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Table of Contents 3/2012
Essays:
- Eva Oberloskamp: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre. Political Learning Processes in Dealing with Transnational Terrorism. [
 Abstract] - Thies Schulze: Anti-Communism as a Political Guideline? Affinities and Conflicts between the Holy See and the Nazi Regime in 1933. [Abstract]
- Tal Bruttmann, Laurent Joly und Barbara Lambauer: The Beginning of the Persecution of the Jews in France in 1940: A Case of German-French Interaction. [Abstract]
- Stephan Lehnstaedt: The German Labour Administration in the General Government and the Jews. [Abstract]
Documentation:
- Dieter Neitzert: The German Foreign Office between Versailles and Rapallo. The Retrospective Account of State Secretary von Simson. [Abstract]
Memo:
Reviews online (April-June 2012)
Abstracts
Eva Oberloskamp: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre. Political Learning Processes in Dealing with Transnational Terrorism. On a number of occasions in early March 1933, Pope Pius XI voiced the opinion, that Hitler was the only statesman doing something against Communism. His utterances were in no way spontaneous or thoughtless, as some of his interlocutors suspected. Rather they expressed his hope that the new government in Germany could be won as an ally against the Communist threat and the alleged accompanying moral decline. Even though the period of rapprochement towards Germany, which the Pope initiated after the Reichstag fire, only lasted for a few weeks and even though Pius XI noticeably moved away from his rather benevolent view of German politics since late April 1933, this phase was certainly important for the relationship between church and state during the “Third Reich”. During this time, essential decisions were made, including the commencement of negotiations about the Reich Concordat. The article examines the motives on which the papal view of Germany was based, and in particular investigates the question which domestic and foreign policy aims it was connected with. It discusses the reasons why papal policy was once again revised as of May 1933. Finally it provides a perspective on the later years of the Nazi regime and discusses whether and to what extent anti-communist motives influenced papal policy even after 1933.
Read More: http://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/abs/10.1524/vfzg.2012.0018
[German language only]
Abstracts / Top of page
Thies Schulze: Anti-Communism as a Political Guideline? Affinities and Conflicts between the Holy See and the Nazi Regime in 1933.
On a number of occasions in early March 1933, Pope Pius XI voiced the opinion, that Hitler was the only statesman doing something against Communism. His utterances were in no way spontaneous or thoughtless, as some of his interlocutors suspected. Rather they expressed his hope that the new government in Germany could be won as an ally against the Communist threat and the alleged accompanying moral decline. Even though the period of rapprochement towards Germany, which the Pope initiated after the Reichstag fire, only lasted for a few weeks and even though Pius XI noticeably moved away from his rather benevolent view of German politics since late April 1933, this phase was certainly important for the relationship between church and state during the Third Reich. During this time, essential decisions were made, including the commencement of negotiations about the Reich Concordat. The article examines the motives on which the papal view of Germany was based, and in particular investigates the question which domestic and foreign policy aims it was connected with. It discusses the reasons why papal policy was once again revised as of May 1933. Finally it provides a perspective on the later years of the Nazi regime and discusses whether and to what extent anti-communist motives influenced papal policy even after 1933.
Read More: http://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/abs/10.1524/vfzg.2012.0019German language only] Abstracts / Top of page
Tal Bruttmann, Laurent Joly und Barbara Lambauer: The Beginning of the Persecution of the Jews in France in 1940: A Case of German-French Interaction. Why did both the German Military Commander in France and the French Government in Vichy publish anti-Jewish decrees almost simultaneously in autumn 1940? Which influences affected both sides? Did each side act independently from one another? A review of the available sources shows, that the German military administration had not initially envisaged special treatment of the Jewish population and that its first measures did not proceed without hesitation. In the unoccupied area, French government officials were pursuing their own plans of antisemitic legislation in the summer of 1940. The announcement of German steps was more of an obstacle than an advantage to these efforts. Ultimately these different initiatives led to an acceleration of the measures against Jews throughout the whole of France.
Read More: http://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/abs/10.1524/vfzg.2012.0020[German language only]
Abstracts / Top of page
Stephan Lehnstaedt: The German Labour Administration in the General Government and the Jews. The German Labour Administration in the General Government of Poland was also responsible for Jewish labour between the summer of 1940 and mid-1942. It established a system of registration, placement and remuneration of the Jews, which – after certain initial difficulties – came into universal use. The Labour Offices favoured “voluntary” employment, which specifically took advantage of the desperate situation that the ghettoised Jews found themselves in. Simultaneously forced labour was dismissed as its economic benefit seemed too minimal. For this reason, 80 to 90 percent of the working Jewish population were working voluntarily and for remuneration (in cash or foodstuffs) from the turn of the year 1940/41 to mid-1942. Wages were however neither adequate nor sufficient. Even so their manpower was preserved to a certain degree and, most importantly, their exploitation was total. The German Labour Administration proved to be a sort of agent of the Jewish labourers inherent to the system, which, while not protecting their rights, still offered preservation out of self-interest. For the National Socialist war economy, this form of exploitation of the Jews was the most efficient method. In the summer of 1942, however, the primacy of ideology over economic considerations asserted itself, as the extermination of the Polish Jews began despite their extensive and useful labour.
Read More: http://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/abs/10.1524/vfzg.2012.0021[German language only]
Abstracts / Top of page
Dieter Neitzert: The German Foreign Office between Versailles and Rapallo. The Retrospective Account of State Secretary von Simson. In his recently discovered memoirs written shortly before his death in 1941, Ernst von Simson reports about his activities as head of the legal department and as State Secretary for economic issues in the German Foreign Office between 1918 and 1922. He speaks about the international tensions, which mostly resulted from the Treaty of Versailles, and his opposition to the extradition of German officers. It was his duty to sign the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles as the German representative. His memories of the conferences in Spa in 1920 and in London in 1921 illustrate the cold atmosphere of the first post-war negotiations and end in a detailed description of the economic conference in Geneva in 1922. In this context von Simson avows his personal role in the conclusion of the German-Russian Treaty of Rapallo, which he still saw as positive almost twenty years after its signing.
Read More: http://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/abs/10.1524/vfzg.2012.0022[German language only]
Abstracts / Top of page
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