subject. On that occasion I learned that he had told the Department of State still another story concerning his prospective trip.

You will perhaps recall that at about that time another single German individual, Adam von Trott came here. He must be about forty years of age<sup>136</sup>. He arrived here just before the war broke out or during its „phoney“ phase<sup>137</sup>, and he was then very much interested in the possibility of bringing the war to an end before it began. I have at home, locked up, a memorandum which von Trott gave me at that time which set forth his ideas concerning the kind of „peace“ which might avert a war<sup>138</sup>. I mention this matter because of the fact that I have since heard that Adam von Trott has a very important post in the German Foreign Office for a man of his age and that von Trott is a member of the group which I have referred to above and also that he is a friend of the author of the basic document.

W [hitney] HS [hepardson]

<sup>134</sup> Gemeint ist der um vier Jahre jüngere Bruder Wilhelm Viggo von Moltke („Willo“). Wilhelm Viggo von Moltke verließ Deutschland im Jahr 1937, nachdem er an der Technischen Hochschule Berlin ein Diplom in Architektur erworben hatte, gelangte aber erst 1940 nach Zwischenstationen in Großbritannien und Schweden in die USA.

<sup>135</sup> Zu diesem Zeitpunkt Undersecretary of State.

<sup>136</sup> Trott, am 9. 8. 1909 geboren, war noch keine 35 Jahre alt.

<sup>137</sup> Trott reiste bereits im Oktober 1937 das erste Mal in die Vereinigten Staaten. Durch Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Mitglied des „Council of Foreign Relations“ und Herausgeber der „Foreign Affairs“, machte er die Bekanntschaft mit Whitney Shepardson, der ebenso wie Trott Rhodes-Stipendiat gewesen war. (Sykes, Adam von Trott, S. 232). Aus den FBI-Akten über Adam von Trott zu Solz geht hervor, daß Trott und Shepardson sich am 30. 10. 1939 im Century Club in New York trafen. Vgl. FBI, Trott file 65-5938/2 (27-34X).

<sup>138</sup> In einer vom FBI abgehörten Konversation zwischen Paul Scheffer und Adam von Trott am 30. 10. 1939 heißt es: „Von Trott was of the opinion that a certain practical plan should be made and, as suggested by a Mr. Shepardson, there should be a peace program worked out to show why the League of Nations failed and to elaborate upon the qualities still remaining in Germany which would give support to a peace program approved by eight Americans and three or four Germans“; in: FBI, Trott file 65-5938/3 (105ff.). Wie aus dem FBI-Akten hervorgeht, haben sich Trott und Whitney Shepardson mehrmals (im Oktober und November 1939) getroffen.

*Dokument 11*<sup>139</sup>

2. März 1944: Memorandum Hugh R. Wilson, OSS Planing Group an General William J. Donovan

Top Secret

Subject: Herman Project

This is the first time I have been able to study your papers both from Istanbul and from Dr. Brand [sic].

I am deeply impressed with the possibilities of this matter. To my mind, it all hinges on one fact – namely, is there genuinely in existence such a group in Germany as Herman asserts.

To ascertain this it would seem to me that one immediate preliminary step is essential, namely, to ascertain here who and what Herman is in Germany. Also, an appreciation of his character and capabilities.

When this is done and if he is a serious person, then the ground should be thoroughly explored with him. As I told you last night I think Col. Truman Smith would be the most competent man to pass on the military personalities involved. I believe, as well, you should find somebody competent to pass on the civilian personalities and suggest consideration of Raymond Geist, for many years Consul General in Berlin.

Particular attention should be paid, in any examination, to how the members of this group are able to consult under Gestapo surveillance and how they have been able to maintain unified views and consultation. This phase of the question seems so difficult to me as to throw an element of doubt on the whole proposal.

I would go into this matter in more detail but realize that you are writing your letter today and want to get this before you urgently.

H [ugh] RW [ilson]

*Dokument 12*<sup>140</sup>

5. März 1944: Telegramm OSS-Bern an OSS-Washington (Auszug)

Secret

For Action: SI<sup>141</sup>

For Information: Director, Secretariat, Magruder

#2307-11.KAPPA<sup>142</sup>

Action: Washington.

Information: London

<sup>139</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 351.

<sup>140</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 352 f. sowie ebenda, Entry 138, box 2.

<sup>141</sup> Secret Intelligence Branch des OSS.

<sup>142</sup> Kappa war der Codename einer Serie von Mikrofilmen, die ein Mitarbeiter des Reichsaußenministeriums, Fritz Kolbe (OSS-Codename „George Wood“), seit August 1943 an die OSS-Außenstelle Bern leitete. Da die Dokumente unter anderem Deutschlands Zusammenarbeit mit den Satellitenstaaten auf dem Balkan und in Ostmitteleuropa betrafen, waren sie von großer politischer wie militärischer Brisanz. Vgl. zu Kolbe: Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, S. 224 und 266 f. sowie Phillip Knightley, *Philby. The Life and Views of the K. G. B. Masterspy*, London 1988, S. 120 f.

We have received an additional report by way of Breakers<sup>143</sup>, according to which 659<sup>144</sup> has been placed „zur Disposition“ and given a naval promotion *pro forma*. The following have lately been placed under arrest: Madame Solf, wife of the well-known German diplomat, now deceased; Kiep, who was once Consul-General in New York, probably for not keeping his mouth shut, Scherfenberg [sic], who did liaison work with the OKW<sup>145</sup>; and Helmut von Moltke, a man close to Breakers, and adviser to OKW on International Law, who prior to the war, often visited London.

(. . .)

*Dokument 13a*<sup>146</sup>

9. März 1944: Brief Irving H. Sherman<sup>147</sup> an General William J. Donovan TOP SECRET

Dear General Donovan:

Enclosed you will find the requested memorandum on the Herman Plan. I have here written it out just as I had prepared it in pencil prior to our conversation yesterday. In the light of that conversation, I might have omitted Point No. 4, inasmuch as you had stated it as your intention to disclose the matter to the Russians, but I thought it better to give you the memorandum complete, in any case.

Very truly yours,

*Irving H. Sherman*

*Dokument 13b*<sup>148</sup>

9. März 1944: Memorandum Irving H. Sherman an General William J. Donovan

<sup>143</sup> OSS-Codename für die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler, die über Hans-Bernd Gisevius, Adam von Trott zu Solz u. a. Kontakt mit dem Berner OSS-Chef Allen W. Dulles aufnahm. Die Breakers-Telegramme befinden sich im Bestand RG 226 der National Archives Washington. (Xerokopien am Seminar für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Tübingen).

<sup>144</sup> OSS-Codenummer für Admiral Canaris.

<sup>145</sup> Hanna Solf, Otto Kiep und Hilger van Scherpenberg (Schwiegersohn Schachts) gehörten dem sogenannten Solf-Kreis an.

<sup>146</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 355.

<sup>147</sup> Irving Sherman, ein New Yorker Bankier, arbeitete während des Krieges im New Yorker OSS-Büro. Dort war er nicht zuletzt wegen seiner Kontakte zu deutschen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkreisen geschätzt. Unter anderem lieferte er Donovan Hintergrundinformationen über den Industriellen Eduard Schulte (OSS-Codenummer 643), der die Amerikaner als erster über die systematische Judenvernichtung der Nationalsozialisten unterrichtete. Im Juli 1943 wurde Sherman über die Kontakte zwischen Dulles und Schulte informiert. OSS-Bern an OSS-Washington, 3.7. 1943, in: NA, RG 226, Entry 134, box 339, folder 1817 sowie OSS-Bern an OSS-Washington (undatiert, ca. 15. 8. 1944), in: ebenda, box 277, folder 1579; ferner Walter Lacqueur/Richard Breitman, *Breaking the Silence*, New York 1986, bes. S. 207.

<sup>148</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 356 f.

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: The Herman Plan

As per your request, I give you herewith my comments on the Herman Plan, as well as some comments on Doctor Karl Brandt's evaluation of said plan:

1 – The Plan is only as good as the individuals behind it. We know only of Herman. We can guess who some of his associates are from his former associations. We are given some description of the kind of people in the outline of the Plan. They include the groups where anti-Nazi elements can be found, but this element is not likely, by itself, to be able to stage a successful revolution without *very substantial* military assistance, *both* from the Army and the National Socialist Party. It is only in the last groups that real force rests. In short, we should know much more about the personalities involved before coming to definitive conclusions.

2 – The Plan should be studied in the light of its possibly being „phony“ or a „plant“ to split the Allies from Russia. In the light of this, the plan, which is very strongly directed against Russia, is well prepared and arouses suspicion, for the following reasons:

(a) It warns against the pro-Russian elements in Germany.

(b) It tempts the Western Powers with unconditional surrender, complete military occupation and an easy invasion from the West.

(c) It seeks negotiations only with Alexander Kirk (an official American), General Smuts (in effect, an official Britisher), which negotiations would be readily construed as official and compromising. (Dorothy Thompson is suggested to make the Plan look innocent. They know she could never be chosen. One wonders whether a plan which suggests her in this kind of role could be serious).

(d) They ask for absolutely no assurances for the future. (This is not like the Germans. They are not the kind to volunteer a free hand for nothing. Anti-Nazis are still good Germans).

(e) Herman, for a civil servant, travels to Turkey surprisingly easy. He even offers to go to Cairo.

3 – The Germans under this Plan having nothing to lose. If it is „phony“ and „leaks“, it would split the Allies; if successful, it would keep the Russians out of Germany, which they undoubtedly prefer.

4 – The only safe procedure, if any negotiations are pursued, is to take the Russians completely into our confidence.

As regards Doctor Karl Brandt's evaluation of the Plan, I should like to state the following: His observations are substantially sound and well worth noting. However, some comments may be in order.

1 – Doctor Brandt's recommendation of the Plan is as anti-Russian as the Plan itself. He reasons that all alternatives to the Plan result in situations favorable only to Russia.

2 – Doctor Brandt says that we have nothing to lose by attempting the Plan. If we pursued the Plan as proposed and it „leaked“, we could conceivably lose everything.

3 – Doctor Brandt says that there are no alternatives to the Herman Plan; therefore it should be attempted. Even if this were so, which I do not believe, it does not necessarily follow that the Plan must be pursued at the present time or as presented.

4 – Brandt gives the impression that he knows the people behind the plan. Aside from a very few individuals, I doubt that this can be so. Brandt left in 1933. The kind of people with whom Herman and Brandt associated prior to that time cannot stage a successful revolution.

The Power has gone into very different hands and Brandt cannot know whether, or how many, of these people are included.

IHS

Irving H. Sherman

*Dokument 14*<sup>149</sup>

15. März 1944: Memorandum William L. Langer<sup>150</sup> an General William J. Donovan

Top Secret

Subject: Herman Plan

I read the subject plan and its various attachments in your office yesterday afternoon. Since it raises a number of questions of very wide scope one really ought to have it at hand before attempting any criticism of it. Nevertheless, I should like to set down a few points which occur to me. They are only a few because I think many of the thoughts that would occur to any reader of the plan are very effectively dealt with in the Memorandum from Karl Brandt.

- 1) The ABC of the whole matter would be, of course, to determine the size and nature of the organization in Germany supposedly backing this plan. I have just reread the study made by our staff last December on the „German and Austrian Underground Movements“ (R&A #992.1). Members of our staff had not at that time and have not up to the present discovered any evidence to support the contention that there is a fairly large, well organized and influential opposition group such as the Herman Plan suggests. There is some slight evidence for the existence of a basically military opposition organization said to be headed by a general of high rank<sup>151</sup>. This claims to have a following of diplomats, junkers, big industrialists and even a few of the Gestapo. Its orientation is anti-Communist and its main objective a united non-Nazi Germany. Possibly this is the same group supposedly represented by Herman. Personally, I find it extremely difficult to believe that such an opposition organization exists or, if it does, that this opposition is in a sufficiently strong position to give orders and have them carried out. Without entering into a lot of detail, I am still of the opinion that nothing can be done in Germany until the Nazi regime collapses and that no such collapse is probable in the immediate future unless the armies are defeated decisively. It is at least conceivable that under such circumstances an opposition group like the one described might succeed in seizing power though it is also conceivable that the military disintegration may take place piece-meal with various generals making separate arrangements with their enemies<sup>152</sup>.

<sup>149</sup> NA, RG 226 Entry 110, box 47, folder 3.

<sup>150</sup> William L. Langer (1896–1977), Professor für Geschichte in Harvard, arbeitete seit 1941 für den Coordinator of Information und wurde 1942 Nachfolger von James Phinney Baxter III als Chef der Research and Analysis Branch des OSS. Nach dem Krieg war er persönlicher Referent des Secretary of State in nachrichtendienstlichen Fragen, bevor er 1946 an die Harvard University zurückkehrte. William L. Langer Papers in den Harvard University Archives. (Die Bearbeiter danken Mr. Leonard C. R. Langer für die Genehmigung der Einsichtnahme in die Papers).

<sup>151</sup> General Ludwig Beck.

<sup>152</sup> Nachdem es den Deutschen im Herbst und Winter 1943/44 gelungen war, die militärische Lage an

- 2) It goes almost without saying that certain elements or groups in Germany must be thinking in terms of surrender to the British and Americans in order to avoid being overrun by the Bolshevik armies. It is certainly true that for a very long time the upper and middle classes in Germany have been divided between those of western orientation and those of eastern orientation. By and large, I should say that dislike and distrust of Russia outweighed hostility to the Anglo-Saxon world, though recent intelligence would seem to indicate that the middle classes which were the chief supporters of the western orientation have become in a measure Bolshevized through heavy losses by air bombardment. I should rather expect, though, that the larger landholders and the military caste would still lean toward the west rather than toward the east because the west would hold some promise of revival and independent action while the domination of Russia on the continent would mean indefinite subordination to a great military power. My own feeling is that the Anglo-American forces can still count on some measure of sympathy and support and that they could even strengthen their hold if they were able to offer the Germans something more promising than abject and complete surrender.
- 3) Coming back to the Herman plan, it is clear that the main objective of its supporters is to hold a pretty generous line against the Russians in the east and to enlist the British and Americans in the defense of Germany against the Bolsheviks. This is a well-worn theme which by this time has become pretty much hackneyed. It seems to me that it would be a very grave mistake to enter upon any such plan without full knowledge and agreement from the Russians. There is no denying the fact that they are the greatest land power in Europe and that there is nothing either the British or the Americans can do to alter that fact. My own conviction is that the present Russian government is prepared to play ball but is equally prepared and determined to execute a volte-face if the British and Americans do not play fair. In this connection, I am convinced that from every point of view they have much greater possibility of independent action than have the western powers.
- 4) I do not believe that the Herman group is strong enough to really make a substantial contribution. As a matter of fact, this group itself states that it can be of no service unless the western powers make an all-out effort which would lead to victory. It may be that after a successful invasion of western Europe a group of this type could emerge and serve a very useful purpose in reducing the length of the campaign and the loss of life, but it seems to me that it would do this in any event and in its own interests so that there is no sense in our obligating ourselves. Certainly it would be a vast mistake for any military commander to count upon such inside aid and to modify his plans accordingly. The whole thing appears to me to involve a great deal of risk for us without any commensurate gain.
- 5) My recommendations would be:
  - (a) To keep the wires open and find out as much as possible about the constitution and prospects of this group;

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der Ostfront und in Italien zu stabilisieren, rechneten R&A und die Joint Chiefs of Staff nicht mehr mit einem baldigen „Collapse of Germany“. Siehe R&A 1849, German Misinterpretation of the Unconditional Surrender, 3.2. 1944, in: NA, RG 59. Auch im britisch-amerikanischen Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) betrachtete man eine erfolgreiche Invasion als Voraussetzung für den Zusammenbruch: „Probabilities of German collapse“, 21.10. 1943, in: NA, RG 165, ABC 381, Germany Sec 1-A.

- (b) To inform the Russian government that we have been approached in this way but do not propose to commit ourselves excepting in agreement with the Allied powers;
- (c) If agreeable to Russia and Britain, to give such aid and comfort as may be possible to the group with a view to using it later as a nucleus for a post-Nazi government;
- (d) To lay all military plans as though this group did not exist.

*William L. Langer*

Director, Branch of Research and Analysis

*Dokument 15*<sup>153</sup>

19. März 1944: Memorandum Captain F.[ritz] E.[rnst] O.[ppenheimer]<sup>154</sup> an General William J. Donovan

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: HERMAN PLAN

After reading the expose re Herman Plan, I wish to make the following observations.

A. GENERAL

The plan proposes conditions of collaboration with the Allies. It stands to reason that any plan which would save human lives and hasten the victory of the Allies must be given most careful consideration and should be followed up, provided

- a. We do not disclose in our negotiations with the Herman group our own plans, and
- b. We do not rely on the assistance promised by the Herman group in formulating our plans.

B. BACKGROUND: RUSSIAN AND ANGLO-SAXON ORIENTATION  
IN GERMANY

The political background of Germany to-day is rather well-analyzed, but the following points could be made more clear:

- a. Germany is torn between the Western and Eastern (Asiatic) civilizations. This split permeates the whole of Germany and dates back to long before the Nazi Regime. Hitler was not able to overcome this cleavage. According to the expose, the only „decided and conspicuous“ opponents of Naziism are divided into a western (pro-Anglo-Saxon) and an eastern (pro-Russian) wing. It is overlooked, however, that the split between western and eastern orientation is noticeable in the whole Nazi party and in all Nazi organizations. Even in the highest ranks of the Nazi officials, there were (and I believe there are still to-day) men who favor alliance with Russia. The „German friends of Russia“ expect of course that once an alliance is concluded, Germany, with her greater efficiency, will be able to absorb Russia. This orientation is based mainly on the theory that Germany, having lost its chance to build

<sup>153</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68.

<sup>154</sup> Für die Identifizierung des Autors spricht ein handschriftlicher Zusatz „Oppenheimer“, die General Donovans Exemplar des Memorandums aufweist; in: ebenda. Zu Oppenheimer vgl. Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933, Bd. I, hrsg. von Werner Röder/Herbert A. Strauss, München/New York u. a. 1980, S. 542.

an overseas empire, must seek compensation for its expansionist tendencies in Russia with her unlimited resources. I may, in this respect, refer to Professor (General) Haushofer<sup>155</sup>, well known here as a Geo-Politician, whose basic theory is that whoever dominates the „Heartland“ (Europe and Asia) controls the world – the „Heartland“ being the greatest unified island on this globe.

b. It is, of course, difficult to tell how important in the Wehrmacht is the Russian oriented group as compared with the pro-Anglo-Saxon group, but I dare to question the correctness of the statement that „In the Wehrmacht, the pro-Russian orientation is stronger than the western, and in the Luftwaffe the former is supreme“. This is a new development which must have been caused by the amazing success of the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force. During the last war, the German officer rated the Russian soldier very low indeed. Compared with the western front, the war in Russia after Tannenberg was looked upon as a place of relaxation. When this writer was east of Tarnopol in the autumn of 1917, the Russian Army was no match whatsoever for the German Army. I do not wish to imply that the statement in the expose is wrong; I have no means to check its truth. In any case, the Russian orientation of the German Army and Air Force is a highly significant point which requires most careful consideration.

c. The reference in the expose to the Rapallo Treaty is misleading. The treaty did not bring about „a far-reaching understanding regarding military collaboration and reciprocal training facilities“ between the two countries<sup>156</sup>. This document bears the signature of Walter Rathenau, then Foreign Minister of the German Republic and an exponent of German industry. He did not conclude this treaty for any military reasons. His philosophy was fundamentally un-militaristic, but he believed that Russia alone was able to save his country from complete financial bankruptcy. His vision was justified. The cooperation between German industry and Russia was very intimate during the following nine years up to the rise of Hitler.

d. In addition to the Wehrmacht and Nazi officials, one could find to-day Russian oriented persons among the SA, the labor class, the „have-nots“, and in particular among the politically most active group – the youth. To the young people, Russia seems to promise more than the Anglo-Saxon world.

e. The expose emphasized that, apart from the Nazi party, there are left in Germany two elements vested with political power – the Officers' Corps and the upper ranks of the civil service. I doubt whether this statement is quite correct. Neither officers of the Wehrmacht nor the upper ranks of the civil service are really politically minded, and except for a very few, none have any political influence. On the other hand, the expose does not mention the leaders in Finance and Industry (D-Banks, I. G. Farben, potash syndicate, et cetera). They

<sup>155</sup> Karl Haushofer, General im Ersten Weltkrieg, begründete den Wissenschaftszweig Geopolitik in Deutschland und war Mitarbeiter des Auswärtigen Amtes. Rudolf Heß war 1922 sein Assistent an der Berliner Hochschule für Politik gewesen. Haushofers Sohn Albrecht gehörte dem Widerstand gegen Hitler an. Vgl. Edmund A. Walsh, Die Tragödie Karl Haushofers, in: Neue Auslese 2 (1947), S. 27ff.; zu Albrecht Haushofer vgl. Walter Stubbe, In memoriam Albrecht Haushofer, in: VfZ 8 (1960), S. 236–256.

<sup>156</sup> Vgl. hierzu neuerdings Carole Fink/Axel Frohn/Jürgen Heideking (Hrsg.), Genoa, Rapallo and the Reconstruction of Europe in 1922, Cambridge, Mass. u. a. 1991, speziell den Aufsatz von Peter Krüger, A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922. The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy, S. 49–64.

surely still exercise a certain influence on developments in Germany. This latter group sympathizes with the United States and England.

f. As a result of the continuous advance of the Russian Armies and the threat to Germany proper from the East, the gap between eastern and western orientation will undoubtedly have widened much more than we realize over here. In fact, Germany today might believe that there is only one of two courses to escape complete annihilation:

either negotiate with Russia to prevent an American-British invasion,

or appeal to the British-American forces to occupy Germany in order to prevent a Russian invasion.

The first course is confirmed by the expose in the following unequivocal manner:

„Among the Eastern wing the foundation of the German Officers' League at Moscow has evoked a powerful echo, the more so, as the leaders of the League are recognized in the Wehrmacht as officers of outstanding ability and personal integrity by the standards of their caste. This group has for a long time been in direct communication, including regular wireless contact, with the Soviet Government, until a breach of security on the Russian side led to the arrest and execution of many high-placed officers and civil servants early in 1943.“

The importance of this statement cannot be exaggerated. The alternate course is adopted by the Herman group which we deal hereafter.

### C. STANDING OF THE HERMAN GROUP

The expose defines it as „an extremely influential group of the German opposition inside Germany“. No names are mentioned, nor is any evidence given in support of this statement. Judging by the spokesman of the group who was sent to Turkey this writer believes that the western group is genuine, serious and reliable in its sympathy for the Anglo-Saxon Allies. Herman represents intellectuals, industrialists, members of the liberal professions, lawyers, doctors, officers, civil servants, and potential middle classes, better placed workmen, who are all united in their hatred of Bolshevism. It is certainly easier to work with them than with members of the so-called underground, the majority of whom will be Communistic. On the other hand, the weakness of the Herman group consists of their very loose organization and of their lack of active political momentum as well as their lack of integration with the masses. Brüning, with his high ethics and ideals, is powerless against von Ribbentrop, the expert in intrigues and treachery<sup>157</sup>. Although I do not question the sincerity and loyalty of the Herman group, I don't really have confidence in their ability to carry out their plans. This uncertainty, however, should not prevent us from continuing discussions and negotiations in order to gain additional information. At present, very little if anything is known about their intended strategy and plans of operation.

<sup>157</sup> Im OSS, insbesondere in der Foreign Nationalities Branch, gab es seit 1942 Spekulationen über die Rückkehr Heinrich Brünings von Harvard nach Deutschland. Später erfolgte ein Versuch Otto Johns, Brüning über das OSS zu kontaktieren und ihn zur Übernahme eines politischen Amtes nach Kriegsende zu bewegen. OSS-Interviews mit Brüning in: NA, RG 226, Entry 100 sowie OSS-Washington an OSS-Bern, 29. 5. 1944, in: ebenda, Entry 138, box 2.

## D. SUBSTANCE OF THE PLAN

The plan itself contains only two positive points:

- a. It accepts military defeat and occupation by as well as surrender to the American-British Allies, motivated by the fear of a Russian invasion.
- b. The expose mentions the Tilsit-Lemberg Line as the point where the Russian advance must be stopped as an important condition for the success of the plan.

This would mean that the part to be occupied by British-American troops would include not only all of Germany but also a great part of Poland east of Warsaw. Although I have at present no means to check, it is believed that this line coincides more or less with the boundary line agreed upon between Germany and Russia in 1940<sup>158</sup>. This shows clearly the intention of the Herman group to keep the Russian Army far away from the original German border. In fact, Dr. Brandt calls this plan „the only practical and permissible way to keep Russia out of Central Europe.“ This is one point which has to be kept in mind. The plan is intended to be and must also be interpreted to be Anti-Russian.

The plan is completely silent as to the method by which assistance can be rendered to the Allies; how opposition in Germany against any intended cooperation with the Allies can be crushed; how a premature betrayal of the plan can be prevented; or how a provisional free democratic government can be established in Germany or Austria against the armed and violent opposition of the Nazi regime.

Apart from this negative aspect, the plan is rather vague as to the course to be followed in order to get more widespread support in Germany. It is stated that, „the envisaged democratic government should operate at home with a very strong left wing and lean heavily on the Social Democrats and organized labor, even, if necessary, seek the cooperation of personally unimpeachable independent communists“. When Hitler came to power, the Social Democrats and labor were well organized but were swept away in no time without offering the slightest resistance. Social democrats have been suppressed for ten years; labor is no longer organized except in the Labor Front. Is there any reason to believe that to-day these groups will show the courage and determination and aggressiveness necessary to defeat the brutal Nazi regime? Moreover, does the author understand „personally unimpeachable independent Communists“ to mean Germans who are anticapitalist and anti-Russian? Without the support of pro-Russian circles, the plan does not seem to be feasible.

In view of the foregoing, I feel that the leading representative of the group has not yet done too much hard thinking about the proposed plan or has not yet disclosed his ideas in spite of „the frequent and searching conversations and discussions“ which took place.

## E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION

Though the plan is still very immature, I suggest giving it most careful consideration. We can only benefit from maintaining contact with the group for the following reasons:

- a. We gain additional valuable information.
- b. We should do from here whatever might increase the differences inside Germany and thus strengthen the opposition to the regime. If we encourage the Anti-Nazi forces, we weaken the power of the Nazi Armies to resist the Allies.

<sup>158</sup> Die Linie entspricht in etwa der Interessengrenze, die im Geheimprotokoll zum deutsch-sowjetischen Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 28. 9. 1939 festgelegt worden war.

c. We might obtain assistance and cooperation which would save lives and hasten victory.

The following course of action is recommended: In view of the revelation referred to under „C“ concerning the German Officer's League in Moscow and the fact that the plan might and will be construed as anti-Russian in character, I would submit the plan to Russia and would ask for information about the German Officers' League.

I would immediately resume the contact with the Herman group to get enlightenment on the following questions:

1. Who is their key man in the Ministry of Transportation (Reichs-Eisenbahn); the communication system; the Wehrmacht; in the Luftwaffe (Milch, who as is known became Aryanzed through Goering?<sup>159</sup>); in the Labor Front; in the Nazi party, in the Police, in Finance and Industry?
2. Who are the candidates for the provisional government?
3. What would be the best beachhead for invasion in France, Holland, Belgium, and Norway?
4. What measures are contemplated to
  - a. prevent a betrayal of the plan for collaboration, and
  - b. to smash any opposition by the Nazi party, the Nazi government and the Wehrmacht to the establishment of a new provisional government and to any kind of cooperation with the Allies?
5. What are the chances for a unilateral German-Russian understanding, and what means are being considered to prevent such an action?
6. How many divisions would be shifted from western Europe to the eastern front to facilitate an invasion by the Allies in the West?
7. What contacts have been made with people in France, Belgium, and Holland to insure cooperation in case of Allied invasion?
8. What would be the best measures for obtaining inside Germany more support for the plan?
9. What aerodromes would members of the group be able to occupy to insure safe landing of Allied Troops?
10. Which radio stations could be occupied by the Herman group?
11. To what extent could the group destroy refineries, power plants, and other installations as a signal for the invasion?

#### *Dokument 16*<sup>160</sup>

24. März 1944: Memorandum Wallace R. Deuel an General William J. Donovan

<sup>159</sup> Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch war am 30. 1. 1933 als Günstling Görings zu dessen Stellvertreter als Reichskommissar für die deutsche Luftfahrt, einen Monat später zum Staatssekretär ernannt worden. Da er für die katastrophalen Mißerfolge der Luftwaffe im Winter 1943/44 verantwortlich gemacht wurde, entzog man ihm bis Januar 1945 sämtliche Funktionen. Vgl. Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika. Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich*, New York 1952.

<sup>160</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 180, A 3304, Roll 68. Das Dokument ist in den Headquarter Records (ebenda, Entry 190) nicht überliefert.

## TOP SECRET

## Subject: Herman Plan

1. Regarding the political aspects of the plan, I concur in Dr. Langer's views<sup>161</sup>, without, however, being quite as pessimistic as he is as to the possibility that the Group might be able to accomplish something of great value to us. Also, I subscribe to his recommendations.

2. In addition to the points Dr. Langer makes in this connection, these other points may be relevant:

(a) Any form and any degree of cooperation with us by the Group would contribute toward the rise of a new „stab in the back“ myth, with all the tragic consequences that would entail.

(b) The kind of a deal here proposed, which would leave the Soviets out in the cold, might well cause a violent reaction, among the masses of the German people, in favor of Russia and against the Western Allies, which in not too long a time might throw the Reich into the arms of the Russians.

(c) Even if the Group's plans should work out up to and including the engineering of a defeat in the West, the „Eastern“ element might be able to seize control of the situation. This element, as the Plan itself states, is „considerably stronger“ than the Group.

(d) The members of the Group are, of course, German nationalists who in the long run undoubtedly would seek to establish a German hegemony in Europe.

(e) Even assuming both the goodwill and the security of the Group, the fact that the Group has been in touch with us with an essentially anti-Russian proposal will almost certainly come to the Soviet's knowledge, with quite possibly disastrous consequences.

3. For the rest, I know Herman extremely well<sup>162</sup>. He and his wife are among the closest and dearest friends Mary and I have ever had. The most useful comment I can make on the plan therefore derives from my friendship with him.

4. There can be no question as to Herman's courage, his good faith, the closeness of his ties with the sorts of people he says he represents, or his intelligence. I am as sure as I am of anything in this world that no kind and no degree of intimidation could [induce] him to make the kind of representations he is here quoted as making, if he knew or even suspects [them to be false]. Also it would be difficult for anyone to use him as an unwilling pawn in a deception; he knows too much and is too intelligent.

5. The one major reservation I might suggest is this: that both he and his principals may overestimate their ability to deliver and/or underestimate the ability of the [Nazis] to prevent them from delivering. It is my own belief that Herman and the Group have made precisely this miscalculation.

6. To explain the assurance with which I speak of Herman's intelligence, integrity and courage, [I may] append the following brief account of my friendship with him:

He looked me up [w]hen [I] first [went] to Berlin for Col. Knox in 1914, and introduced himself as an old friend of Edgar Mowrer's<sup>163</sup> and Dorothy Thompson's.

<sup>161</sup> Dok. 14.

<sup>162</sup> Zu den geheimen Treffen zwischen Moltke und Deuel, an denen auch Kirk und Kennan beteiligt waren, siehe George Kennan an Robert D. Murphy 10. 5. 1945, in: PUA Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Kennan Papers, box 28. Vgl. Anm. 6.

<sup>163</sup> Edgar Ansel Mowrer war Berlin-Korrespondent der „Chicago Daily News“. Moltke hatte ihn über Dorothy Thompson kennengelernt und nach dem Jurastudium kurzzeitig erwogen, als Assistent

I satisfied myself as well as I could of his good faith before I had much to do with him, but in the course of a few months found that my caution had been unnecessary, and he, Freya, his wife, and Mary and I became very close friends.

Parenthetically, Herman is approximately my age (I am 38) and so is Freya. They have two children. The first, who must now be about 5 or 6 years old, is named Casper (spelling not guaranteed)<sup>164</sup>. The second child has been born since I left Germany, [and] I am not sure either of its age or its sex<sup>165</sup>.

Herman was always anti-nazi, and made little secret of it; so much so that I used to worry about his safety. He always said, though, when I cautioned him, that life wouldn't be worth living if he had to repress all his feelings, and that besides, all his ancestors for hundreds of years back had always guessed strong on revolutions, and there was no use his trying to do anything about [it now].

[. . .]<sup>166</sup>

Herman maintained this attitude after the outbreak of the war. When the war began, he was practicing law in Berlin, specializing, as I recall it, in cases of international law and conflicts of law. He shared offices just inside the Brandenburg Gate with a lawyer named Leverkuhn [sic] who had practiced for a time in this country and [whom] I know slightly also. [S]oon after the outbreak of the war, Herman went into the legal section of either the High Command or the General Staff, I forgot which, to advise on questions of international law. His chief was Brauchitsch. (Incidentally, Franz von Halder is Casper's godfather<sup>167</sup>).

Herman and I continued to see each other about once a week, at his insistence and although it would have meant the end of him if it had become known that he was seeing me at all. The blackout facilitated our rendez-vous, but it was damnably dangerous for him all the same.

He used to tell me a good deal of what was going on in the High Command: plans for the future, current operations and the disaffection of certain elements. Most of this information I could never use, but it helped me to an extraordinary degree just to know it.

At that time, and up to my departure from Germany in December, 1940, Herman had little or no faith in the possibility that an effective opposition existed or could be erected among the sorts of people described as now constituting the Group. The generals in particular, he said,

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von Mowrer nach Chicago zu gehen. Vgl. Edgar Anselm Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, New York 1933 (Harmondsworth<sup>2</sup> 1937), sowie Shiela Grant Duff, *Fünf Jahre bis zum Krieg (1934–1939). Eine Engländerin im Widerstand gegen Hitler*, München 1978, S. 68–84.

<sup>164</sup> „Caspers“ Taufname war Helmuth Caspar Graf von Moltke.

<sup>165</sup> Gemeint ist der 1941 geborene Konrad von Moltke.

<sup>166</sup> An dieser Stelle wurden zwei, auf dem Donovan-Microfilm (NA, RG 226, Entry 180) nicht entzifferbare Paragraphen ausgelassen.

<sup>167</sup> Daß Halder tatsächlich Caspars Patenonkel war, läßt sich nicht verifizieren. Jedenfalls beanspruchte auch Lionel Curtis für sich, der Pate Caspar von Moltkes zu sein. Curtis an Beckett, 26. 6. 1943, in: BLA Oxford, Lionel Curtis Papers MS 99/14ff. General Franz Halder war Ludwig Becks Nachfolger als Generalstabschef des Heeres; er setzte die von Beck geknüpften Kontakte mit Goerdeler, Schacht, Gisevius, Canaris und Oster fort. Zur unterschiedlichen Beurteilung Halders vgl. Heidemarie Gräfin Schall-Riauour, *Aufstand und Gehorsam. Offizierstum und Generalstab im Umbruch. Leben und Wirken von Generaloberst Franz Halder, Generalstabschef 1938–1942*, Wiesbaden 1972 und Gerd Ueberschär, *Generaloberst Halder im militärischen Widerstand 1938–1940*, in: *Wehrforschung* 3 (1973), S. 20–31. Neuerdings außerdem Christian Hartmann, *Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942*, Paderborn/München/Wien u. a. 1991.

were terrified of Hitler and Himmler, and were neither able nor willing to attempt any measures aimed at the regime. Thus, when the very highest-ranking generals called on Hitler, they were instructed by one of the Chancellor's adjutants to toe the line literally as well as figuratively: to stand in a geometrically perfect straight line, with their toes along the same crack or line in the floor, because any other posture annoyed Hitler. Again, the Gestapo controlled and edited the news reports, which were the only ones the highest-ranking generals ever saw, except for the daily newspapers – and they were actually too busy to read even those.

The only way the outside world's news could get to the General Staff and the High Command was by radio, because the generals did have their own radio digest reports of foreign broadcasts. Herman asked me when I came home to try to do whatever was possible to improve American broadcasts to Germany, with this in mind.

These are petty details, but typical to a vast number of facts pointing toward the same conclusion.

The most that the generals dared try to do to block the big offensive against France and the Low Countries in 1940 was to fake some weather reports to try to discourage the opening of the attack.

Another cause for the weakness of the opposition, Herman used to say, was the conviction the members then shared that there was no alternative; that it would be impossible to talk sense to either Chamberlain or the French.

Moreover, the Gestapo controlled field intelligence and communications of even the highest echelons in the armed services.

When I told Herman I was coming home, he asked me to introduce him to Alexander Kirk, then charge d'affaires in Berlin, and to some one other Embassy officer of outstanding discretion and intelligence. I chose George Kennan for this. Herman thereafter kept in touch with both Alexander and George, I believe.

Alexander tended at that time to be most skeptical regarding the possibility that the opposition could do anything effective.

When I left Germany, Herman said he would try to communicate with me but that I should not try to get in touch with him. He also suggested that I get in touch with a brother of his then living near Philadelphia<sup>168</sup>, but I never did this.

I have received two letters from Herman since my return to this country. One he sent from Italy, where he had gone on a trip; this was before Pearl Harbor. The second came a few months ago from Stockholm. Both were signed by false names, but there was no question that they came from him. Both letters were purely personal. I thought there might be some hidden message in the second, and had our people go over it, but they found nothing. I don't know whether Herman knew of my connection with you. Both letters were addressed to me at the paper<sup>169</sup>, but obviously that proves nothing.

7. If you wish to check the individuals among the Group whose identities may become known to you, I suggest that Major General Arthur W. [Vansman], USAAF, would be good on the military, and, on the civilians, Alexander Kirk himself, or James Riddleberger<sup>170</sup> or

<sup>168</sup> Siehe Anm. 134.

<sup>169</sup> Chicago Daily News.

<sup>170</sup> James Riddleberger war einer der Deutschlandexperten im State Department und gehörte unter anderem dem Editorial Board in Psychological Warfare against Germany an; vgl. NA, RG 226, Entry 99, box 69, folder 306.

Henry P. Leverich<sup>171</sup> of the Central European Division of the State Department, or George F. Kennan, now, I believe, in Lisbon<sup>172</sup>. I don't think either Truman Smith or Raymond Geist would serve this particular purpose notably well.

8. One other point regarding Herman's good faith: When I came home on leave after the Polish campaign, he asked me to deliver a message to Lord Lothian, whom he knew, to the effect that he (Herman) and others like him were still doing what they could to try to save Germany, although this was not very much. I delivered this message. I also delivered a personal message to the South African Minister to be forwarded to Herman's relatives in South Africa.

*Dokument 17a*<sup>173</sup>

2. April 1944: Brief General William J. Donovan an Shepard Morgan, OSS-Planning Group  
TOP SECRET

Mr. Shepard Morgan  
The Planning Group

Dear Shepard:

I am asking you to have the Planning Group examine this paper<sup>174</sup> before I send it to the Joint Chiefs. I am anxious to get it in before I leave the country, so if they have any comments that they think should be included, I would like to receive word by Thursday afternoon in San Francisco.

My only feeling is that we should get this information to Russia and to Britain in order by that reconnaissance to see if they have likewise been dealt with.

Sincerely,  
William J. Donovan

*Dokument 17b*<sup>175</sup>

2. April 1944: William J. Donovan, Entwurf eines Memorandums an die Joint Chiefs of Staff  
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Herman Plan

1. I am attaching to this a copy of the proposal handed to our people in Istanbul several weeks ago by a member of the group known as Herman<sup>176</sup>. Herman is the name of a mem-

<sup>171</sup> Leverich war zur gleichen Zeit wie George F. Kennan an der US-Botschaft in Berlin beschäftigt. 1943/44 gehörte er im State Department dem sogenannten Germany Committee an, in dem Fragen der Nachkriegsplanung für Deutschland erörtert wurden. Vgl. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs*. 1925–1950, Boston/Toronto 1967, S. 174.

<sup>172</sup> George F. Kennan war bereits seit Januar 1944 als Delegierter der European Advisory Commission und Botschaftsrat in London tätig. Vgl. Kennan, *Memoirs*, S. 164 ff.

<sup>173</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 390.

<sup>174</sup> Dok. 17 b.

<sup>175</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frame 394 f.

<sup>176</sup> Dok. 3.

ber of the Prussian landed nobility, a well-known lawyer, who, at the time of the delivery of the paper, was attached to the German High Command as an expert on international questions.

2. At that time, I directed our representative to enter into no talks but to keep open the channel of communication<sup>177</sup>.

3. A short time ago, further overtures were made and a meeting was requested for some time in the coming month.

4. Since this request has come in, Herman, who was an intimate friend and former law partner of the Chief of German intelligence in Istanbul<sup>178</sup> has been arrested and is still in custody<sup>179</sup>. We are not yet advised what member of the group may take his place; however, it seemed that we had come to such a point that the matter should be presented to you and for submitting recommendations and asking for instructions.

5. The Standing of the Herman Group. I am personally acquainted with certain members of this group and know them to be sympathetic to the British and to the Americans<sup>180</sup>. I am assured by those competent to know that members of this group can be found among the intellectuals, the industrialists, members of the liberal professions and the higher level of workmen. Its weakness lies in its loose organization, its lack of integration with the great mass of the people, and its failure of proof as to any political strength or ability to carry out the plan.

6. The plan itself pivots upon two conditions;

a. It accepts military defeat and occupation by as well as surrender to the American British Allies, motivated by the fear of a Russian invasion, and

b. The expose mentions the Tilsit-Lemberg Line as the point where the Russian advance must be stopped as an important condition for the success of the plan.

This would mean that the part to be occupied by British-American troops would include not only all of Germany but also a great part of Poland. This would seem to show the intention of the Herman Group to keep the Russian Army far away from the original German border. The only fair interpretation, then, is to consider it as an anti-Russian proposal.

7. That this is the true interpretation is borne out by the statement made in the proposal as to Russian and Anglo-Saxon orientation in Germany. In pointing out that Germany is torn between the western and eastern civilizations, the writer of the paper merely repeats what one finds stated so often in Germany. This split is said to date back beyond the Nazi regime and permeates the whole of Germany including the Nazi organizations themselves.

<sup>177</sup> Dok. 6.

<sup>178</sup> Paul Leverkuehn.

<sup>179</sup> Dok. 12.

<sup>180</sup> Hier sind an erster Stelle Adam von Trott zu Solz und Paul Leverkuehn zu nennen. In New York hatte Donovan im April 1937 Adam von Trott getroffen. Adam von Trott zu Solz an Shiela Grant Duff, 18.4. 1937, in: *A Noble Combat. The Letters of Shiela Grant Duff and Adam von Trott zu Solz 1932–1939*, hrsg. von Klemens von Klemperer, Oxford 1988, S. 223. Aus den FBI-Akten zu Adam von Trott geht hervor, daß sich Donovan und Trott auch 1941 getroffen haben. Edward A. Tamm, Memorandum for the Director, 31.10. 1941: „You are advised that Colonel Donovan called me by telephone at three p. m. and indicated that the President was interested in this matter and that a further conference was to be held in Colonel Donovan's office at once“; in: FBI, Trott file 65-5938/9 (181–223).

It is said that to-day Russian oriented persons can be found in the labor class and in the youth of all classes.

8. As a result of the continuous advance of the Russian allies and the threat to Germany proper in the East, the gap between eastern and western orientation may be widened much more than we realize here.

9. It will be noted in the paper that the founders of the German Officers' League at Moscow are recognized as men of outstanding ability and personal integrity as judged by the standards of their caste. The Herman Group, seeing only one of two alternatives:

- a. To negotiate with Russia to prevent an American-British invasion, or
- b. To appeal to the American-British forces to prevent a Russian invasion, seeks to adopt the second alternative.

10. The plan, however, is completely silent as to the method by which assistance can be rendered to the Allies; how a premature betrayal of the plan can be prevented; or how a provisional democratic government can be established in Germany or Austria against the opposition of the Nazi regime.

11. In view of the fact, that this proposal is aimed against Russia, it seems to me that it is our duty to call the matter to the attention both of Great Britain and of Russia – as a matter of fairness. Further, as a matter of wisdom, it might be a means of ascertaining whether or not any propositions have been made by the pro-Russian group. In any case, it appears to be indicated that we should make the disclosure of this paper.

12. It is therefore recommended that the proposed plan be turned over to both the British and the Russians; and, if to do this on a higher level would seem to give it too much significance, that the turnover could be made to the organizations in both countries corresponding to OSS as incident to the nature of the work of these organizations<sup>181</sup>.

William J. Donovan  
Director

*Dokument 18*<sup>182</sup>

3. April 1944: Memorandum Whitney Shepardson, OSS-Planning Group, an General William J. Donovan

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Herman Plan

1. Papers relating to this plan were considered at a meeting of the Planning Group this morning, 3 April, 1944, together with your draft of a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 2 April, 1944<sup>183</sup>. The Planning Group had the advantage of discussion with Mr. Macfarland in order to clear up with him certain points of fact.

<sup>181</sup> Ab Dezember 1943 kam es zu einer Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem OSS und dem sowjetischen NKVD, vgl. hierzu die Quellenedition *The OSS-NKVD Relationship, 1943-1945*, hrsg. von J. Dane Hartgrove, New York/London 1989 (Covert Warfare, vol. 3).

<sup>182</sup> NA, RG 226, Entry 190, M 1462, Roll 52, frames 391 ff.

<sup>183</sup> Dok. 17 b. Neben Whitney Shepardson als Acting Chairman waren folgende Personen anwesend: Major General J. P. Smith, Vice Admiral W. T. Tarrant, Robert Woods Bliss, Colonel Buxton, Wil-

2. Responsive to your request for comment, the following is submitted:

a. The Group feels that if any submission is to be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is undesirable to make submission in present form, since (a) several of the accompanying papers are not self-explanatory, in some instances containing neither the name of the addressee or the name of the writer; and (b) dates of certain of these attendant papers do not appear. It becomes difficult, therefore, to see the papers in their relationship to each other. Indeed, in spite of the background of the Planning Group, it was necessary to ask Mr. Macfarland to identify several of the papers.

b. The dossier contains a letter addressed to Mr. Kirk, which Mr. Macfarland has stated was signed by Herman<sup>184</sup>. This letter, and various references to Mr. Kirk in other papers, indicates [sic] very great knowledge on his part of the plan and of discussions connected with it than is the case. Mr. Kirk was personally unwilling to play any part in it and did not wish his name to appear in this matter in any shape or form. To carry out his wishes and to protect him from any possible misunderstandings of his position, by the Department of State and/or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is felt by the Planning Group that every reference of any kind of description to Mr. Kirk should be omitted.

3. It is recommended that the plan be not transmitted to the Joint Chiefs at this time because,

a. A careful study of the plan indicates that there is no action of a military character which the Joint Chiefs could take upon it.

b. If the Group should be employed further, or exploited further by OSS, any discussion of this matter might impair such exploitation.

c. The Planning Group feels, and Mr. Macfarland confirms, that these discussions are tenuous in making the statement of the situation rendered more precise before being brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs.

4. Note being taken of the fact that the expose and attendant papers are premised upon feelings of the Russians and hostility toward them, and the preparation of plans whereby Germany might be occupied by the „Anglo-Saxons“ with the Russians being held away from Germany on a military line, Tilsit-Lene [sic], the Planning Group feels that this paper would be unacceptable to the Russians in the extreme and might cause damage to the group in the hands of the Russians without producing thereby any military benefit<sup>185</sup>.

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liam S. Culbertson, Lt. Comdr. Kenneth W. Hinks. Dr. R.C. Tyron sowie Lanning Mcfarland. Auch William J. Donovan war vorübergehend präsent. In seinem Kommentar zum Herman-Plan hob er hervor, man solle die Joint Chiefs of Staff informieren „to ascertain if the British and Russians had received similar proposals“. Vgl. OSS Planning Group, Minutes of 375th Meeting, 3. 4. 1944, in: ebenda, Entry 144, box 6, folder 41.

<sup>184</sup> Dok. 1.

<sup>185</sup> Acht Tage nach dem Attentat vom 20. Juli teilte Donovan dem Londoner OSS-Chef David Bruce mit, man werde den Russen unter keinen Umständen die OSS-Informationen über den deutschen Widerstand übermitteln. Die gleiche Anweisung habe er bereits vor ungefähr einem Jahr über türkische Kanäle übermittelt: „A group much like the Breakers, or possibly the Breakers themselves, said they were ready to help us in the West as a means of keeping Russia out. Simultaneously, it was reported that similar group [sic] was inclined towards the Soviet [sic]. I took up this proposition with the British, and we concluded that it would be wiser not to inform the Soviet [sic], (1) because it might arouse their suspicions of us rather than impress them with our desire to be helpful, and (2) because there was some evidence that the eastern-oriented group had already approached them with proposals“; in: NA, RG 226, Entry 146, box 235.

5. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Macfarland be instructed to continue his enterprise on an exploratory and informal basis and that he be given the mission to concentrate upon the possibility of using the Herman connections in some way as to assist the invasion effort without any regard whatsoever for any further consideration such as the future of Europe or the future of Germany. That, in particular, he be instructed to play upon this group as a possible instrument of double agents or in any way coldly calculated to promote the success of the invasion, without any regard whatsoever for the German individuals involved, their safety, personal relations to them, or the ultimate effect upon Germany once the invasion has succeeded. The Group feels that this is a proper and authorized function of OSS which can be carried on without reference either to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the Department of State. If successful, these two agencies of government can be notified of results when the job is done.

*Whitney Shepardson*