

**Amerikanische Besatzungsherrschaft in Japan 1945–1947\***  
Dokumentation von Wolfgang Benz

Die amerikanische Besatzungspolitik gegenüber Japan unterschied sich von der gegenüber Deutschland nicht so sehr durch die Zielsetzung – wie Entmilitarisierung und Demokratisierung – als durch die Methode<sup>1</sup>. Deutschland, stückweise niedergeworfen und erobert, verlor im Mai 1945 seine staatliche Existenz, seine staatliche Einheit, einen beträchtlichen Teil seines Territoriums; die deutsche Regierung wurde durch die totale Verfügungsgewalt von vier Okkupationsmächten ersetzt, übrig blieb eine dezentralisierte Administration, die nur im Auftrag der Sieger handeln konnte. Mit Japan, das vier Monate später, im August 1945, die Waffen gestreckt hatte, wurde anders verfahren: Sein organisiertes Staatswesen mit Kaiser, Regierungsapparat und Parlament blieb intakt, das Staatsgebiet wurde nicht in verschiedene Okkupationssphären aufgeteilt<sup>2</sup>, die Präsenz fremder Truppen blieb ziemlich geringfügig, der einzelne Japaner hatte nicht viel mit ihnen und gar nichts mit einer Militärregierung zu tun. Die Herrschaft der Sieger wurde indirekt, ausschließlich über die japanische Regierung und deren Organe ausgeübt. Die Amerikaner hatten sich aus einer Reihe von Gründen entschlossen, die Macht über Japan allein auszuüben, allenfalls ein Stück der Verantwortung mit den Alliierten bzw. den Opfern der japanischen Aggression zu teilen. Die Niederkämpfung Japans war zur Hauptsache das Werk amerikanischer Truppen gewesen, die Sowjetunion, die nachdrücklich verlangte, ebenfalls einen Teil Japans zu besetzen, war erst wenige Tage vor der japanischen Kapitulation in den pazifischen Krieg eingetreten. Das amerikanische Engagement im pazifischen Raum war traditionell stärker als das Interesse an europäischen Angelegenheiten<sup>3</sup>; die Monroe-Doktrin hatte die amerikanische Außenpolitik nur gegenüber

\* Die im folgenden abgedruckten Dokumente, die einen Überblick über die Gesamtanlage der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Japan vermitteln, werden in Hinblick auf das zu erwartende internationale Interesse ausnahmsweise in englischer Sprache gebracht. Diese Ausnahme bedeutet aber kein Abgehen von dem Grundsatz, unseren Lesern auch fremdsprachige Dokumente in der Regel in deutscher Sprache vorzustellen. *Die Herausgeber*

<sup>1</sup> Die amerikanischen Besatzungsziele gegenüber Japan sind in folgenden Dokumenten festgelegt: United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, August 29, 1945; Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, JCS 1380/15, November 3, 1945; Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, June 19, 1947; abgedr. u. a. in: A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941–1949, Washington 1950, S. 627 f., 633 f., 652 f.

<sup>2</sup> Japan hatte auf den Stammiseln kaum Territorialverluste erlitten, rechnet man jedoch die Außenbesitzungen hinzu, die um die Jahrhundertwende völkerrechtlich unangefochten erworben worden waren, wie Korea (1905), Formosa (1895) oder Süd-Sachalin (1905), so beläuft sich der Gebietsverlust nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg auf 45 %. Zählt man auch den Satellitenstaat Mandschukuo mit, so wurde Japan sogar auf 19 % des Vorkriegsgebiets reduziert.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1945–1947, New York 1947, S. 254 f.

Europa abgegrenzt, in Asien waren die Vereinigten Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert selbst als imperialistische Macht aufgetreten: 1854 hatte ein amerikanisches Geschwader unter Commodore Perry die Öffnung japanischer Häfen und den Abschluß eines Handelsvertrags erzwungen, 1897 begann mit der Annexion Hawaiis die territoriale Expansion, 1898 waren die Philippinen unter US-Hoheit gekommen. Die Politik der offenen Tür gegenüber China und das damit verbundene Engagement in Ostasien war für die amerikanische Außenpolitik auch ein wichtiger Faktor geblieben, als Washington nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg der europäischen Szene den Rücken gekehrt hatte. Das Bedürfnis, Japan allein und ungeteilt zu besetzen, resultierte auch aus dem Schock von Pearl Harbor, und schließlich haben die aus der Besetzung Deutschlands schon vorliegenden Erfahrungen ebenfalls dazu beigetragen, daß in Washington keine Neigung zu kollektiver Kontrolle und Verantwortung der Geschicke eines in Zonen eingeteilten Japan bestand<sup>4</sup>.

Der Einfluß, den die Amerikaner ihren Verbündeten freiwillig konzederen wollten, bestand in der Teilnahme an einer beratenden Kommission (Far Eastern Advisory Commission, FEAC). Am 21. August 1945 luden die USA China, Großbritannien und die UdSSR zur Teilnahme an der FEAC ein; trotz des sowjetischen Vetos begann die Kommission mit der Arbeit und studierte von Dezember 1945 bis Februar 1946 die Möglichkeiten der Abrüstung und des wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbaus in Japan. Auf der Moskauer Außenministerkonferenz im Dezember 1945 einigten sich die Großmächte dann auf die Einrichtung von zwei Instanzen, die an der Besetzung Japans mitwirken sollten. Die Far Eastern Commission (FEC), der zunächst elf Nationen<sup>5</sup> angehörten, trat im Februar 1946 erstmals in Washington, ihrem ständigen Sitz, zusammen. Ihr oblag die Ausarbeitung der politischen Leitlinien, aufgrund derer Japan die Kapitulationsbedingungen erfüllen sollte, und sie hatte die Möglichkeit, gegen Direktiven des amerikanischen Oberbefehlshabers in Japan Stellung zu nehmen. Militärische und territoriale Probleme gehörten nicht in den Kompetenzbereich der FEC. Als zweites alliiertes Organ wurde in Tokio der Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) installiert, ihm gehörten unter dem Vorsitz des amerikanischen Oberbefehlshabers bzw. seines Stellvertreters Delegierte Chinas, der Sowjetunion und Großbritanniens (zugleich für Australien, Neuseeland und Indien) an. Der Allied Council hatte im wesentlichen nur beratende Funktion, der amerikanische Oberkommandierende verspürte allerdings keine Lust, sich des Rates dieser Institution zu bedienen und strafte sie mit Mißachtung.

Die tatsächliche Macht in Japan lag bei General MacArthur, der in seiner Dop-

<sup>4</sup> Harry S. Truman, Memoiren Bd. I, Stuttgart 1955, S. 447.

<sup>5</sup> Australien, China, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Indien, Canada, Niederlande, Neuseeland, Philippinen, UdSSR und USA; ab 16. November 1949 gehörten auch Burma und Pakistan der FEC an.

pelfunktion als Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) und Commander-in-Chief, Far East der amerikanischen Streitkräfte im gesamten Fernen Osten eine einzigartige Machtfülle ausübte und genoß<sup>6</sup>. MacArthur, der diese Stellung seit 6. September 1945 innehatte, empfing seine Richtlinien von der amerikanischen Regierung<sup>7</sup>. Die Far Eastern Commission der 11 Mächte konnte nur über die US-Regierung und nur prinzipiell auf die Besatzungspolitik einwirken. Für FEC-Beschlüsse war einfache Mehrheit und Übereinstimmung der vier Großmächte China, UdSSR, USA und Großbritannien erforderlich. Das bedeutete in der Praxis, daß die Vereinigten Staaten durch „interim directives“ allein entscheiden und handeln konnten<sup>8</sup>.

MacArthurs General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokio, das der Doppelfunktion des Oberbefehlshabers entsprechend zwei ganz verschiedene Aufgaben zu erfüllen hatte, nämlich die nichtmilitärischen Besatzungsfunktionen für Japan (GHQ, SCAP) und die militärische Leitung aller amerikanischen Truppen im Fernen Osten (GHQ, Far East Command), war damit das eigentliche Zentrum der Besatzungspolitik in Japan, und das um so mehr, als MacArthur in autokratischem Selbstbewußtsein nicht nur den alliierten Organen wenig Hochachtung entgegenbrachte, sondern auch seine direkten Vorgesetzten in Washington bis hin zu Präsident Truman durch Eigenmächtigkeit ärgerte<sup>9</sup>. MacArthur spielte mit entschieden größerer Überzeugung als etwa Lucius D. Clay in der US-Zone Deutschlands die Rolle des Prokonsuls in Japan. Er hatte auch die besseren Voraussetzungen: beträchtlicher Schlachtenruhm aus dem Krieg im Pazifik sicherte seine Stellung gegenüber der öffentlichen Meinung seines Heimatlandes, und eine gewaltige amerikanische Bürokratie in Tokio mit ergebenen Mitarbeitern an der Spitze seines Stabs garantierte ihm Unabhängigkeit und freie Hand in Japan. Dort scheint seine durch „gütigen Optimismus“ erworbene Gloriole immer noch zu

<sup>6</sup> Vgl. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, New York 1964; John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur. Japan, Korea and the Far East*, New York 1951; Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur. His Rendezvous with History*, New York 1956.

<sup>7</sup> Entscheidungen wurden im State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) bzw. dessen „Far Eastern Subcommittee“ vorbereitet, über das State Department dem Weißen Haus vorgelegt und dann durch die Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) an SCAP übermittelt.

<sup>8</sup> Ab Mitte 1947 gewann die Far Eastern Commission etwas mehr Einfluß auf die Besatzungspolitik, zu dem Zeitpunkt waren aber die meisten Weichen schon gestellt. Die große Eile der Reformen erklärt sich zum Teil auch dadurch, daß vollzogene Tatsachen geschaffen werden sollten, ehe die FEC handlungsfähig war. – Zur Errichtung der FEC siehe *Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan*, December 27, 1945, in: Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, New York 1948, S. 117 ff. Zur Vorgeschichte s. *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers* [künftig: FRUS] 1945, Vol. VI, Washington 1969, S. 497 ff.; s. a. *Activities of the Far Eastern Commission*, Department of State Publication 2888, Washington 1947.

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Truman, *Memoiren* Bd. I, S. 561 ff., Bd. II, S. 394 ff. u. 497 ff.

strahlen<sup>10</sup>; in der neueren amerikanischen Literatur hingegen gibt es sehr skeptische Beurteilungen: „For although it would be an error to view MacArthur as an innovator of policy in Japan, the entire occupation was under his egocentric shadow. His overwhelming personal vanity demanded fealty from his staff and a public image of himself as the personal creator of Japans ‚spiritual revolution‘.“<sup>11</sup>

Knapp zwei Jahre nach der Niederlage Japans konnte der Chef der Okkupationsarmee (im ersten der nachstehend abgedruckten Berichte) erklären lassen: „Japan, bis vor zwei Jahren ein feudaler Polizeistaat, beherrscht von einer Oligarchie aus Militaristen, Bürokraten und Geschäftsleuten, die mehr als 80% des Handels, der Industrie und der Finanzen des Landes kontrollierten, ist in eine moderne Nation verwandelt worden, deren Verfassung wirtschaftliche, soziale, politische und kulturelle Freiheit garantiert.“ Eine wahrhaft erstaunliche Zwischenbilanz militärischer Besatzung, besonders erstaunlich deshalb, weil die Betroffenen auch nachträglich kaum Einspruch gegen diese Darstellung erhoben.

Die amerikanische Besetzung Japans, die mit dem Inkrafttreten des Friedensvertrags von San Francisco (28. April 1952) endete<sup>12</sup>, wird bis heute überwiegend als ungewöhnlich geglücktes Experiment der Erziehung einer Nation zur Demokratie angesehen. Als äußerliches Symbol der erfolgreichen Reformen gilt das Wirtschaftswachstum des Landes, dem ebenso wie dem deutschen Aufschwung nach der Besatzungszeit (unter Nichtbeachtung langfristiger Trends) der Charakter eines Wunders zugesprochen wurde. Die Frage, ob der Wiederaufstieg beider Länder dank oder trotz des amerikanischen Einflusses erfolgte, ist hier nicht zu beantworten. Die Dokumentation einer Zwischenbilanz amerikanischer Besatzungspolitik, die SCAP im Sommer 1947 vorlegte, geschieht vielmehr zunächst in der Absicht, Vergleichsmöglichkeiten für solche Untersuchungen zu schaffen. Die Gegenüberstellung der historischen Entwicklungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Japans – beide Länder weisen ja neben einer sehr ähnlichen Ausgangssituation 1945 eine Generation später parallele Symptome wirtschaftlicher und politischer Stabilität auf – ist, nicht zuletzt wegen der Sprachbarrieren, noch kaum in Angriff genommen worden<sup>13</sup>. Bei der Betrachtung der japanischen

<sup>10</sup> Vgl. Ikubiko Hata, Japan unter amerikanischer Besatzung, in: Arnulf Baring, Masamori Sase u. a., Zwei zaghafte Riesen? Deutschland und Japan seit 1945, Stuttgart 1977, S. 203; Shigeru Yoshida, Japan im Wiederaufstieg. Die Yoshida-Memoiren, Düsseldorf 1963, S. 51 f.

<sup>11</sup> Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954, New York 1972, S. 305.

<sup>12</sup> Einen kurzen Gesamtüberblick zur Besetzung Japans gibt Ikubiko Hata, a. a. O., dort auch Hinweise auf ältere Darstellungen; vgl. auch Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, Princeton 1963.

<sup>13</sup> Ein fürs erste beachtlicher Versuch liegt seit kurzem vor: Arnulf Baring, Masamori Sase u. a. (Hrsg.), Zwei zaghafte Riesen? Deutschland und Japan seit 1945, Stuttgart 1977. Das

Nachkriegszeit, vor allem der ersten beiden Jahre, die hier im Mittelpunkt stehen, fällt der Reformeifer der Amerikaner, mit dem sie sowohl radikal in der Sache als auch atemberaubend im Tempo in fast jeden Lebensbereich der Japaner eingriffen, ebenso auf wie der Reformwille der Japaner, die, ganz anders als die Deutschen, ohne Murren, ja mit Begeisterung, mitmachten. Zur Erklärung dieses Phänomens gibt es mehrere Hypothesen. Viele Amerikaner glaubten in naiver Selbsteinschätzung an einen natürlichen Minderwertigkeitskomplex und Untertanengeist der Japaner, der sie darin bewog, die amerikanischen Errungenschaften freudig zu übernehmen<sup>14</sup>. Shigeru Yoshida, Japans Premierminister während des größten Teils der Besatzungszeit, entwickelte dagegen die Philosophie des guten Verlierers, der nach besten Kräften mit den Besatzungsbehörden zusammenarbeitete und „nach freimütiger Kritik“ alle Entscheidungen des Siegers akzeptierte. Diese Philosophie funktionierte aufgrund des guten Einvernehmens zwischen MacArthur und Yoshida, die in ihrer Persönlichkeitsstruktur wie in ihren politischen Anschauungen gewisse Ähnlichkeiten aufwiesen<sup>15</sup>. Edwin O. Reischauer, dessen Bücher für das amerikanische Japan-Verständnis nach dem Krieg einzigartige und kaum zu überschätzende Bedeutung gewannen<sup>16</sup>, ergänzt die These Yoshidas noch dadurch, daß er die Amerikaner als geniale und generöse Gewinner beschreibt, denen auf der Verliererseite in Japan ideale Partner gegenüberstanden<sup>17</sup>. Möglicherweise war auch die Konformität der japanischen Gesellschaft ein wesentliches Element für die Bereitschaft, Reformen hinzunehmen<sup>18</sup>, auf jeden Fall war es nicht das erste Mal, daß die Japaner den Beweis für ihre Fähigkeit erbringen konnten, fremde Errungenschaften, seien es kulturelle, wirt-

Buch enthält auch eine sehr nützliche kommentierte Bibliographie. In Deutschland schwer zugänglich ist dagegen Robert E. Ward and Frank Joseph Shuhman, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952. Annotated Bibliography of Western Language Materials*, Chicago 1974. Die Referate der im Mai 1977 in Washington veranstalteten Konferenz „Americans as Proconsuls: U. S. Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952“, die teils von Historikern, teils von ehemals Handelnden gehalten wurden, sind noch nicht im Druck erschienen. Vergleichende Studien zur amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Japan und Deutschland sind in fernerer Zukunft zu erhoffen, wenn die überreichen Materialien der Besatzungsbürokratien aufgearbeitet sind: Während die Erschließung und Verfilmung der Akten der US-Militärregierung für Deutschland (OMGUS) durch deutsche Historiker und Archivare seit längerem im Gange sind, steht die Auswertung der Besatzungsakten für Japan (SCAP) durch japanische Historiker unmittelbar bevor.

<sup>14</sup> Truman, *Memoiren* Bd. I, S. 560 f.

<sup>15</sup> Yoshida, a. a. O., S. 60 f.

<sup>16</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan. The Story of a Nation*, New York 1974 (Neuaufgabe des seit 1946 in zahlreichen Auflagen erschienenen Buches *Japan: Past and Present*); ders., *The United States and Japan*, Cambridge, Mass. 1965<sup>9</sup>. Vgl. auch Nathan Glazer, *From Ruth Benedict to Herman Kahn: The Postwar Japanese Image in the American Mind*, in: Akira Iriye (Ed.), *Mutual Images. Essays in American Japanese Relations*, Cambridge, Mass. 1975, S.138 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, S. 234.

<sup>18</sup> Ebenda, S. 133.

schaftliche, technische, rechtliche oder politische, zu adaptieren und in ihre traditionellen Strukturen zu integrieren. Eine Grundübereinstimmung zwischen MacArthur und der japanischen Oberschicht bestand auch in der gemeinsamen Furcht vor einer kommunistischen Revolution in Ostasien, die die Zusammenarbeit ungemein erleichterte.

Festzuhalten bleibt auch, daß die optimistische Beurteilung der amerikanischen Erfolge in Japan durch amerikanische Historiker und Politologen im Lauf der Jahre abnahm, die Erfahrung des Vietnamkrieges verstärkte die Skepsis erheblich. An die Stelle der Demokratisierungs- und Modernisierungseuphorie trat, am schärfsten artikuliert von Joyce und Gabriel Kolko, die Überzeugung, Amerika habe von Anfang an das Besatzungsziel vertreten, Japan als einzige Industrienation Ostasiens unter amerikanischem Einfluß zu behalten, und daher versucht, durch Reformen einerseits die politische Kultur der Vereinigten Staaten zu exportieren, andererseits nach Ausbrechen der aggressiven Giftzähne des japanischen Imperialismus das konservative Vorkriegssystem zu stabilisieren und damit im wesentlichen den status quo ante der japanischen Expansion der 30er Jahre wiederherzustellen<sup>19</sup>.

Die nachfolgend abgedruckten Dokumente sind eine Momentaufnahme aus der Perspektive der Besatzungsbürokratie, sie haben natürlicherweise den Charakter von Erfolgsmeldungen und sind entsprechend zu beurteilen. Ihr Wert liegt neben der Darbietung von Fakten und Details, die zum Vergleich mit denen der Okkupation Deutschlands einladen, auch darin, daß sie das Selbstgefühl der Funktionäre und das Sendungsbewußtsein der Besatzungsmacht spiegeln.

Die drei Berichte mit dem gemeinsamen Obertitel „Two Years of Occupation“ wurden unter Verantwortung des Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers vom Public Information Office im GHQ aus Einzelberichten der Abteilungen zusammengestellt. Die Berichte „Political“ (Dokument I) und „Economic“ (Dokument III) sind auf den Deckblättern mit „August 1947“ datiert, beim Social Report (Dokument II) fehlt die Datierung ebenso wie der Hinweis auf das Public Information Office. Die Berichte sind vervielfältigt, die Exemplare, die dieser Veröffentlichung zugrunde liegen, befinden sich in den Akten des Adjutant General der amerikanischen Militärregierung für Deutschland (OMGUS) in den National Archives Washington<sup>20</sup>. Wegen des erheblichen Umfangs (Political 47, Social 13, Economic 27 Schreibmaschinenseiten) konnten einige Abschnitte jedes Dokuments nicht abgedruckt werden. Statt einer Kommentierung „en detail“

<sup>19</sup> Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, New York 1972, S. 300 ff.; viel früher schon die Kritik bei Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, Chicago 1960; aufschlußreiches Material, basierend auf empirischer Sozialforschung, enthält ferner Bradley M. Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan*, Berkeley 1974.

<sup>20</sup> Record Group 260, AG 1947, box 123, folder 1.

wurde jedem der drei Dokumente ein zusammenfassender Überblick vorangestellt. Nicht belegte Zitate in diesen Vorbemerkungen entstammen ausnahmslos den abgedruckten Dokumenten.

### I. Verfassung, Regierung, Parteien, Verwaltung

Um ihre langfristigen Okkupationsziele zu erreichen, leiteten die Amerikaner im Herbst 1945 ein ehrgeiziges Reformprogramm ein, das die Japaner jedoch selbst in die Praxis umsetzen durften (bzw. mußten). Auf amerikanischer Seite war die Government Section im Hauptquartier MacArthurs zuständig, sie war am 2. 10. 1945 als „Beratungsgremium“ eingerichtet worden<sup>21</sup>. Die Government Section hatte mindestens die Ideen zu liefern und den notwendigen Druck auf die japanischen Stellen auszuüben. Ihre Operationen wurden auf amerikanischer Seite als überaus geglückt empfunden, nicht nur wegen der greifbaren Ergebnisse, sondern auch weil sie so reibungslos verliefen, daß das von manchen befürchtete Chaos, der Zusammenbruch des japanischen Regierungsapparats, ausblieb.

Die Reform des politischen Systems in Japan erforderte folgende Schritte:

- 1) Transfer der Souveränität vom Kaiser auf das japanische Volk und deren Garantie durch die Erklärung der Menschenrechte nach westlichem Vorbild,
- 2) eine demokratische Verfassung,
- 3) eine direkt gewählte Volksvertretung als höchstes Organ der Staatsgewalt,
- 4) Dezentralisierung und Demokratisierung der Regierungsgewalt durch gewählte regionale und lokale Selbstverwaltungen,
- 5) Reform der traditionellen Familienordnung, politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Gleichberechtigung der Frau,
- 6) Säuberung wichtiger Positionen im politischen und wirtschaftlichen Leben von den Verantwortlichen für die aggressive ultranationalistische und imperialistische Politik,
- 7) Beseitigung von mindestens 150 Organisationen, die diese Politik gefördert und getragen hatten,
- 8) Beseitigung des Staats-Shintoismus als Instrument der Unterjochung des Bewußtseins der Japaner,
- 9) Reform des Bildungssystems („Freiheit der Lehre statt Reglementierung“, „historische Wahrheit anstelle von Mythen und Legenden“),
- 10) Bodenreform zur Schaffung einer neuen Schicht von kleinen Grundbesitzern,
- 11) Abschaffung des Systems der staatlich geschützten Privatmonopole, das einem Dutzend Familien die Kontrolle über 80 % der Wirtschaft erlaubt hatte,

<sup>21</sup> Vgl. die voluminöse Selbstdarstellung: SCAP, Government Section (Ed.), *Political Reorientation of Japan. September 1945 to September 1948 in two Volumes*, Washington 1949 (Reprint Westport Conn., 1970) [künftig: *Political Reorientation*].

## 12) Befreiung der Arbeiter von Koalitionsverbot und Ausbeutung.

Höchste Priorität hatte für das ganze Reformwerk die Vorbereitung der neuen Verfassung. Über den Entstehungsprozeß des in der gesamten Verfassungsgeschichte einmaligen japanischen Grundgesetzes ist aus dem amerikanischen Dokument wenig mehr zu erfahren, als daß es nach vielen Diskussionen in verschiedenen Gremien und in der Öffentlichkeit mit breiter Zustimmung des japanischen Volkes, ohne daß eine einzige Vorschrift durch SCAP ergangen wäre, am 6. November 1946 verkündet worden und am 3. Mai 1947 in Kraft getreten ist, als „ein historischer Markstein im uralten Kampf der Menschen um Freiheit, ein Leuchtfeuer nicht nur den Völkern des Fernen Ostens, sondern der ganzen Welt“. Im Anhang des Berichts werden dann die Grundzüge der japanischen Verfassung und die Wirkungsweise ihrer Organe dargestellt<sup>22</sup>.

Im Oktober/November 1945 hatte eine Kommission aus japanischen Fachleuten unter dem Vorsitz Joji Matsumotos mit Verfassungsberatungen begonnen. Über die Ergebnisse, die Ende Januar 1946 vorlagen, waren die Amerikaner entsetzt, bestanden die neuen Entwürfe doch lediglich in einer sehr behutsamen Adaption der Meiji-Verfassung von 1889 (der die preußische als Vorbild gedient hatte) an die veränderten Verhältnisse<sup>23</sup>. Auf Weisung MacArthurs wurde daher in Klausursitzungen der Government Section unter General Whitney ein vollständiger Verfassungsentwurf erarbeitet. Diese Modellverfassung, deren Väter Charles L. Kades (Chef der Public Administration Division), Milo E. Rowell (Chef der Legal Branch) und Alfred R. Hussey waren<sup>24</sup>, wurde innerhalb einer Woche eronnen und am 13. Februar 1946 im japanischen Außenministerium übergeben. Das Erschrecken war nun auf seiten der Japaner, sie waren nicht nur durch den revolutionären Inhalt des amerikanischen Papiers, sondern auch durch den Zeitdruck, unter den sie gesetzt wurden, überrascht und bestürzt. Das Verfassungsmodell war als Empfehlung, keineswegs als Befehl, deklariert, aber die Empfehlung hatte recht zwingenden Charakter, wie die Japaner bei vergeblichen Verhandlungen in den folgenden Tagen und Wochen merkten. Lediglich in der Frage der Parlamentsstruktur zeigte sich das GHQ nachgiebig und konzedierte das Zweikammersystem. Die einzelnen Stadien des Verfassungsentwurfs bis zur Annahme im Reichstag am 7. Oktober 1946 unterschieden sich denn auch substantiell nicht vom Modell, in dem die Grundzüge der amerikanischen (system of checks and balances) und der britischen (supremacy of the legislature) Verfassungsphilosophie miteinander verknüpft waren.

<sup>22</sup> Vgl. Wilhelm Röhl, *Die Japanische Verfassung*, Frankfurt a. M. 1963.

<sup>23</sup> Die verschiedenen Entwürfe (und auch die Meiji-Verfassung) sind abgedruckt in: *Political Reorientation II*, S. 536 ff., in deutscher Übersetzung teilweise auch bei Röhl, a. a. O., S. 147 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Vgl. Ikuhiko Hata, a. a. O., S. 198 f.

Die wichtigsten Errungenschaften der den Japanern verordneten Verfassung bestanden daher in der Verankerung der bürgerlichen Grundrechte, der Kontrolle der Regierung durch das Parlament, der Trennung von Justiz und Exekutive und in der Reform des vom Adel besetzten Oberhauses zu einem gewählten Senat.

Die am stärksten ins Auge springenden Maximen der Verfassung trugen MacArthurs Handschrift: die Stellung des Kaisers als Staatssymbol ohne politische Macht und der berühmte Artikel 9, in dem das Recht zur Kriegführung und Bewaffnung aufgehoben ist<sup>25</sup>.

So revolutionär diese Grundsätze waren, sie wirkten auch stabilisierend, einmal nach außen, weil sie das Mißtrauen der Alliierten, etwa in der Washingtoner Fernost-Kommission gegenüber Japan dämpfen halfen, zum anderen nach innen, wo sie von vielen als Akt der Fürsorge für die Erhaltung des Kaisertums empfunden und daher akzeptiert wurden<sup>26</sup>.

Die in der Potsdamer Deklaration geforderte Säuberung Japans vom Einfluß derjenigen, „die das japanische Volk getäuscht und irregeleitet“ hatten<sup>27</sup>, begann im Oktober 1945. Die Grundsätze der als Präventivmaßnahme ohne Strafcharakter gekennzeichneten Aktion wurden am 4. Januar 1946 der japanischen Regierung mitgeteilt<sup>28</sup>. Der betroffene Personenkreis war in sieben Kategorien klassifiziert:

- A Kriegsverbrecher,
- B Militärs ab Generalstabsrang, alle Offiziere und Mannschaften der Militärpolizei und der Geheimdienste, alle höheren Ränge im Kriegs- und Marineministerium,
- C verantwortliche Mitglieder von 123 ultranationalistischen, terroristischen oder geheimen Organisationen,
- D bestimmte einflußreiche Mitglieder von Vereinigungen wie der „Gesellschaft zur Unterstützung der Kaiserlichen Herrschaft“,
- E Funktionäre von wirtschaftlichen Organisationen zur Ausbeutung der besetzten Gebiete,
- F leitende Angehörige des japanischen Regimes in den besetzten Territorien,
- G „weitere Militaristen und Ultranationalisten“ (in diese Kategorie fielen auch Künstler, Schriftsteller, Publizisten, Wirtschaftsführer, die irgendwie die japanischen Kriegsziele propagiert und unterstützt hatten).

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. *Political Reorientation I*, S. 102; die Version, daß der Inhalt des revolutionären Artikels 9 vom damaligen Premier Shidehara initiiert worden sei, wurde zwar von MacArthur selbst kolportiert (*Reminiscences*, Crest Pocket Book 1965, S. 346 f.), ist aber wenig wahrscheinlich (vgl. Yoshida, *Japan* S. 134).

<sup>26</sup> Vgl. Yoshida, a. a. O., S. 152.

<sup>27</sup> *Political Reorientation II*, S. 413; *Archiv der Gegenwart* 1945, S. 337.

<sup>28</sup> In der Direktive SCAPIN 550, s. *Political Reorientation II*, S. 482 ff.

Wichtigstes Werkzeug der Säuberung waren, wie bei der Entnazifizierung in Deutschland, Fragebogen<sup>29</sup>. Die Durchführung lag in den Händen der Japaner, wurde aber natürlich von SCAP überwacht.

Die Wirkung schon der einleitenden Säuberungsdirektive war beträchtlich. Das Kabinett Shidehara geriet im Januar 1946 in eine Krise, drei Minister und zahlreiche hohe Beamte traten zurück. Eine weitere Welle von Demissionen erfolgte am 9. März. Mit der Ausdehnung der Säuberungsaktion im Januar 1947 wurde die ganze politische Szene verändert, Parteiführer (wie der Vorsitzende der Liberalen, Hatoyama) mußten in der politischen Versenkung verschwinden, von den 3384 Kandidaten für das Unterhaus wurden 252 ausgeschlossen.

Im ersten Jahr nach dem 4. Januar 1946 fielen 1067 Personen der Säuberung zum Opfer, in der zweiten Phase, die am 4. Januar 1947 begann, waren es bis Mitte 1947 weitere 1681 von bis dahin insgesamt 563 099 Überprüften. 183 000 Berufsoffiziere, Polizisten und Angehörige des Geheimdienstes waren außerdem schon bei der ersten Säuberungswelle suspendiert worden, weitere 20 000 Personen hatten sich durch Aufgabe ihrer Positionen der Säuberung entzogen. Im Berichtszeitraum waren 16 047 Entscheidungen durch SCAP überprüft worden, in 47 Fällen wurden die japanischen Maßnahmen mißbilligt. Im August 1946, als die japanische Regierung das Ende der ersten Säuberungsphase verkündete, verlangte SCAP die Ausdehnung auf das Informationswesen (Massenmedien), auf bestimmte Positionen der Wirtschaft und auf Amtsinhaber bis hinab zum Bürgermeister oder Ortsvorsteher. Das Gros der Überprüfungen mußte vor den Wahlen im April 1947 durchgeführt werden, es handelte sich um 3426 Kandidaten für das Unterhaus, 1406 für das Oberhaus, 451 Gouverneurskandidaten, 43 Bewerber für Bürgermeisterämter in den großen Städten und 72 550 in kleineren Städten und Dörfern, 42 252 Kandidaten für Verwaltungsgremien usw. Von der obersten Instanz, dem zentralen Prüfungsausschuß, der dem japanischen Premierminister verantwortlich war, wurden schließlich noch einmal 11 Unterhaus- und 4 Oberhauskandidaten ausgeschieden. Die Säuberung in der Wirtschaft begann im April 1947; bis Mitte des Jahres waren von 3200 Überprüften 292 von wichtigen Posten ausgeschlossen worden. Nicht enthalten in diesem Zahlenmaterial sind Zehntausende, die zu Beginn der Säuberung keine öffentlichen Ämter mehr innehatten, oder etwa 5000 Lehrer oder rund 6000 Angehörige der Geheimpolizei, die schon im Oktober 1945 von ihren Posten entfernt worden waren.

Mit der Vorbereitung des Internationalen Militärtribunals gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher (Kategorie A) beschäftigte sich seit 8. Dezember 1945 die International Prosecution Section von SCAP. Sie stellte das Beweismaterial der Anklage wegen Verbrechen gegen den Frieden (Vorbereitung des Angriffskrieges

<sup>29</sup> Muster ebenda, S. 486 f.

gegen die Mandschurei und China, gegen Frankreich, die UdSSR, USA, Großbritannien und die Niederlande, illegale Befestigung der Mandats-Inseln, Verbrechen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung der Philippinen u. a.) zusammen, das dem am 19. Januar 1946 in Tokio errichteten Tribunal, dem fernöstlichen Gegenstück zum Nürnberger Gerichtshof, unterbreitet wurde. Der Prozeß wurde am 4. Juni 1946 eröffnet; vom 13. Juni bis 24. Januar 1947 dauerte die Beweisaufnahme der Anklage, bei der die Amerikaner 2282 Dokumente und 104 Zeugen gegen die 28 japanischen Angeklagten präsentierten. (Der Gerichtshof, der, von einem Australier präsiert, mit Richtern aus 11 Nationen besetzt war – die Anklage vertrat Joseph B. Keenan, USA–, verurteilte im November 1948 sieben Angeklagte zum Tod, 16 zu lebenslänglichem Gefängnis und zwei zu kürzeren Haftstrafen.<sup>29a</sup>

Für die Kriegsverbrecher der Kategorien B und C war die Prosecution Division der Legal Section von SCAP zuständig. Sie untersuchte zwischen dem 1. November 1945 und dem 21. Juli 1947 2665 Fälle. Ein großer Teil der den Japanern zur Last gelegten Taten bestand in Grausamkeiten gegen Kriegsgefangene, gegen Besatzungen von abgestürzten US-Bombern, die sich mit dem Fallschirm über japanischem Gebiet gerettet hatten, oder in „medizinischen Experimenten“ der japanischen Armee. In den ersten 18 Monaten ihrer Tätigkeit hatte die Prosecution Division in 146 Prozessen gegen 274 Angeklagte vor Militärgerichten mitgewirkt.

Die gesamten Kriegsverbrecherprozesse scheinen – entgegen den amerikanischen Erwartungen – keinen nachhaltigen Eindruck im Bewußtsein der japanischen Öffentlichkeit hinterlassen zu haben. Die Feststellung von Kazuo Kawai, damals Herausgeber der „Nippon Times“ in Tokio, dürfte symptomatisch sein: „At first most Japanese, disillusioned with their wartime leaders, were glad enough to see them brought to justice. As the trials dragged on month after month, however, the public lost interest. Finally, when the end of the trials brought on a renewed burst of publicity, the public was annoyed to be made aware that the trials had been going on so long. Why was further punishment necessary when history itself had already broken and discarded these old men? – such was the common attitude.“<sup>30</sup>

Überhaupt hatten die Japaner für die ganze Säuberungsaktion kein Verständnis. Die Ausschaltung einer riesigen Anzahl von Experten aus Politik, Verwaltung und Wirtschaft wurde einerseits als Opfer empfunden (und zum Teil noch während der Besatzungszeit mit amerikanischem Einverständnis rückgängig gemacht; nach dem Friedensschluß in San Francisco wurde die ganze Angelegenheit durch Aufhebung aller entsprechenden Gesetze erledigt), andererseits sahen die

<sup>29a</sup> Vgl. Sung Yoon Cho, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, in: *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* 24 (1967), S. 309–318; ein Vergleich zwischen den Tribunalen in Nürnberg und Tokio bei Robert K. Woetzel, *The Nuremberg Trials in International Law*, London, New York 1960, S. 226–232.

<sup>30</sup> Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, S. 23.

Japaner auch keine Notwendigkeit für das, wie die Amerikaner glaubten, heilsame Purgatorium: „Wir hatten gar nicht das Bedürfnis, diejenigen zu verfolgen und zu richten, die möglicherweise für unser Elend verantwortlich waren.“<sup>51</sup>

Bei den Wahlen, so heißt es zu Beginn des Abschnitts über die politischen Parteien, war besonders bemerkenswert, daß Kandidaten eher aufgrund persönlicher Qualifikation als wegen ihrer Parteizugehörigkeit siegten und daß Extremisten keine Chancen gehabt hatten. Bei den Aprilwahlen 1947 wurden von den 207 Kandidaten für die 46 Gouverneure der Präfekturen 29 Unabhängige, 5 Liberale, 4 Sozialdemokraten, 3 Demokraten und 5 Kandidaten kleinerer Parteien gewählt. Der Trend zeigte sich bei den Kommunalwahlen noch deutlicher: in den größeren Städten wurden von 202 Bürgermeisterstellen 144 mit Unabhängigen besetzt, in den 4247 kleineren Gemeinden siegten 3716 Unabhängige, 159 Liberale, 145 Demokraten, 126 Sozialisten, 74 Kandidaten kleinerer Parteien, 19 der Kooperativen Volkspartei, 8 Kommunisten.

Im Unterhaus errangen im April 1947 die Sozialdemokraten 144, die Demokraten 130, die Liberalen 129, die Kooperativen 31, Unabhängige 9, die Bauernpartei 8, die Kommunisten 4 Sitze, verschiedene Splitterparteien erhielten zusammen 10 Mandate. Die Koalition aus Sozialisten, Demokraten und Kooperativen verfügte über 305 Sitze gegenüber 159 der Opposition. Im Oberhaus, dem Haus der Räte, hatte eine Gruppierung Ryokufu Kai („Gesellschaft Grüner Wind“) mit 96 Mandaten die meisten Sitze errungen, denen 47 sozialistische, 43 liberale, 42 demokratische, 18 unabhängige und 4 kommunistische Mandate gegenüberstanden. Die Ryokufu Kai verstand sich nicht als Partei, sondern als überparteiliche Vereinigung zur Erneuerung Japans; ihre Abgeordneten rekrutierten sich im wesentlichen aus Mitgliedern des alten Oberhauses, ehemaligen Diplomaten und anderen, die die zweite Kammer als eine Institution oberhalb des Parteienstreits wünschten.

Die Sozialdemokratische Partei, Nachfolgerin einiger Landarbeiterparteien der Vorkriegszeit, erfreute sich der Unterstützung der Mehrheit der Gewerkschaften. Sie propagierte außer einer friedlichen demokratischen Entwicklung Japans die allmähliche Verstaatlichung der Schlüsselindustrien, vertrat die Besteuerung von Kriegsgewinnen und die Annullierung von Kriegsanleihen. Bei der Demokratischen Partei, die im März 1947 als Erbin der früheren Fortschrittspartei gegründet worden war, gab es ebenso wie bei den Sozialisten (mindestens) zwei Richtungen: die Erneuerer unter Außenminister Hitoshi Ashida und eine konservative Faktion, die der frühere Premierminister Shidehara führte. In ihrem Wirtschaftsprogramm hielten die Demokraten die Mitte zwischen der sozialistischen Forderung nach staatlicher Kontrolle und den Liberalen, die das freie Unternehmertum propagierten.

Die Liberalen hatten sich unter Führung von Shigeru Yoshida vor allem dem

<sup>51</sup> Yoshida, a. a. O., S. 155.

Antikommunismus verschrieben. Die Kooperative Volkspartei, als Agrarpartei von Unternehmern gefördert, war eine Nachkriegsgründung, die freilich durch die Säuberung einen beträchtlichen Teil der ursprünglichen Mitglieder verloren hatte. Die Partei, die bald stark an Bedeutung einbüßte, hatte durch den Zusammenschluß mit einer Lehrerorganisation und durch die Aufnahme städtischer Mitglieder zwar ihre Basis verstärken können, verlor aber dadurch den rein agrarischen Flügel, der sich als Bauernpartei selbständig machte.

Zum japanischen Parteiensystem der ersten Nachkriegsjahre gehörte eine große Anzahl von Splitterparteien, zu denen der Quantität nach (1–2 % der Wählerstimmen) auch die Kommunisten gerechnet werden mußten. Die Eigenart der japanischen Parteien – Zerfall in Faktionen und Desintegration der einzelnen Gruppen innerhalb der Partei – zeigte sich schon in den ersten beiden Besatzungsjahren. Die Amerikaner konnten diese Eigenart freilich ebensogut als Erscheinung der Gründerphase, wie als noch nicht überwundenes historisches Erbe interpretieren, am wenigsten wohl als konstitutives Element des japanischen Parteiensystems, das die Besatzungszeit bis zur Gegenwart überdauern sollte. Die Liberale und die Demokratische Partei fusionierten 1955, die Sozialisten vom November 1945 spalteten sich mehrfach bis hin zur Demokratisch-Sozialistischen Partei ab Januar 1960, neben der die (linke) Sozialistische Partei fortexistiert, die Kooperativen verschwanden zu Beginn der 50er Jahre von der Bildfläche, während Anfang der 60er Jahre mit der Komeito eine neue, mit westlichen Begriffen schwer faßbare rechtsradikale politisch-religiöse Partei auftauchte<sup>82</sup>.

Mit Stolz vermerkten die Amerikaner, daß im Juli 1947, und zwar auf japanische Initiative, ein Arbeitsministerium errichtet worden war. Das neue Ressort war zur Ausführung der Arbeitsgesetzgebung notwendig geworden, da sich das Wohlfahrtsministerium hierzu als unzulänglich erwiesen hatte. Tiefgreifender jedoch waren die Eingriffe im Bereich des Innenministeriums. Das japanische Innenministerium, dessen Tradition Jahrhunderte zurückreichte, kontrollierte als mächtigstes Ressort das Leben der Japaner „von der Wiege bis zum Grab“. Ihm unterstanden nicht nur die mehr als 100 000 religiösen Schreine (die höheren Priester waren Staatsbeamte gewesen), das Innenministerium überwachte auch die gesamte lokale Verwaltung; Präfekten wie Bürgermeister wurden von der Zentrale ernannt, Parlamente der Präfekturen konnten ebenso wie Gemeinderäte von Tokio aus aufgelöst werden. „Der Innenminister war tatsächlich der absolute Monarch der inneren Verwaltung Japans.“ Dem Innenministerium oblag ferner die Wahlleitung in allen Instanzen, und die Wahlergebnisse waren – zumindest nach amerikanischer Ansicht – stets dementsprechend ausgefallen. Dann war die gesamte Polizei, die ohnehin überreich mit Kompetenzen und Funktionen ausgestattet war, dem Innenministerium unterstellt. (Die Dezentralisierung der Polizei aufgrund des Polizeigesetzes vom 17. 12. 1947 wurde 1951

<sup>82</sup> Vgl. Paul Kevenhörster, *Das politische System Japans*, Köln 1969, S. 85 f.

und 1954 größtenteils wieder rückgängig gemacht.) Dazu kam noch in der Abteilung Öffentliche Arbeiten die Aufsicht über Häfen, Straßen, Flüsse bis hin zu Asylen und Besserungsanstalten. Nach der Kapitulation steckten sich die Amerikaner das Ziel, diesen allmächtigen politischen Konzern zunächst zu entflechten – durch die Dezentralisierung der Polizei und die Einführung der lokalen Selbstverwaltung –, um ihn schließlich ganz zu zerschlagen. Am 31. Dezember 1947 wurde das Ministerium des Innern aufgelöst.

Mit der Einführung der lokalen Selbstverwaltung beschäftigte sich eine eigene Abteilung der Government Section von SCAP. Ihr oblag auch die Beseitigung des 1940 eingeführten Zwangssystems von Nachbarschaftsvereinigungen (Tonari Gumi), in denen Haushalte stufenweise, nicht unähnlich der untersten Organisationsebene der NSDAP, zusammengefaßt waren. Das Tonari-Gumi-System hatte auch nach der Kapitulation noch Funktionen, u. a. bei der Verteilung der Lebensmittelrationen. Am 31. März 1947 wurde diese zwischen Bürger und Verwaltung geschobene, den direkten Kontakt hindernde Organisation beseitigt.

Durch das Gesetz Nr. 67 vom 16. April 1947 erhielten alle Gebietskörperschaften das Recht zur Selbstverwaltung nach den Grundsätzen direkter Wahl der Gemeindeoberhäupter, der Präfekten und der Selbstverwaltungsorgane; die parlamentarischen Gremien wurden mit legislativen Funktionen ausgestattet. Freilich gelang es auch hier nur scheinbar, den direkten Zugriff der Zentralbürokratie zu unterbinden, da die stellvertretenden Gouverneure von Tokio ernannt wurden. „Das gab der Zentrale die Möglichkeit, auch hier ‚erfahrene Beamte‘ aus der Tradition des Kaiserlichen Innenministeriums in das neue System der Selbstverwaltung einzuschleusen, bevor dieses sich entfalten konnte.“<sup>33</sup>

Mit dem Inkrafttreten der Verfassung mußte auch das gesamte Rechts- und Gerichtssystem Japans, das im Zuge der Meiji-Reformen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts unter starkem deutschem Einfluß kodifiziert worden war, revidiert werden. Die beiden Kommissionen, die von der japanischen Regierung bzw. vom Justizministerium eingesetzt worden waren, arbeiteten parallel zur Vorbereitung der neuen Verfassung Gesetzesvorlagen u. a. zu folgenden Rechtsmaterien aus: Stellung der Kaiserlichen Familie, Organisation und Rechtsstellung der Regierung, des Reichstags, des Finanzwesens, des öffentlichen Dienstes, Revision des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches und des Strafgesetzbuches, der Strafprozeßordnung, des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, ein Wahlgesetz zum Oberhaus. Mit der Verkündung der neuen Verfassung trat eine weitreichende Amnestie für politische Vergehen wie Majestätsbeleidigung und für die meisten militärischen Vergehen in Kraft. Der Reichstag verabschiedete zwischen 26. November und 26. Dezember 1946 vier grundlegende Gesetze: das Kabinettsgesetz, das Wahlgesetz zum Oberhaus, das Gesetz über das kaiserliche Haus und über den kaiserlichen Haushalt.

<sup>33</sup> Karl F. Zahl, *Die politische Elite Japans nach dem 2. Weltkrieg (1945–1965)*, Wiesbaden 1973, S. 149.

Die Verankerung der Menschenrechte in der Verfassung bedingte Reformen des Gerichtswesens. Der erste Schritt dazu war die Neuorganisation der Justiz. Wesentliche Kompetenzen gingen – nach dem amerikanischen Vorbild strikter Gewaltentrennung – vom Justizministerium auf den neugeschaffenen Obersten Gerichtshof über. Eine neue gesetzliche Basis erhielten auch die Staatsanwälte auf allen Ebenen der Gerichtsbarkeit.

gerichtsbarkeit.

Die vorläufige Revision des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches brachte die Gleichberechtigung der Frau und – als einen der stärksten Eingriffe in das tradierte Gesellschaftssystem – die juristische Beseitigung der Vorrechte des „Oberhauptes der [Groß]Familie“ mit erheblichen Konsequenzen, nicht zuletzt im Erbrecht. Die Strafprozeßordnung mußte ebenfalls entsprechend der Verfassungsmaxime der Freiheit des Individuums umgestaltet werden. Neu eingeführt wurden Grundsätze wie Haftbefehl nur durch Richter, unverzügliche Vorführung Festgenommener vor den Richter, Ingangsetzung des Verfahrens innerhalb von zehn Tagen, Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung u. a. m. Nach dem revidierten Zivilprozeßrecht wurden die normalen Gerichte auch für Verwaltungsstreitsachen zuständig, da die bisherige Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit aufgehoben worden war.

Zum Zeitpunkt der Berichterstattung waren einige Reformkomplexe erst provisorisch geregelt, eine größere Zahl von Gesetzentwürfen befand sich in Vorbereitung, so die endgültige Fassung vom Zivil- und Strafgesetzbuch, ein Gesetz zur Regelung staatlicher Regreßpflicht gegenüber dem Bürger, Besoldungsgesetze für Richter und Staatsanwälte, Gesetze zur Berufung und Rechtsstellung der Richter, zum Vollzug des Jugendstrafrechts usw. Die amerikanische Bilanz der Justizreform schließt mit der Feststellung: Letzten Endes entscheide das japanische Volk über ihren Erfolg; die Japaner müßten daher zum richtigen Gebrauch ihrer neuen Rechtsordnung noch erzogen werden. Die Kampagnen hierzu waren – natürlich – bereits im Gange.

### *Dokument I*

## TWO YEARS OF OCCUPATION – POLITICAL GOVERNMENT SECTION

The Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, was established 2 October 1945 to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on policies relating to the establishment of a peaceful democratic government in Japan.

The Section was assigned responsibility for advising the Supreme Commander concerning relationships of the Japanese Government to military affairs, to subordinate governmental agencies, to the people, and to business (including its relationships to

financial regulations, to subsidies, and to other devices for the control and manipulation of industry). It was also assigned responsibilities concerning the demilitarization of the government in all its agencies and sub-divisions, the decentralization of government, the elimination of feudal and totalitarian practices and the elimination of those relationships between government and business which tended to continue the Japanese war potential and to hamper the achievement of the objectives of the occupation.

In June, 1947, the reform of the Japanese bureaucracy, including the establishment of a civil service system based on merit was assigned as an additional function of the Section.

Despite the extensive labor involved in the complete re-organization of the nation's governmental, political and economic structure, sweeping reforms have been put into execution.

Japan, which, until two years ago, was a feudal police state, dominated by an oligarchy of militarists, bureaucrats and big businessmen controlling more than 80 percent of the national commerce, industry and finance, has been transformed into a modern nation with a Constitution guaranteeing economic, social, political and cultural freedom.

The great masses of the people, docile by training and terrorized by fear, were without a voice in the determination of their own affairs. Today they are assured freedom, self-expression and democracy.

A totalitarian economy, wherein the nation's vast industrial combines, concentrating within themselves virtually all economic power dictated their policy to the Government, has been shattered.

An infamous secret police system has been crushed.

Feudalistic governmental structures have been modernized.

Civil liberties have been guaranteed. Old laws forbidding freedom of speech, press, organization, religion, study and research, have been replaced by new guarantees of liberties.

Thousands of political prisoners have been released from prison and have been restored their proper political and civil rights.

All vestiges of militarism have been destroyed through abolition of the War and Navy Ministries, the Ministry of Munitions, the Great East Asia Ministry and other governmental agencies.

The major reform measures taken in Japan under SCAP supervision may be summarized as follows:

1. The transfer of sovereignty from the Emperor to the people and the guarantee to the latter of a bill of rights derived from the experience and enlightened thought of the Western democracies;
2. Drafting the adoption of a new democratic Constitution vesting sovereignty in the people and guaranteeing civil liberties;
3. The elevation of the Legislature, as the body directly representing the people, to the position of supreme organ of state power;
4. Decentralization of government and the democratization of local governments working through leaders elected by and responsible to the people of their localities;
5. The reform of the traditional family system to conform to enlightened principles of human relationships and the conferment of political, social and economic equality upon the women of Japan;
6. The removal from important positions in the political and economic life of Japan of leaders who formulated the policies of conquest, ultra-nationalism and aggression;
7. The eradication of at least 150 ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations, including infamous secret and terroristic societies and their responsible leaders who

have been barred from further interference in Japan's political, cultural, or economic activities.

8. The elimination of State Shintoism as an instrument for instilling Emperor worship and for enslaving the minds of the Japanese people;

9. The revision of the educational system to replace regimentation of the mind with academic freedom, the teaching of myth and legend with historical truth;

10. The breaking up of a system of land ownership and tenancy rooted in feudalism to permit ownership by the farmers of the land they long have tilled, thus creating throughout Japan a new class of small land owners;

11. The breaking up of the system of private monopolies under which, with government protection, a dozen families have controlled over eighty per cent of Japan's commerce, industry and finance, in order that under a system of truly free enterprise, widely owned, the economy may be oriented solely toward peaceful ends;

12. The freeing of labor from the prohibitions under which it could not organize to fight for decent living wages and for years was exploited under conditions beside which our sweatshops at the turn of the century were models of advanced liberalism.

All of these reforms have been initiated through the instrumentality of the existing governmental and economic machinery. There has been no suspension, disruption, no discontinuity of functioning of these organs, no collapse, no dislocation, no disorder. The fears of chaos and confusion, voiced by those persons who viewed with alarm any move to disturb the status quo, have not materialized.

Cabinet decision to dissolve the once-powerful Ministry of Home Affairs, long the core of centralized bureaucratic authority marks an important step in the democratization of Japan. Among civil agencies, the Home Minister, because of his complete control over the daily life of the people, had been popularly ranked in power and prestige, as second only to the Prime Minister.

A vitally important step, perhaps in some respects the most important governmental achievement during the Occupation, was the drafting, debating, passage and implementation of a new, democratic Constitution.

Under the leadership of the Supreme Commander, negotiations were undertaken with Japanese Governmental agencies which resulted in the preparation of a new fundamental Constitution.

Both within the Diet, in the press and public forums as well as in innumerable general conversations, the provisions of this document were debated long and earnestly. After extensive nationwide discussions, certain revisions in the basic draft were accepted and the Constitution was adopted virtually unanimously in both branches of the Diet.

The Constitution, promulgated 3 November 1946, became effective 3 Mai 1947.

This new Constitution, now the nation's fundamental law, conforms to the most advanced concepts of human relationships and is a realistic blending of divergent theories concerning the application of democratic principles by a large modern state.

An historic landmark in the age-old struggle of mankind to be free, it serves as a shining beacon for the peoples not only of the Far East but of the world. Japan thereby divorced itself from the past and assumed the lead in declaring its faith in justice and in tolerance.

Widespread popular acceptance by both people and Government, without the issuance of a single directive by the Supreme Commander is itself a fact fraught with the greatest significance for the ultimate re-entry of Japan into the family of nations.

In April, 1947, the Japanese people, under their new Constitution and through a democratic election procedure, chose 232,863 elected officials on all levels of govern-

ment. These constituted the entire body of elected officers, including a new Diet, 46 governors, 209 mayors, 1784 town and village chiefs, 8522 headmen and new prefectural and local assemblies. These new officials carry on the work of self-government and self-reformation - to the end that Japan may, some day in the not too distant future, be able to take its place - a dignified and helpful place - in a world community of peaceful democratic nations.

NOTE: See Appendix I for more complete information on the new Japanese Constitution.

### THE PURGE

The purge of all persons who shared the responsibility for Japan's program of aggression always has been intended to be a preventative, never a punitive measure.

Based on internationally approved policies of the Potsdam Declaration, it was conceived and is being administered with the purpose of eliminating continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and world peace.

The purge was initiated in the fields of education and police as early as October, 1945. Its fundamentals were first expressed to the Japanese government in SCAPIN 550 of January 4, 1946, which ordered the removal of all undesirable persons from influential positions in the political, economic, and social life of Japan.

In the first year after SCAPIN 550 was issued, 1,067 persons had been barred and removed. An extension of the original purge directive was issued by the Japanese government on January 4, 1947 and an additional 1,681 persons had been barred or removed up to July 15, 1947.

There had been 183,000 career officers, gendarmes, and intelligence agents by the 1946 original directive. Another 20,000 persons quickly had resigned their positions to avoid designation as purgees.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese government January 4, 1946, and certain memorandums issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese government itself implement and administer the purge program. All Japanese government actions are subject to SCAP review to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

Up to January 4, 1947, SCAP had reviewed 1,770 cases acted upon by the Japanese government and had disapproved 27 decisions.

Between January 4, 1947, and July 19, 1947, the Japanese government screened 563,099 cases, most of them before the general election in April. A total of 1,681 individuals were removed or barred.

The small number of persons actually purged indicated that few risked running for office when they considered it possible that they would be designated as purgees.

Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases involving persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

### INITIAL PURGE DIRECTIVE

The impact of the initial purge directive, which listed undesirable Japanese in seven

categories, was immediate and profound. Nine days after the directive was issued the cabinet, under Kijuro Shidehara, underwent extensive reorganization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned.

Another wave of resignations came on March 10, 1946, when the cabinet interpreted „additional militarists and ultranationalists“, a category of the original SCAP directive. The entire political scene was altered by this announcement. Political party leadership changed, political allegiances shifted, and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in forthcoming April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Among these 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 „recommended candidates“ did not file.

By August 1946 the Japanese government announced it had completed the initial phases of the purge program. A total of 5,520 persons in the Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governments, higher courts, government controlled companies, and higher educational institutions had been screened, and 814 were barred or removed.

In addition, 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred.

#### EXTENSION OF PURGE

Upon confirmation that the initial phases of the purge had been completed, SCAP in August 1946 issued a statement of policy to the Japanese government requiring extension of the purge program to local government, to the economic field, and to the field of public information.

On January 4, 1947, one year from the issuance of the original directive, the Japanese government promulgated implementing ordinances extending the purge to all elective offices in national and local government, and to specified positions in certain companies, associations, and mass communication media.

To insure that local government administration would undergo a complete reorganization, incumbent mayors and headmen were prevented from running for their old positions if they had held these positions consecutively since September, 1945. These officials, however, were not held from becoming candidates for other government positions.

A reorganization of the screening system, setting up local boards, was necessary to funnel upwards of 500,000 cases through screening procedures before the general elections in April.

Numbers of candidates screened, as reported by the Japanese government, included 3,426 for the House of Representatives; 1,406 for the House of Councillors; 451 for prefectural governors; 43 for the mayors of the principal cities; 72,550 for headmen of wards, towns, or villages; 21,126 for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen, and accountants of cities, towns, and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

When successful candidates were re-examined by the Central Screening Committee, 11 members-elect to the House of Representatives, and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed.

The economic phases of the purge began about April 15, 1947, when an estimated 3,200 persons holding policy positions in about 300 companies required screening. By mid-July 1947, 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service.

There followed extensions of the purge in the field of public information media, and to „invisible“ purgees who resigned to escape designation but manipulated behind the scenes strings of influence.

A Board of Appeal, to review cases where injustices may have been committed, was established in February, 1947, to handle the increasing volume of protests as screenings were extended to include more persons.

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from public service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police, removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all public service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

NOTE: See Appendix II for complete review of the purge of Japanese who shared responsibility for their country's program of aggression.

#### 1947 ELECTIONS

The inalienable right to choose and to dismiss their public officials is one of the most important guarantees afforded Japanese by the new Constitution.

In anticipation of the coming into effect of the new Constitution, a series of four (and in some instances, five) elections was held during April in which each of the 232,863 public offices, local and national, legislative and executive, was at stake.

Seldom in history have the people of any nation enjoyed the opportunity in such brief span of time and by so peaceful a process as election, to select all of their elective officials. Certainly never before in Japan had such an opportunity been presented.

Never, before, indeed, had Japanese voted for their local executives or for the Upper House of their Diet. For the first time in their history, Japanese voted for 46 governors, 209 city mayors, 10,210 town and village heads, and 22 ward chiefs in Tokyo. In the past all these had been selected by methods which made no concession to popular wishes. Governors had previously been appointed by the Home Minister; mayors, town chiefs and village headmen by local assemblies from lists approved by prefectural governors, and ward chiefs by the Tokyo governor. The inevitable result had been that local chief executives were indifferent to local desires because they owed their primary allegiance to the Home Minister or to the governor.

The April 1947 elections also represented Japan's first elections for local assemblies on the basis of universal suffrage and the first election for assemblies in which membership was more than a purely honorary distinction. Voting hitherto had been based on limited suffrage only, so that assemblies represented only the conservative element in Japanese life. Membership conferred no legislative powers since the assemblies met infrequently and were invariably dominated by local chief executives.

These elections, moreover, were the first to be publicly administered. Hitherto, all elections had been supervised in detail by government officials controlled by the Home Ministry. In April 1947, however, 10,500 local elections administration committees were established.

Technical changes introduced into the laws prior to election forbade candidates to campaign in more than one district, abolished the former abuses whereby teachers had required students to campaign in their interests; they also increased the number of districts from 53 to 117 and increased tenfold the fines to be imposed for violation of election laws.

In connection with the vast amount of publicity given to the election campaign by press, screen and radio, special commendation should be made of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan which rejected a proposed Diet appropriation of eight million

yen, offered in payment of time devoted to election broadcasts, on the ground that it was merely fulfilling its public duty. The Broadcasting Company of Japan thus established the principle of direct public responsibility, free from government direction or political influence.

*Shimane Shimbun* (Matsue) and *Okayama Godo Shimbun* (both 2 May) described the election results as „a corner-stone in Japan's peaceful revolution“. They warned voters, however, that they „must exercise vigilance over the performance of the successful candidates“. *Shinano Mainichi* (2 May) voiced the same theme by writing „If the people are unconcerned with administration after election, it can be said that they are exercising only half their rights and duties“.

A most reassuring feature of the elections was that, following the election, the Japanese press contained virtually no reference whatever to evils such as had been prevalent in pre-war election campaigns.

None but rare and isolated charges appeared concerning disfranchisement (accidental or intentional) of voters qualified to cast their ballots, of the inefficiency or incapability of election officials, of fraud, irregularities, miscounting or ballotbox stuffing.

A certain amount of vote buying and corruption, although far less than in previous elections, was reported, but the total number of incidents was less and the extent of the crime more restricted than in previous years.

Few, if any, charges were alleged that campaign expenses had violated the official ceilings or that money interests had played any important part in the determination of results.

Boss activity, which had been predicted by *Tokyo Times* (12 April) and dishonest practices, which *Ehime Shimbun* and *Iwate Shimbun* (both 24 April) feared might affect the House of Representatives balloting the following day, were not again mentioned in the press following the close of the campaign period.

This situation stood in sharp contrast to the experience of former years when accusation of election law violations, especially bribery and corruption, had been common phenomena of the press.

A wide variety of pre-election measures was taken to insure democratic elections: strengthening of the election laws, extension of the franchise, increase in the number of polls, application of the purge, assurance of non-interference by the police, surveillance by Occupation Forces, to name a few. Insofar as counting and tabulation were concerned, not only did every candidate have the right to have a witness present at every step in the voting and counting process at every polling place and ballot counting station in Japan – but every Japanese citizen had the further right to bring any protest which he might have to the attention of the Occupation Forces as well as his own Government.

With respect to the laws, therefore, every step in the electoral process, from the filing of candidacy and the registration of voters to the final tabulation of results was fully protected by laws and safeguards comparable to those of any democratic nation. Insofar as violations of these laws were concerned, not only were Japanese procedures of investigation, indictment and trial highly competent and satisfactory but once again full opportunity was afforded all citizens to bring any criticisms of methods to the attention of surveillance personnel. The especial fact that indictments for election law violations for all five 1947 elections totaled only 2,997 as opposed to 2,632 in the one election of 1946 is an indication that political morality markedly improved. The figure of 2,997 included all alleged violations from all sources.

In this connection, it is imperative to note that the vast majority of claims of election law violations involved such crimes as bribery of voters, house to house can-

vassing for votes, and violations of the poster law. For all the 42,000 polling places and 11,000 ballot counting stations in all Japan and for all the 200,000,000 ballots which were counted during five elections there were only a handful of charges made anywhere – by press, or public or candidates or parties – of improper casting of votes, and no charges were made of miscounting of votes.

#### Improvement of Elections

In considering the average abstention rate of 30 percent for the 1947 elections, it must be recalled that essentially this represents a percentage of all eligible voters and not a percentage of the total of registered voters. Japanese law provides basically for automatic registration; once each year all eligible voters are registered regardless of whether they have any interest in voting or not. In most western countries, of course, the situation is reversed; registration is not automatic but requires that the voter take the initiative and register himself. From the standpoint of the percentage of all adults actually participating in an election, therefore, a 70 percent turnout in a Japanese election would be equivalent of about an 85 percent turnout in an average American election.

#### Political Implications

The following table summarizes party votes in the 1946 and 1947 elections. Since the method of voting adopted in the House of Representatives election in 1946 permitted voters to cast ballot for two or three candidates, dependent on the size of the electoral district concerned, direct comparison with the Representatives election of 1947 is not possible, since this year electors voted for but one candidate each. Table II, however, projects a basis for comparison, indicating an estimated division of votes in 1946 if electors had then cast ballots for but one candidate.

	Liberals	Democrats	Social Democrats	Cooperatives
1946, April 10	15,505,746	10,350,530	9,858,408	1,799,764
The same reduced to common denom.	6,500,000	4,960,000	4,730,000	860,000
1947, April 5, Governors	2,111,906	1,605,540	6,047,059	392,847
April 20, Local	3,822,767	3,117,202	4,847,188	1,038,271
April 20, National	1,360,456	1,908,087	3,479,814	649,916
April 25	7,295,242	6,857,480	7,168,888	1,862,753
April 30, Municipal	1,980,001	2,073,491	2,049,494	149,453
Prefectural	5,733,280	6,092,169	6,482,627	1,187,322
1946, April 10	24.4	18.7	17.8	3.2
1947, April 5, Gov.	7.9	6.0	22.6	1.5
April 20, Local	17.0	14.3	22.2	4.5
April 20, Natl.	6.6	7.2	16.6	2.6
April 25	26.6	25.1	26.2	6.8
April 30, Pref.	18.3	19.5	17.5	3.8
April 30, Munic.	6.5	6.8	6.7	0.5

	Communist	Minor Parties	Independents	Total
1946, April 10	2,135,757	6,473,272	11,352,402	55,448,879
The same reduced to common denom.	1,020,000	3,100,000	5,430,000	26,600,000
1947, April 5, Governors	258,044	1,590,487	14,734,584	26,740,467
April 20, Local	809,177	1,026,178	7,235,693	21,896,476
April 20, National	610,948	1,039,819	12,462,073	21,411,113
April 25	1,002,883	1,560,070	1,614,295	27,361,611
April 30, Municipal	252,409	652,571	23,481,019	30,638,438
Prefectural	556,473	2,520,428	9,686,347	31,258,646
1946, April 10	3.8	11.7	20.4	100.0
1947, April 5, Gov.	0.9	6.0	55.1	100.0
April 20, Local	3.2	5.0	33.8	100.0
April 20, Natl.	2.9	4.9	59.3	100.0
April 25	3.7	5.7	5.9	100.0
April 30, Pref.	1.8	8.1	31.0	100.0
April 30, Munic.	0.8	2.1	76.6	100.0

## POLITICAL PARTIES

### I

Japanese politics are a tangled maze of personalities, crosscurrents, compromises and flexibilities, but the general course is clear. Japan is moving toward democracy and toward the adoption of a Western type of parliamentary government.

Elections have been marked by the manner in which electors disregarded party lines to select candidates whom they regarded as personally well-qualified by character and experience.

A second noteworthy result has been the repudiation after full, fair and free discussion, of extremists of either reactionary or revolutionary character.

### Recent Election Results

Of 207 candidates in the April 1947 elections for 46 governorships, voters chose 29 Independents, five Liberals, four Social Democrats, three Democrats and five of various minor parties.

In 202 mayoralty elections, 144 Independents, 25 Democrats, 12 Liberals, nine Social Democrats and one Cooperative were elected, together with 11 representatives of minor parties.

In 4,247 village headship contests, 3,716 Independents were returned, 159 Liberals, 145 Democrats, 126 Social Democrats, 74 minor parties, 19 Cooperatives and eight Communists.

An estimated 54 percent of the electorate voted Independent, with 24 percent Social Democratic, eight percent Liberal, seven percent for minor parties, five percent Democratic and one percent each for Cooperatives and Communists.

## House of Representatives

The Social Democratic party, with 144 seats, won a plurality in the House of Representatives. Next in order came the Democrats, 130; Liberals, 129; Cooperatives, 31; various minor parties, 10; Independents, nine; Japan Farmers, eight; and Communists, four.

These figures represent gains of 46 Social Democratic seats over the figures at the close of the last Diet. Minor parties including the New Japan Farmers' party, gained 13 seats while Independent figures remained unchanged. Gains were made at the expense of the Liberals who now have eleven less seats than in the last Diet, Democrats 15 less, Cooperatives 31 less, and Communists two less. The Farmers' party, a new organization, drew its strength largely from last year's Cooperative party.

Since 234 votes were required for a Lower House majority, no party could single-handedly control the government.

After various political maneuvers, therefore, agreement was reached whereby the Social Democrats, Democrats and Cooperatives formed a coalition, totalling 305 seats, as against a maximum of 159 opposition votes. Tetsu Katayama, Social Democrat, became Prime Minister May 1947, with Hitoshi Ashida, Democrat, as vice-Prime Minister.

The Social Democrats are professedly Socialists. The Democrats call themselves stream-lined modernists, but among them are numerous conservatives. The Cooperatives, largely an agrarian group, differ from Social Democrats in philosophy but work with them for practical governmental purposes.

Similarly the opposition is composed of Liberals, who are committed to conservatism, and Communists, as well as various smaller parties of contrasting political opinions.

## House of Councillors

The newly constituted House of Councillors contains a political group peculiarly its own named the Ryokufu Kai, or Green Breeze Society, so-called because it announced its intention of effecting a spring-like renaissance in Japanese affairs. This group enrolls 96 members. These include virtually all former members of the House of Peers who succeeded in being elected as Councillors, ex-diplomats and other who felt that the Upper House should preserve a character above the party battle.

True political parties in the Councillors include 47 Social Democrats, 43 Liberals, 42 Democrats, 18 Independents and four Communists.

If party lines were strictly drawn this might seem to indicate that the Katayama coalition controls only 89 votes out of 250 in the House of Councillors, as against a possible opposition bloc of 161 votes.

Such, however, is not the case since the 96 Green Breeze members do not constitute a genuine party and are neither pro- nor anti-coalition. At least 13 of them were members, at the time of their election, of the Cooperative party, but merged thereafter with others, chiefly Independents and Liberals, to form the non-partisan Green Breeze Society.

## II

All parties profess to favour democratic government, anti-bureaucracy, social insurance, stabilization of the people's livelihood, better rationing methods, abolition of the black market, entry of Japan into the United Nations, a speedy peace treaty, justice in international relationships, and other popular causes. They differ in the ways suggested to accomplish these results.

### Social Democratic Party

The Social Democratic party, for instance, contains some members who are popularly classified as left-wingers, as well as so-called right wingers.

The Social Democratic party is the contemporary successor to several pre-war farm-labor parties. Some of these were frankly proletarian, and their survivors constitute the Social Democratic left wing.

The Social Democratic party has enjoyed the support of the largest group of politically conscious labor unions. For example, the Speaker of the House of Representatives is a right wing Social Democrat who is also president of the Japan Federation of Labor. Many members of the formerly outcast Eta group are also believed to have supported the Social Democrats; their leader, who is vice-president of the House of Councillors, is also a Social Democratic committeeman.

As might be expected from its large labor unionist membership, the Social Democratic party is strongest in the cities.

It stands for the creation of a peaceful democratic revolution through peaceful democratic processes, for the progressive nationalization of essential key industries, beginning with coal and iron, for the taxation of incomes derived from war profits, and for the suspension of interest on war bonds.

Not all these aims are being pushed at the present since the terms of coalition with more conservative parties precluded aggressive action of measures which conservatives termed socialistic, but the party is at present moving toward introduction of a bill for state control of coal production.

### Democratic Party

The Democratic party, created in March as the successor of the former Progressive party, is also divided into two groups – a renovationist faction headed by Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida, and a more conservative group led by former Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara.

The Ashida section, now in control, includes most of the younger members of the party.

This party holds second place in the Diet but in many localities it led in elections for mayors, village headmen and assemblymen.

Some observers believe that its nucleus consists of remnants of the pre-war Minseitō party – citing Home Minister Kozaemon Kimura and State Minister Takao Saito as examples – and there is no doubt but that many old-line politicians of that party are influential local leaders.

The Democratic party stands for strict economic supervision (in contrast to Liberal desires for free economy and to Social Democratic ideas of state control).

### Liberal Party

The Liberal party, strong among businessmen and financial interests, and headed by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, regards anti-Communism as its strongest platform plank.

Because it defends individual enterprise, it argues that it would accomplish its ends gradually and through evolution rather than by immediate drastic action.

The Liberal party was the plurality party in the 1946 Diet elections but fell to second place in 1947, and then to third place among Diet parties.

### Peoples' Cooperative Party

The Peoples' Cooperative party, founded as an agrarian party based upon Japanese

semi-official producing and distributing monopolies, lost most of its original members through the purge. It then broadened its base by merging with a powerful bloc of schoolteacher Diet members headed by State Minister Junzo Szamori, and with various local parties such as that led by the party's present chief, Communications Minister Takeo Miki.

The party stands for the cooperative principle, for the promotion of education, and for the stabilization of Japan upon a generally conservative basis.

#### Japan Farmers' Party

The Japan Farmers' party regards itself as the true Cooperative Party from which it split when the latter voted to admit city members and education members to what had been a purely agrarian group. The Farmers' party strength lies in Hokkaido, formerly a Cooperative stronghold.

#### Other Minor Parties

Minor parties and Independents are, in the main, identical. In virtually no instance except that of the Communists, is any national group concerned nor are any firm ideas set forth differing from those of other parties. These groups, some of which may be as evanescent as the 28 Minor Parties which existed when the 1946 Diet opened but which gradually became absorbed in larger parties, center about the personality of individuals popular in one locality but entirely unknown elsewhere in Japan.

The Communists call themselves the party of the masses but have failed to win support of more than between one to two percent of the voters. The party platform calls for abolition of capitalism and the Imperial System. This attack upon the Emperor was more strongly voiced in 1946 than in 1947.

The party is led by Sanzo Nosaka and Ryuichi Tokuda. Tokuda spent eighteen years in prison prior to his release under the terms of SCAP's civil liberties directive issued on 4 October 1945. Nosaka is well known for his propaganda work among Japanese troops captured by Yenan Chinese.

#### LABOR MINISTRY

Noteworthy among the specific steps undertaken by the Japanese nation to secure a complete reformation of its governmental structure has been the establishment of a Labor Ministry.

The Japanese labor record prior to the surrender had indeed been black, but in the early days of the Occupation, the workingman was freed from all the oppressive restrictions. During succeeding months, measure after measure designed to protect him and promote his welfare was enacted into law. No cabinet, however, established any governmental agency with sufficient authority and prestige effectively to represent labor's interest in government, although during the January 1947 crises, the Yoshida Cabinet suggested establishing a Labor Ministry.

With Labor steadily becoming more articulate and better organized and with measures such as the Labor Standards Law, the Labor Relations Law and the Unemployment Security Law reaching fruition, it became apparent that the makeshift machinery set up in the Welfare Ministry was inadequate. The Katayama Cabinet, under the leadership of its Minister of Labor designate, Yonekubo, therefore drafted a bill to establish a strong and effective labor ministry.

The movement was Japanese in conception and execution. When the final Cabinet draft was presented to the Supreme Commander for approval in early July, no alteration or amendment was required and the bill in its original form was laid before the Diet on 22 July 1947.

## NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

## Ministry of Home Affairs

The Ministry of Home Affairs (*Naimusho*) is probably the oldest formal arm of government in Japan, dating back as far as the year AD 649. Its position was established more definitely in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration and became, probably at that time, the most important ministry of government as created by the Meiji Constitution. It consisted of the four most powerful bureaus in the scheme of government as it affected the domestic affairs of the people. These were:

- Shrines Bureau
- Local Affairs Bureau
- Police Bureau
- Public Works Bureau.

It can be truthfully said that the Home Ministry controlled the intimate lives of the Japanese people from the „cradle to the grave“. Through its Shrines Bureau it forced the people to conform to ritualistic State Shinto. While this was not a real religion it compulsorily required the people to observe and partake of the various rites and ceremonies which were developed under this cult. This was one of the principle devices by which the people's spirit was held in subjection and through which it was possible to infuse the general populace with ultranationalistic and militaristic doctrines.

All of the shrines, numbering more than 100,000 came under the jurisdiction of this Ministry. The members of the higher priesthood were State employees and directly under the Home Ministry, thus the spiritual education of the people was completely in the hands of the government.

Through its Bureau of Local Affairs the Home Ministry controlled to the minutest detail the local government in Japan. The Home Minister appointed all of the prefectural governors. They were subject to his discipline and could be shifted or removed at his pleasure. The governor, in turn, could refuse to follow actions taken by the prefectural assembly. Any prefectural assembly could be dissolved by the Home Minister whenever he so desired. The governor also had power to nominate mayors and could remove them. City assemblies could be dissolved by the Ministry of Home Affairs the same as prefectural assemblies. Thus by his power of life and death over countless thousands of local officials, the Home Minister was virtually an absolute monarch of internal administration in Japan.

Another of the principal functions of the Local Affairs Bureau was the administration of elections. This was absolute. At no point in the election procedure or machinery did the citizens of Japan have any representation. The Home Ministry was in charge of the machinery at the national level and its henchmen, governors and local officials, ran the machinery at the local level. From the earliest days of the parliamentary system elections were notoriously swung by the power which the Home Ministry exercised. During the period, through the 1920's, when party development reached its highest level, the party in power, through its use of Home Ministry controls, was always able to swing the elections as it saw fit.

In the later years, preceding and during the war, the most vicious regimentation of the people came through the police force of Japan, which was also under the Home Ministry. By both legal and extra-legal methods the police eliminated dissident elements, frequently throwing people in jail who were considered troublesome and keeping them there for years without lodging specific charges. The police department exercised many functions which are not normally associated with police administration in the western world. These cover such a wide range of subjects as recording births and

deaths, exercising many functions in connection with economic affairs, keeping track of movements of people, censorship of books, magazines, newspapers, etc.

In elections, previously discussed, the police were used to harass, intimidate, and often to eliminate troublesome opposition candidates or groups.

The neighborhood associations, which represent an oriental institution dating back some centuries, were highly developed during the war. Through these associations the most intimate check was kept on every individual person in Japan. Operating the rationing system, it exercised tremendous power over every family. This institution was also directly under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Public Works Bureau, as its name implies, was in charge of such matters as harbors, roads, rivers, flood control, etc. By virtue of its veritable size, the Home Ministry was in a position to exercise great power in its administration of this Bureau.

This Ministry also had under it many of the public institutions in Japan, such as Homes, Asylums, Houses of Correction, etc.

The surrender of Japan and successive directives from SCAP had stripped the Home Ministry of many of its principal functions and responsibilities. The two most important of those remaining early this year were local affairs and the police. The responsibility with respect to the former was substantially eliminated by the granting of local autonomy by Diet action to the prefectural, city, town and village governments. Decentralization of the police force which was obviously close at hand would reduce the Home Ministry's responsibility in regard to that function. Thus it was clear that this Ministry, which was once the most powerful in the Japanese government with the exception of the War and Navy Ministries, was now merely a hollow shell of its former self.

The Japanese government accordingly presented a plan for the reorganization of the Home Ministry, taking into account the changed conditions. This Ministry had within it the most hardened core of the professional bureaucracy and it was plain that this bureaucracy was resisting a thorough reorganization.

Inevitably, as the days went by, it became apparent that the Ministry could and should be abolished. Draft legislation to accomplish this has been prepared by the government, and will be submitted to this session of the Diet for its consideration. Thus will come to an end an institution which has for centuries been an instrument of oppression for the Japanese people. It was a most powerful ally of the militarists in conditioning the nation to face almost unbelievable privations in making preparations for war and during the war itself.

#### LOCAL GOVERNMENT

During the first year of the occupation the Local Government Division was concerned with the reorganization of the organic laws which have established the structure for government in the local echelons: the Law Concerning the Organization of Towns and Villages, the Law Concerning the Organization of Cities, the Law Concerning the Organization of Urban and Rural Prefectures and the Law Concerning the Metropolis of Tokyo-to. The program was divided into two phases of work, one dealing with the central government and the other with the local governments. The first phase entailed extensive examination and study of fundamental laws, Imperial ordinances and ministerial orders under which the ministries of the central government exercised authority and control over the echelons of local government. Administrative procedures were also analyzed intensively. Although all the ministries of the central government were studied, special attention was devoted to the Ministry of Home Affairs because of its jurisdiction and direct authority over all local governments. The second phase was wholly one of field investigation,

first to obtain knowledge and benefits from the experience of military government companies, and second to test and observe the results of the findings produced in the first phase. These field investigations covered numerous military government companies and other units, as well as, of course, many villages, towns, cities and prefectures in which Japanese officials and other citizens were contacted.

The purpose of conducting so widely a detailed examination and analysis was to secure an unquestionable foundation of facts on laws and administrative practices and procedures on which could be built more simplified and useful structures for local governments and from which could be devised a democratic, integrated system for the whole framework of government in Japan.

The revisions represented great progress in the democratization of the government even for the Japanese countryside in which the old feudalistic elements were entrenched more strongly than elsewhere. The revisions introduced (1) the principle of direct elections by universal suffrage in all three echelons of local government, (2) the concept that local assemblies in Japan can be effective controlling bodies, (3) a new agency in the system of conducting local elections to make manipulations more difficult, and (4) the practice of recall and initiative thus giving the people themselves some certainty of control on all their elected officials and representatives.

The completion of the four laws was achieved at the end of the first year of the occupation although final enactment by the Diet and promulgation were not accomplished until the beginning of the second year.

During the second year of the occupation continued work and further revisions of the four laws given above, produced a bill entitled, „The Law Concerning Local Autonomy“ and was promulgated as Law No. 67 on 16 April 1947. This Law is a codification of the four laws and the revised Imperial Ordinance No. 147 which provides the prefectural governments with their more important departments and offices and the governors with powers over the personnel to staff them.

The new law still within the confines of the Meiji Constitution contains many added liberalizations. It eliminates the dominant power of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Under the old laws local decisions could not be made on a host of local problems because of hampering restrictions in a chain of permissions having to be sought from higher authorities. In the law local assemblies are given the right and power to debate the budget completely, even to altering the total sum of it. With the introduction of the procedure of having standing committees for particular or combined functions of government, the assemblies have been provided with agencies for obtaining better and continuing information to utilize in their legislation. This new procedure, together with more frequency of assembly meetings, lessened the need for a council. Previously the council functioned when the Assembly was not in session. Vice-governorships were also established. For the first time the right of self-government was given to the inhabitants of the outlying islands. Moreover, a system for the creation of special cities was introduced under which a large municipality could obtain the status of a prefecture.

During the year another major alteration was made by dissolving and eliminating the system of Tonari Gumi. In its compulsory form in which all people were forced to be members, this system was introduced in 1940 to regiment citizens for war. It placed between the citizen and the municipality three organs of control to watch and direct their activities. Approximately ten families were united into a neighborhood association or Tonar Gumi with a chief at its head; about one hundred of these formed a block association of Chonakai in the cities and towns or a Burakukai in the villages. In some cases the Burakukai and Chonakai formed federations or Rengokai. All these

organizations had their own chiefs, in theory elected, in practice appointed.

In view of the small number of members in each Tonari Gumi, the life of every individual was under a constant surveillance. The eradication of this evil system was a *sine qua non* for the healthy development of democracy in Japan. Its existence had been defended because (1) the administration could easily issue orders to citizens, and (2) the distribution of rations was facilitated. Not only was the abolition of the Tonari Gumi needed but also a radical change in the system of rationing and re-establishment in Japan of a free consumers' movement.

The present efforts of the Local Government Division are directed toward (1) the prevention of further establishment of the central organs in the prefectures, independent of the prefectural government; (2) the study of the relationship between the central ministries and the local bodies to determine (a) which functions of sound government may be most properly performed by the local body without any interference on the part of the central government; (b) which functions may be most effectively performed by the central government with its own representatives in the given area; (c) which functions should be performed by the local governments under the supervision of the central government.

The actual work here involves the legal and functional relationships between the central government and all local bodies, particularly prefectures, in the fields of finance, commerce and industry, education, labor, public health and welfare, agriculture, forestry and transportation.

#### LAW No. 67

Law No. 67, the Law Concerning Local Autonomy, was promulgated 16 April 1947. This law codifies former laws dealing with the organization and structure of (1) towns and villages, (2) cities, (3) prefectures, (4) Tokyo.

##### I. Chief Executives:

1. Today they are elected directly by the populace for a four year term. They may be re-elected. This term of office is provisional because the officers can be removed through (a) vote of non-confidence of assemblies, (b) recall procedure by voters through petition, and (c) impeachment of governors only for non-performance of national duties.

Formerly the governors, as high ranking bureaucrats, were appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs and served appointments of short duration with the avowed purpose of serving primarily the central government rather than the local. Mayors took office through indirect election by the assemblies; they were elected renewable terms of four years. Today the executives are now responsible to the electorate and must answer at the polls for their actions.

2. Powers in general are in administration, finance and personnel. Each is responsible for the administration within his area of jurisdiction; each has final control of personnel although the actual work is performed by a deputy through an organized division of the administrative offices; each initiates a budget bill and is responsible for its execution.

Under the old laws these powers were held completely by the executive. Today, they share this authority with the legislatures. The budget may be altered in the legislative assembly whereas before, the budget was the prerogative of the executive.

##### II. The Assemblies:

1. Today as before the assemblymen are elected directly by populace from a four-year term. The term also is provisional as, after a vote of non-confidence, the assembly

can be dissolved. Assemblymen today can be recalled by popular vote. This could not have been done previously.

2. Powers of the assembly have been greatly increased. Today they exercise real legislative powers. Formerly their position was almost entirely advisory.
  - (a) Today the assembly can override the executive's veto. Formerly this required action by the governor and the Minister of Home Affairs. Moreover the Minister of Home Affairs held the threat of dissolution over the assemblies. This power has now been taken from him.
  - (b) Today the assemblies may alter the budgets. Under the old laws, assemblies could lower the total amount but could not raise it.
  - (c) Ratification and confirmational powers are greater in that more nominees' names must be submitted for appointment.

### III. Other Changes:

1. Election Administration Committees now supervise and control elections and political campaigns. These bodies are independent and are responsible to the public.
2. Recall procedure gives the public a check on executive and legislative agencies.
3. Initiative procedure allows the public to bring a matter or bill directly for legislative consideration.
4. The *Tonari Gumi* system established as an integral part of Japan's total war effort, has been abolished. The individual can now go with his or her problems direct to ward, village, town or city offices instead of being forced to belong to a system of organizations which intervened between the people and their government. With the abolishment of the *Tonari Gumi*, *Chonaikai* and *Rengokai*, a three layer network of compulsory organizations has been removed.

Under the *Tonari Gumi* system, as amplified during the war, no Japanese could receive food or other necessities if he failed to cooperate with all orders of his superiors. The system drilled and disciplined Japan for war, indoctrinated every individual with nationalistic and militarist theory, and spied upon those deemed likely to hold liberal or democratic ideas.

This system was wiped out by Japanese Government orders demanding the absolute cessation of all *Tonari Gumi* activities by 31 March 1947.

New regulations provided for a more democratic method of food distribution and for the assumption by local authorities of all governmental or quasi-governmental responsibilities formerly administered through *Tonari Gumi* channels.

Until the close supervision over their freedom had been removed, and until Japanese could be assured an opportunity for individual development, free from fear of espionage, from malicious interference by envious or suspicious neighbors seeking to curry favor with the authorities, and from the crushing weight of bureaucratic intervention in even the minor details of their daily life, Japanese had no real opportunity to be free.

Abolition of the *Tonari Gumi* and the assumption of true personal liberty affords Japanese society its first real opportunity in history to win and to enjoy the blessing of liberty.

[...] <sup>34</sup>

### APPENDIX I

#### GIST OF THE NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The new Constitution of Japan which became effective May 3, 1947, transformed

<sup>34</sup> Nicht abgedruckt ist der Abschnitt „Courts and Law“ (S. 19-27 des Berichts).

Japan into a representative and parliamentary democracy, characterized by the supremacy of the legislative branch over the executive.

Sovereignty, which hitherto rested with the Emperor, now rests with the people.

The imperial institution survives only in the modified form of an Emperor who is even more restricted than is the Head of the State in other parliamentary governments.

As in Great Britain, Japan has a bicameral legislature, the lower house wielding more power than the upper, and a strong Prime Minister within the cabinet. The cabinet, exercising executive power, is responsible to the Diet.

The Constitution abolishes the former dependence of the courts upon the executive. Moreover, it establishes „judicial supremacy“ by granting the Supreme Court the power to determine the constitutionality of legislative and administrative acts, thus subjecting both the executive and legislative branches of government to check by an independent judiciary.

A Japanese Bill of Rights covers the broad fields of political, social, economic and juridical relations between the individual and the state. The Meiji Constitution nominally provided for the traditional civil liberties, but actually operated to cancel those rights by legislative acts. The new Constitution contains no such loopholes, but solemnly declares that fundamental human rights are eternal and inviolate.

The renunciation of war is a unique feature of the new Constitution. Born out of the bitter experience of war and defeat, this provision bears the impress of the modern conception that mankind constitutes a unity. It renounces the right of belligerency and forbids development of the means to wage war as the only effective curb upon war. Here, for the first time in history, a national state thus offers specific and absolute guarantees of peaceful intention, not only to its own people, but to the world at large. The moral significance of this renunciation is self-evident.

The permanent total abolition of armed forces is a logical result of the renunciation of war. This, too, is an innovation in the history of constitutions.

Of all the government institutions, that of the Emperor has undergone the most striking transformation under the new basic law. The Meiji Constitution declared him head of the Empire, sacred and inviolate; under it he held and exercised the rights of sovereignty; the legislative power, the supreme command of the Army and Navy, with the right to declare war, to make peace and to conclude treaties. The new Constitution vests sovereignty in the people and regards the monarch only as a Japanese citizen. His share in the sovereignty is the same as that of any other citizen. As in Belgium and Holland, he is merely the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.

It is significant that the Constitution does not make the Emperor even a titular chief executive or head of the State. In England, France, Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries while the Cabinet or the Prime Minister actually exercises the executive power, the king or president, even if a mere figurehead, is considered the chief executive. The new Japanese device of vesting with executive power only the organ which actually exercises it is an innovation in the history of constitutions.

#### THE NATIONAL DIET

In accordance with the principle that sovereignty rests with the people, the Diet as the representative of all people ranks first among the governmental institutions. The Constitution solemnly proclaims that the Diet shall be the highest organ of state power and the sole law-making organ of the state.

The Diet consists of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. The members of both Houses shall be representative of all people and shall be elected

by secret ballot in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage. The right to vote and the right to be elected shall not be abridged because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.

The denial of family origin as a standard for determining membership in the upper house and the requirement that members of both Houses must be representative of all the people make it constitutionally impossible to revive the former House of Peers.

The term of office of members of the Lower House is four years, while that of Councillors is six years, with half of the members being chosen every three years.

The Diet has important functions with regard to the budget. The Constitution sets forth the general principle that the power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine. No money shall be expended nor shall the State obligate itself, unless authorized by the Diet. Furthermore, the power to impose new taxes or to modify existing ones is exclusively vested in the Diet.

The far-reaching budget power of the Diet signifies an important forward step in the democratic process. According to the Meiji Constitution the Diet had no power to increase the budget submitted to it by the Cabinet, and in the event of rejection by the Diet, the budget of the preceding year remained in force. These crippling limitations have been abandoned.

The new Constitution provides that all property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State and that all expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget.

#### THE CABINET

Executive power is fixed in the Cabinet with the Prime Minister as head of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister must be a member of the Diet. His appointment shall be formally made by the Emperor but only after designation by the Diet. This, in substance, means an election of the Prime Minister by the Parliament.

The other Ministers of State are appointed by the Prime Minister and may be removed by him as he chooses. However, at least half of their number must be members of the Diet. This is another evidence of the People's insistence on the designation of Ministers who have won popular approval by election to the Diet.

In case the Cabinet no longer enjoys the confidence of the House of Representatives it must resign. This requirement of solidarity is a logical consequence of the predominant position of the Prime Minister, who on important political issues must identify himself with his associates. In addition it is in keeping with the traditional Japanese characteristic of group responsibility.

The Constitution requires the resignation of the Cabinet in two other instances: (1) when there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, and (2) upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general election to the House of Representatives. While not always explicitly provided for constitutionally, this is the practice in most parliamentary democracies. A change in the person of the premier as well as in the composition of the Parliament generally necessitates some political adjustment.

As to the functions of the Prime Minister, the Constitution provides that, representing the Cabinet, he submits bills to the Diet, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations and exercise control and supervision over various administrative branches. The Cabinet as such is entrusted with functions of a general as well as special nature. It shall administer the law faithfully and conduct affairs of the State. The Constitution, moreover, lists the management of foreign affairs; the conclusion of treaties, which however, require the preceding or subsequent approval of the Diet; the administration of the civil service in accordance with standards established by law; the

preparation of the budget and its presentation to the Diet; the issuance of Cabinet orders to execute the Constitution and the law; and the decision on matters of amnesty and rehabilitation.

### THE JUDICIARY

In the past Japanese judges were theoretically independent but actually were controlled by the Ministry of Justice. This arrangement did not foster a genuinely independent judiciary. Ambitious judges were inclined to adapt their decisions, particularly in political cases, to the wishes of their superiors. Moreover, they were under continuous observation and control by public procurator who reported to and obeyed the Ministry of Justice.

The new Constitution removes the courts from the Justice Ministry. Thus foundations are laid for the independence of the judges in the exercise of their conscience. They are bound only by the Constitution and by the laws.

The President of the Supreme Court is appointed by the Emperor upon designation by the Cabinet. This places the Chief Justice on an equal ceremonial level with the Prime Minister. Other Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Cabinet. A popular revise of judicial appointments to the Supreme Court at 10-year intervals is provided. Japan has by this means expressly recognized the political character of the highest tribunal and the interest of the people in the personnel composing it.

The judges of the inferior courts are also appointed by the Cabinet, but from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. This arrangement entrusts the determination of personnel policy practically to the Supreme Court. Life tenure is replaced by a 10-year term of office in order to permit a removal in incompetent or otherwise objectionable judges. For all judges an age limit for retirement will be provided by law. Apart from this the Constitution provides the judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. An impeachment court will be established from among the members of both houses of the Diet for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted.

The most important and far-reaching power which the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court is the power of judicial review. The Court will „determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act“ and thus becomes the guardian of the Constitution. The political significance of this development can hardly be overestimated. The power of judicial review has frequently been characterized as judicial supremacy, a term which sometimes obscures the understanding of the functions pertaining to this power. The Judiciary does not interfere with the prerogatives of the legislature and does not violate the principle that the Diet shall be the sole law-making organ of the State. In reviewing laws the Supreme Court determines whether laws conform to the Constitution. A court decision that a law is unconstitutional has the effect of rendering it unenforceable. The court does not make or even veto laws; it simply reviews them to determine whether they are in harmony with the supreme law, the Constitution.

### APPENDIX II

1 August 1947

### THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

### BASIS FOR THE PURGE

#### Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, „There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world“.

#### Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be „allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society“ . . .who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, „or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation“.

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

### THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the „4 January Directive“ is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#### Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. *War Criminals*

Category B. *Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.*

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career com-

- missioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.
- Category C.** *Influential Members of Ultrationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.*  
 Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.
- Category D.** *Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.*  
 National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.
- Category E.** *Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.*  
 Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.
- Category F.** *Governors of Occupied Territories.*  
 Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.
- Category G.** *Additional Militarists and Ultrationalists.*  
 These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:  
 1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.  
 2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.  
 3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

#### INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

##### Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special con-

trol of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).
2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.
3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.
4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.
5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.
6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category F) were defined.
7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of „The China Incident“ and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicuous evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

#### Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had

been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 „recommended candidates“ did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

#### Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

### EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

#### Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Go-

vernment to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

#### The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

#### The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

#### Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc. were specifically listed.

#### Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as „influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel“. This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who

in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

#### Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine exceeding 15,000 yen.

#### Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (*Chonai Kai Cho* and *Buraku Kai Cho*), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

#### Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for once Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

#### Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with

the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

#### Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

#### Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

\*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as „provisionally passed“ because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

#### Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was *Ishibashi, Tanzan*, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

### Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

### Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the „remarks“ section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the „remarks“ outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

### PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or „invisible“ purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all „invisible purgees“.

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the

purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all „evidence to the contrary“ can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

#### APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

#### SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Government screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases, representing persons, holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase  
(4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947) . . . . . 1,067
2. Barred and removed under the Extension  
(4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947) . . . . . 1,681
3. Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive . . . . . 185,000
4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation 20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from Police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

#### INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

On December 8, 1945, the International Prosecution Section was established as a staff section of SCAP and charged with the duty of investigating and bringing to trial those persons who could be charged as having committed crimes against peace; that is, planning, preparing, initiating or waging of aggressive war contrary to international law or treaties, agreements and assurances, or participating in a conspiracy to perform any of such acts.

The first task of the section in its first year of work was to determine the persons who were to be charged as responsible for the bringing about of the aggressive wars which Japan had waged since 1931 and to determine the charges against them. To accomplish this task, a large number of persons including the proposed accused were interrogated at length and thousands of documents, some of which had been newly discovered in the archives of the Japanese government, were scanned for evidentiary material. The first indictment charging twenty-eight persons as responsible for the activities of Japan in waging aggressive warfare was filed with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on April 29, 1946. On May 3, the Tribunal formally convened for the purpose of arraigning the defendants.

The formal trial opened on June 4, 1946, with the delivery of the opening address by Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel. The actual presentation of evidence began on June 13, 1946. Shortly after the formal trial had opened, the Tribunal adjourned the proceedings for about two weeks to enable air conditioning to be completely installed in the courtroom. From the time the Tribunal resumed, the Prosecution continuously presented its evidence without interruption or recess until it rested on January 24, 1947.

For purposes of convenience in handling the vast amount of material which the Prosecution had to present to the Tribunal, the Prosecution's evidence was broken down into phases. By the conclusion of the first year of the occupation the Prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence on four phases of the case; namely, the Constitution and Government of Japan, Propaganda in Preparation for War, the Manchurian Aggression, and Aggression against China.

During the first half of the second year of the occupation, the Prosecution completed presentation of its remaining phases. The phases covered in that period were Narcotics and Opium, Economic Aggression in Manchuria and China, Conspiratorial Relations between Germany and Italy, Aggression against France, Aggression against the Soviet Union, Economic, Military and Naval Preparation for Aggressive War, the Illegal Fortification of the Mandated Islands, Aggressive Warfare against the United States and Great Britain, Aggressive Warfare against the Netherland, Atrocities against the people of the Philippines, General Conventional War Crimes and Atrocities against civilian populations in other areas, and evidence relating specifically to one or more of the individual defendants.

The Prosecution finished presentation of its evidence on January 24, 1947. In the course of the presentation of its evidence, the Prosecution brought before the Tribunal 104 witnesses and submitted 2282 documents consisting of official records of the Japanese government and of other nations, interrogations of the accused, affidavits, and other similar documents. The documents presented were but a small fraction of the total number of documents scanned and translated, and were selected after mature and deliberate consideration as the best then available for the presentation of the evidence against the accused. In preparing any document for presentation to the Tribunal, it was necessary under the rules of the Tribunal to translate the document into either English or Japanese. In the event the document was in a third language, it had to be translated into both English and Japanese. Thereafter, 250 copies of the document had to be reproduced for distribution to the Tribunal, the Prosecution, Counsel for the Defense, other public bodies and newspapers.

The Defense began to present its evidence on February 24, 1947 after a short recess to allow for preparation. The several hundred witnesses which the Defense proposed to call have had to be investigated for purposes of cross-examination and their connection with the case determined. Defense documents must be analyzed for purposes of determining their relevancy, materiality, and probative value as evidence to meet the issues of the Prosecution.

## LEGAL SECTION

### Investigation of War Criminals

During the period November 1, 1945, to July 21, 1946, the Investigation Division had under investigation 636 cases. A total of 430 cases were completed, leaving 206 on hand at the end of the period.

Branch offices were opened during 1945 and 1946 in Osaka, Fukuoka, Sapporo, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Niigata and Sendai so that interrogations and investigations could be carried out with a minimum of delay in dealing with Japanese Government agencies.

During the period July 21, 1946, to July 21, 1947, the Investigation Division had under investigation 2,029 new cases in addition to the 206 cases not completed by July 1, 1946. Of these cases, 590 were completed. This resulted in a cumulative total of 1,020 cases completed of the total of 2,665 under investigation during the period from November 1, 1945, to July 21, 1947.

#### Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals

As of July 15, 1947, the apprehension of 2,214 Japanese Suspects has been directed by the Legal Section, some for trial in Japan and some for trial by Allies in areas outside Japan. Of this number approximately 1,529 have been interned in Sugamo Prison, 216 were deleted from the memoranda after proof was received that the suspects were held in prisons outside Japan, or were otherwise proven to be unobtainable or not desired. A high percentage of those interned, approximately 55 per cent, have been or are awaiting transfers to other areas for trial. Seventy-five have been proven dead and authenticated death certificates have been received. As of July 15, 1947, there were 393 Suspected War Criminals whose apprehension has not yet been accomplished. This figure, which is 17 per cent of the total, includes a number who are believed to be held by Allied Nations in areas other than Japan proper and also a number who are believed dead, but whose death cannot be proven.

During the past year, requests have been received from various Allied Governments and the United States Navy to locate, contract for, and dispatch Japanese lawyers and interpreters to various areas throughout the Pacific, to assist in the conduct of war crimes trials.

As of July 28, 1947, Japanese personnel in the categories indicated have been engaged:

BRITISH:	Singapore	Hong Kong	
	Lawyers	43 Lawyers	2
	Interpreters	42 Interpreters	2
	Bhuddist Priests	2	
DUTCH (NEI)	Lawyers	9 Interpreters	11
PHILIPPINE REP (MANILA)		10	10
AUSTRALIAN (Rabaul)		4	3
		Admin. Pers.	10
U. S. NAVY (Guam)		4 Interpreters	3

#### Prosecution of Suspected War Criminals

The Prosecution Division of the Legal Section began 18 months of actual trial work before Military Commissions appointed in December 1945. During this period of time prosecutors have organized, assembled and classified an enormous volume of documentary evidence; classified much oral evidence coming from witnesses, and drafted charges and specifications against many accused Japanese.

The Prosecution Division has been charged with the responsibility of preparing charges and specifications and trying Class B and Class C Japanese War Criminals. A large number of the cases involve atrocities committed in Prisoner of War Camps, aboard transports enroute to Japan, against B-29 crew members after they had parachuted to safety, by members of the Japanese Army Medical Corps in conducting medical and surgical experiments, and atrocities involving the Japanese Kempeitai, or secret police.

Material assistance and a great contribution to the program has resulted in the assignment to the Section of a number of Australian, British, Canadian (mission completed), Chinese and Dutch officers and other military personnel from these Allied countries, all of whose Governments have furnished excellent documentary evidence and, in many instances, have been able to procure live witnesses for the trial of cases here.

As of July 1, 1947, after 18 months of actual trial work, the Division has assisted in the trial of 146 cases involving 274 perpetrators. Of this group, nine were found „Not Guilty“; in 25 cases the death sentence was imposed and five accused have been executed to date. Life imprisonment was imposed in 21 cases. Sentences ranging from 25 to 50 years were imposed in 36 cases, 10 to 25 years were imposed in 83 cases, 5 to 10 years were imposed in 37 cases, and 5 years or less were imposed in 62 cases.

## II. Bildung, Religion, Gesundheit und Sozialpolitik

Während im ersten Besatzungsjahr die Wiedereröffnung von Schulen, die Suspendierung militaristischer und nationalistischer Lehrer und die Reinigung der Lehrmittel, vor allem aber eine Bestandsaufnahme des japanischen Bildungssystems durch eine amerikanische Expertenkommission, die sich drei Wochen lang im Lande aufhielt, im Vordergrund standen, wurde im zweiten Jahr der Okkupation mit dem am 27. März 1947 vom Reichstag verabschiedeten Gesetz – im Bericht als magna charta des japanischen Bildungswesens gepriesen – der Grundstein zur tiefgreifenden Bildungsreform gelegt. Die allgemeine Schulpflicht (1908 auf 6 Jahre festgelegt) wurde auf neun Jahre ausgedehnt, amerikanischem Vorbild entsprechend folgen der 6jährigen Grundschule zwei je dreijährige Sekundarstufen und schließlich die vierjährige „higher education“, in der die Befähigung zu „graduate studies“ erworben wird. Hauptanliegen der Schulreform war die Dezentralisierung und Demokratisierung des Schulsystems; neben der Verlagerung der Verantwortung auf regionale und lokale Ebene sollten diese Ziele mit Hilfe gewählter Beiräte an den Schulen erreicht werden. Das von den Amerikanern eingeführte System ermöglichte äußere Chancengleichheit auf dem Bildungsweg; als Bildungsziel erhofften die Amerikaner anstelle der bislang in Japan praktizierten Erziehung zum Untertanen durch autoritären Drill, die Heranbildung von selbstverantwortlichen Bürgern, denen frühzeitig Werte wie die

Grundrechte und die Bedeutung internationaler Beziehungen bewußt werden sollten<sup>35</sup>.

Drei grundsätzliche Entscheidungen waren zu Beginn der Besatzung im religiösen Bereich erfolgt: die Wiederherstellung der Religionsfreiheit, die Entstaatlichung des Shinto-Kultes und das Verbot militaristischer und ultranationalistischer Organisationen unter religiösen Vorzeichen. Im zweiten Besatzungsjahr versuchten die Amerikaner nicht nur die komplizierten Grundbesitzverhältnisse der buddhistischen und shintoistischen Schreine und Tempel zu klären, sie ließen auch die Kaiserverehrung in Schulen verhindern, Gedenkstätten beseitigen und die Förderung von Heldengedenkveranstaltungen durch offizielle japanische Stellen verbieten. Dagegen war die Stärkung des Christentums, das zahlenmäßig eine verschwindende Rolle spielte – im Bericht ist die Rede von 500 000 Christen und etwa 2 Millionen „Sympathisanten“ – ein besonderes Anliegen der Besatzungsmacht. Von den 1250 ausländischen Missionen waren ungefähr 250 erst nach Okkupationsbeginn ins Land gekommen. Mit Befriedigung wird erwähnt, daß der Premierminister und der Speaker des Unterhauses praktizierende Christen seien.

Auf dem Gebiet der Schönen Künste kümmerte sich die Besatzungsarmee um die Wiederherstellung von Kulturstätten, um Denkmalpflege, sie ermunterte die Japaner zu Kunstausstellungen; die Eröffnung eines neuen Nationalparks im Dezember 1946 wird ebenfalls erwähnt.

Im Kapitel Public Opinion ist davon die Rede, daß die Japaner die Bedeutung der Erforschung der öffentlichen Meinung rasch erkannt hätten. Die zahlreichen privaten und kommerziellen Bemühungen auf diesem Feld blieben freilich wegen des mangelnden technischen know how ebenso erfolglos wie die Anstrengungen der japanischen Regierung. Die erste japanische Konferenz über Probleme der öffentlichen Meinung hatte im März 1947, unterstützt durch Rat und Tat der SCAP-Experten, stattgefunden. Bei aller Skepsis gegenüber den japanischen Fortschritten auf dem Gebiet der Demoskopie wird doch hervorgehoben, daß es einigen japanischen Organisationen gelungen sei, die Wahlergebnisse vom April 1947 auffallend genau vorherzusagen.

Der Analyse japanischer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften wurde in den Dienststellen von SCAP größter Wert zugemessen. Die regelmäßige Auswertung der Presse diente der internen Erfolgskontrolle der Besatzungsherrschaft, ab Beginn der Okkupation wurden die Tokioter Zeitungen täglich, die Provinzpresse dreimal wöchentlich ausgewertet.

Der Bericht der Public Health and Welfare Section von SCAP, der aus Platzgründen nicht abgedruckt wird, verzeichnet die stolze Erfolgsbilanz auf einem Tätigkeitsfeld spezieller amerikanischer Neigungen: Im ersten Jahr der Besat-

<sup>35</sup> Vgl. Ikuhiko Hata, a. a. O., S. 222; s. a. Ulrich Teichler, *Geschichte und Struktur des japanischen Hochschulwesens*, Stuttgart 1975.

zung wurden 28,5 Millionen Japaner gegen Typhuserkrankungen, 75 Millionen gegen Pocken, 34,5 Millionen gegen Cholera geimpft, die Prostitution abgeschafft (oder wenigstens verboten), ein regelmäßiges Berichtssystem über epidemische Erkrankungen eingeführt. In einem Sofortprogramm wurden Hygieneteams im Sprühen von DDT, der Reparatur von Wasser- und Kanalisationssystemen und der Beseitigung von Trümmern und Ungezieferbrutstätten ausgebildet. Im Sommer 1946 waren 9000 Teams (mit jeweils 6 Mann) an der Arbeit, 1947 waren es 20 000 Teams mit einer Gesamtstärke von 120 000 Mann. „Sufficient supplies and equipment made it possible, for the first time in world history, to successfully carry out a national sanitation program of this scope.“

Die veterinärmedizinische Überwachung von Lebensmitteln wurde wieder eingeführt, die pharmazeutische Industrie (zur Hälfte kriegszerstört, der Rest arbeitete wegen Rohstoffmangels nur zu 20 %) wieder in Gang gesetzt. Vor dem Krieg war Japan der Welt größter Lieferant von Rauschgiften gewesen, unter amerikanischem Einfluß wurden Herstellung und Handel von Narkotika verboten und ein Kontrollsystem errichtet. Als einer der größten Erfolge wurde die demoskopische Erfassung der Ernährungssituation der japanischen Bevölkerung gefeiert („This is the first time in world history that a nutritional survey on such a wide national scale has been accomplished“), konkrete Angaben über Ernährungswerte finden sich im Bericht allerdings nicht. Die Inspektion der 3363 Krankenhäuser Japans ergab, daß ausreichende Möglichkeiten zur stationären medizinischen Versorgung der Bevölkerung existierten. Zur Hebung des Standards der medizinischen Ausbildung wurde ein „Council on Medical Education“ gegründet, entsprechende Gremien wurden auch für Zahnmedizin und Krankenpflege eingerichtet. Aufgrund des „Daily Life Security Law“ (im Oktober 1946 vom Reichstag verabschiedet) bezogen 2 763 333 Personen monatliche Unterstützungen. Zu den weiteren Aktivitäten der Public Health and Welfare Section von SCAP im ersten Besatzungsjahr gehörten Quarantänemaßnahmen für mehr als 5,5 Millionen Heimkehrer auf die japanischen Inseln, die Steuerung der Rückwanderung von Kriegsevakuirten vom Land in die Städte, die Reorganisation des japanischen Roten Kreuzes, Fürsorgeprogramme für Kriegswaisen und Repatrierte und Pläne für 46 Health Departments auf Präfektorebene mit dem Ziel selbständiger Funktionseinrichtungen nach dem Muster der „State Health Departments“ der USA.

Anfang 1946 hatte es in Tokio und im Gebiet Osaka-Kobe Typhus- und Pockenepidemien gegeben, im zweiten Jahr der Besatzung war das Auftreten von epidemischen Krankheiten auf den niedrigsten Stand in der Geschichte Japans zurückgegangen. SCAP führte dies auf seine Hygieneprogramme zurück. 16 Millionen Schulkinder waren im Herbst 1946 (zum erstenmal in Japan überhaupt) gegen Diphtherie geimpft worden. Im Sommer 1947 war die Schutzimpfung von 78 Millionen Japanern gegen Typhus und Paratyphus vorgesehen. 1947 sollte auch die gesamte Bevölkerung zwischen 10 und 24 Jahren (über 24 Millionen) auf

Tuberkulose untersucht werden. Als einer der Höhepunkte des zweiten Besatzungsjahres wurde die Vorbereitung der Produktion von Penicillin in Japan gefeiert. Mit verschiedenen Plänen – Schulspeisung von 18 Millionen Kindern, Reorganisation des japanischen Sozialversicherungssystems, ein Katastrophenhilfegesetz usw. – schloß der Bericht, der mit der Feststellung eingeleitet worden war, daß Zustand und Standard des japanischen Gesundheitswesens nach amerikanischen Maßstäben gemessen praktisch alles zu wünschen übrig ließen.

### Dokument II

## TWO YEARS OF OCCUPATION - SOCIAL

### CIVIL INFORMATION AND EDUCATION

#### EDUCATION

*First Year of Occupation:* Schools of all levels, most of which had been shut down during the spring of 1945, were reopened and resumed operation. Under SCAP directive of 30 October 1945 steps were taken to eliminate militaristic and ultranationalistic influences and personnel from the teaching profession. A total of 115,778 teachers and administrators resigned prior to the issuance of the implementing Imperial Ordinance No. 263 of 7 May 1946. Other teachers, who had been dismissed by the militarists during the war years on account of their liberal views, were reinstated. Military schools were closed, and military training courses and equipment were removed from all schools. Objectionable materials were deleted from textbooks and committees of Japanese educators, aided by SCAP's educational experts, began the task of writing new texts and new courses-of-study.

A Mission of 27 outstanding American educators visited Japan in March of 1946 and, after an examination of the Japanese educational system and a series of conferences with SCAP officials and Japanese educational leaders, prepared a comprehensive report for the reorganization of the Japanese educational system. The suggestions of the American Education Mission were implemented by a group of prominent Japanese educators who prepared detailed recommendations for the guidance of the Ministry of Education. On 9 August 1946 this group was established by ordinance on a permanent basis at Cabinet level as the Japanese Educational Reform Council.

*Second Year of Occupation:* At present approximately 19,000,000 students are attending some 40,000 schools of all levels. Over a half million teachers are gradually learning to make the adjustment from the old authoritative methods of classroom management to the new democratic methods of teaching. From April of 1946 to April of 1947 new editions of textbooks, free of objectionable materials, were printed. A nationwide program for screening all educational personnel by machinery set up on a democratic basis was initiated in implementation of Imperial Ordinance No. 263 of 7 May 1946. A total of 2,643 educators were removed automatically under the features of this Ordinance, 2,268 additional educators have been found unacceptable by the Japanese screening committees.

Based upon the recommendations of the various advisory bodies, the Ministry of Education prepared and the Diet by almost unanimous vote on 25 March 1947 pas-

sed a new Fundamental Law of Education, a document that is referred to by many Japanese as the „magna charta“ of Japanese education. It implements those articles of the new Constitution which have educational implications and provides a legal basis for the elimination of discriminations in education and inequality of educational opportunity. It contains provisions for protecting the national schools from political influence and emphasizes that education is broader than the schoolroom.

The School Education Law passed by the Diet by unanimous vote on 27 March 1947, provides for the extension of compulsory, free education on a step-by-step basis from six to nine years for all Japanese children. For the present school year compulsory education was extended through the seventh year. It is planned to make the eighth school year compulsory starting in 1948, and the ninth year as soon as practicable from the standpoint of availability of schoolrooms, teachers, and funds.

The old complicated educational progression ladder was so designed that only a favored few had opportunity to continue their education to the university level. This system has been replaced by a new school ladder with six years of elementary education and three years of lower secondary education, followed by three years of upper secondary education and four years of higher education, with provision for graduate study. Under the new organizational plan regulations for entrance to the upper secondary and higher educational levels have been broadened and made more democratic.

New history and geography books have been developed which for the first time give Japanese school children an honest and objective story of their country's development and which are free of the mythology which characterized texts of the past. An entire new curriculum and courses-of-study, with accompanying textbooks for the first 12 years of schooling, have been compiled and are being printed and distributed. These are based upon knowledge of the social and mental development of the child and the nature of the community in which he lives. There is stress upon international relations, the basic freedoms, and the accompanying responsibilities of citizenship. Provision has been made for increased teacher participation in the development of teaching materials.

The sweeping changes that have been made and that are continuing to be made in Japanese education necessitate a retraining of teachers already in service to transform them from the old role of subject matter drillmasters to leaders of the learning processes of their pupils. The Education Ministry under SCAP supervision early set to work preparing new teachers' manuals and teaching guides for specific subjects, and undertook to reorient teachers to their new responsibilities. A series of Ministry sponsored regional and prefectural institutes and conferences have been held throughout Japan, at which the new courses-of-study have been introduced and explained. The raising of standards of teacher training institutions has been initiated. Plans are being developed for sound programs of certification. Professional education associations representing various fields of interest have been organized democratically and are lending support to the new educational program.

Educational authority has been decentralized to the extent that, although the legal authority has remained with the Ministry of Education, greater responsibilities have been placed in the hands of the prefectural and local educational authorities, with greater freedom to develop programs and practices to meet local needs. Groups of citizens have been established in local communities throughout Japan to advise educational authorities on critical problems. Preliminary steps have been taken to establish prefectural and local school boards elected by the people, in

whose hands the responsibility for administering the schools will be placed. These plans envisage the retention by law at the national level of certain minimum provisions and standards, and the granting of increasing powers at prefectural and local educational levels.

### RELIGION

*First Year of Occupation:* SCAP directives were issued 1) calling for removal of restrictions on religious freedom, 2) withdrawing state sponsorship, support, and control from Shinto, and 3) prohibiting militaristic and ultranationalistic organizations from carrying on activities under the guise of religion. Religious freedom was established and religious toleration encouraged.

*Second Year of Occupation:* Implementation of the basic SCAP directives continued. Japanese religious life was carefully scrutinized and militaristic and ultranationalistic doctrines and practices are in the process of elimination. The enactment of a law and the promulgation of implementing ordinances established the legal basis for the transfer to shrines and temples of title to the State-owned land which they presently occupy and use for religious purposes. Virtually all Shinto shrines and more than half of the Buddhist temples now possess State-owned land which in the aggregate exceeds 200,000 acres.

Sponsorship and support by units or organs of government of funerals, memorial services, and other ceremonies for the war dead, militarists, and ultranationalists and participation in such ceremonies by public officials acting in their official capacities were prohibited by notifications issued from the Home and Education Ministries. Also prohibited was the construction of monuments and statues for the war dead, militarists, and ultranationalists. The same ordinances directed the removal of such monuments and statues located in public schools, along with those patently objectionable monuments and statues located in public buildings and on public grounds. A notification of the Education Ministry eliminated school-sponsored veneration for the Emperor.

The influence of Christianity was greatly strengthened when Tetsu Katayama and Komakichi Matsuoka, both active Christians, became Prime Minister and Speaker of the House of Representatives respectively. The Christian tenets of justice, tolerance, and understanding which have guided the conduct of the Occupation appear to have contributed materially to the popularizing of Christian principles. Although the number of Christian church members is probably less than 500,000, the number of Christian sympathizers has been estimated at upwards of 2,000,000. Some 1,250 Christian foreign missionaries are presently in Japan, about 250 of whom have entered since the beginning of the Occupation.

### ARTS AND MONUMENTS

*First Year of Occupation:* Instructions were issued to the Japanese government and to Occupation forces to insure the protection and preservation of cultural sites, structures, and objects of national and international importance. Inspections were made to determine the extent of war damage or war deterioration, and reports were completed revealing no appreciable damage to the great cultural centers of Kyoto, Nara and Kamakura, but serious or total damage to castles of the Momoyama and Tokugawa periods (1568-1867 A. D.) of which Nagoya castle was the most prominent and famous example, and architectural losses to 17th and 18th century structures in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Osaka.

*Second Year of Occupation:* Inspections of Registered Sites, National Treasures,

and Registered Objects were continued, with attention to private collections. Encouragement was given to the exhibition of private collections and the first major display of privately owned masterpieces of Chinese and Japanese art was held at the Kakutsuru Museum in the Kobe-Osaka area during April 1947. Exhibition activities at the Nezu Art Museum in Tokyo were renewed with shows in the fall of 1946 and in the spring of 1947.

An exhibition of National Treasures of the Imperial Household Museum held in Nara was attended by more than 120,000 people in 21 days. With the promulgation of the New Constitution on 3 May 1947, the Imperial Household Museum was transferred to the people, and the name changed to the National Museum. Pending the reconciliation of budgetary and other problems, the transfer was accomplished under an interim plan that placed the National Museum under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

Activity in the field of contemporary art has been high, with displays at the Tokyo Municipal Art Gallery taking first place in volume at attendance and variety of exhibition.

The restoration and repair of National Treasures has received the serious attention of the Ministry of Education. Deterioration of the famous Seventh Century lacquer figures of Guardian Kings at Todai-ji, caused by neglect during the war years, has been repaired, as have panel paintings by artists of the Kano school in various temples in Kyoto. The long-range plan of reconstruction begun before the war at Horyu-ji, near Nara – the most important single monument of Japanese art – has been resumed, the current work being concerned principally with the dismantling and reconstructing of the original Seventh-Century Golden Hall and Pagoda. Special problems involving the preservation of the famous murals are being studied by Japanese scholars and experts.

The importance of formulating a plan for the rehabilitation of the area at Itsukushima damaged by flood and typhoon in 1945 has been stressed.

A new national park, Ise Shima, was designated on 20 December 1946.

[. . .]<sup>36</sup>

#### PUBLIC OPINION

*First Year of Occupation:* The Japanese people quickly became aware that public opinion is of importance in the direction of a democratic government, and many private and commercial organizations and agencies were established to study and report on public opinion. However, with no significant prior experience they revealed little technical competence. The national government made an unsuccessful effort to activate an effective public opinion organization as a Cabinet unit.

*Second Year of Occupation:* Informal consultative and advisory liaison has been maintained with a peak number of seventy Japanese organizations engaged in whole or in part in public opinion survey activities. This number settled to forty-eight in July 1947. Liaison also has been maintained with national government and

<sup>36</sup> Nicht abgedruckt ist das hier anschließende Kapitel „Information“, von dem lediglich Anfang und Schluß vorliegen. Im Originalbericht beginnt dieser Teil auf Seite 4 unten, bricht jedoch ab, da die Seite 5 (obwohl richtig paginiert) mit der Seite 3 identisch ist. Seite 6 ist identisch mit Seite 4. Aufgrund des bei der Vervielfältigung entstandenen Irrtums steht auf Seite 7 oben der Rest des Kapitels „Information“. Auf dem Bruchstück Seite 4 wird über Maßnahmen zur Herstellung der Pressefreiheit berichtet, auf Seite 7 von der Errichtung von Bibliotheken aus US-Beständen.

prefectural public opinion organizations to insure conformity with technical requirements of public opinion surveys and to prevent political abuse of such activities. To the extent possible, technical assistance and counsel have been given by SCAP specialists who participated in the first national public opinion conference in Japan held in Tokyo in March of 1947. It is considered significant to note that in the April 1947 elections a number of agencies were able to predict the outcome with striking success. The results of current work of the leading organizations show constant improvement in sample design, quota control, interview design, and interviewing method.

### MEDIA ANALYSIS

The analysis of Tokyo newspapers daily and prefectural newspapers tri-weekly has been an important means of determining trends, opinions, international news interest, and reaction to Occupation policies as expressed in Japanese publications. In addition, opinions reflected by writers in representative Japanese magazines of both general and special coverage have been analyzed in various subject fields. The files of these analyses maintained without a break since the beginning of the Occupation afford an over-all picture of Japanese press and periodical reaction to the events of the day.

[. . .]<sup>37</sup>

### III. Wirtschaft

Auch das japanische Nachrichtenwesen bot den Amerikanern Möglichkeiten zur Entmilitarisierung und Demokratisierung. Alle Radiostationen der japanischen Streitkräfte wurden demontiert oder in den Dienst der Besatzungsarmee gestellt, und die Rundfunkgesellschaft wurde von unerwünschtem Personal gesäubert und von einer „Propagandawaffe der Militaristen“ zur „freien und demokratischen Institution“ umgewandelt. Als wesentlichste administrative Maßnahme bezeichneten die Amerikaner die Einrichtung eines Kommunikationsministeriums.

Im zweiten Besatzungsjahr wurden neue Gesetze für das Nachrichtenwesen vorbereitet und die beiden Monopolgesellschaften für den Telephon- und Telegraphenverkehr liquidiert, ihre Einrichtungen gingen an die japanische Regierung über. Im September 1946 wurde die Wiederherstellung und Erweiterung des japanischen Telephonnetzes in Angriff genommen. Durch 130 000 neu installierte Apparate wuchs es auf 1 160 000 Anschlüsse. Der funktelegraphische Verkehr zwischen Japan und den Vereinigten Staaten wurde auch für den privaten Gebrauch wieder aufgenommen, andere Funkverbindungen im südostasiatischen Raum und nach London dienten in erster Linie offiziellen Stellen. Da die Amerikaner den Rundfunk als ein wichtiges Mittel bei der Erziehung zur Demokratie ansahen, achteten sie nicht nur auf den Zustand der Sendeanlagen und die richtige Gesinnung derer, die sie betrieben, sondern auch auf guten Empfang: die

<sup>37</sup> Nicht abgedruckt ist der hier anschließende Bericht der Public Health and Welfare Section (S. 8-13).

Produktion von Radioröhren wurde von 160 000 monatlich im Jahr 1946 auf 629 000 pro Monat 1947 gesteigert, angestrebt waren 1,5 Millionen Röhren monatlich für das folgende Jahr. Der Postverkehr zwischen Japan und dem gesamten Ausland war ab 10. September 1946 wieder möglich, bis Januar 1947 waren jedoch nur private Postkarten erlaubt. Die Amerikaner beseitigten zahlreiche feudalistische Relikte bei den Postgebühren und führten moderne Methoden im ganzen Postdienst ein.

Ausländisches Eigentum in japanischem Besitz kam nach Kriegsende unter SCAP-Kontrolle (Civil Property Custodian), ebenso wurde mit Vermögenswerten von ultranationalistischen und terroristischen Organisationen und Kriegsverbrechern sowie mit Edelmetallen und Edelsteinen im Besitz der japanischen Regierung verfahren. (Zur Registrierung und Bewertung der Diamanten reisten Experten aus Washington an.) Bewegliche deutsche Vermögenswerte öffentlicher und privater Herkunft wurden unter Aufsicht der 8. US-Armee in vier Lagerhäusern zusammengefaßt; die Habe deutscher Firmen kam unter japanische Treuhänderschaft. Sie wurde zum Teil der japanischen Wirtschaft zur Verfügung gestellt, wie auch die medizinische Ausrüstung des deutschen Marinelazaretts. Zum deutschen Vermögen gehörten auch 130 Grundstücke und Anteile an 78 Unternehmen, von denen fünf noch arbeiteten.

Die japanische Kriegsbeute sollte mit Hilfe der Reparations- und Restitutionsdelegationen der Alliierten den ursprünglichen Besitzern zurückgegeben werden. Zur Verteilung stand aber offensichtlich nicht allzuviel zur Verfügung. 15 Schiffe z. B. wurden an China (4), Korea (9), Großbritannien (1) und die Niederlande (1) verteilt; mit den fünf Automobilen waren die philippinischen und britischen Ansprüche wahrscheinlich nicht gänzlich befriedigt. Unter „Verschiedenem“ befanden sich auch 2 500 Filme ausländischer Herkunft. Besondere Probleme warfen die Vermögenswerte neutraler Länder und das Eigentum der von Japan abhängig gewesenen Marionettenregierungen auf.

Die japanische Handelsmarine war auf ein Fünftel der Vorkriegstonnage zusammengeschmolzen. Die Mehrzahl der benutzbaren Schiffe war während des Kriegs unter reduzierten Qualitätsansprüchen gebaut worden und in schlechtem Zustand. Die Eisenbahn hatte nicht so sehr durch den Krieg gelitten als durch Verschleiß, die städtischen Verkehrsmittel waren hingegen durch die Bombardements mehr als zur Hälfte zerstört worden. Unmittelbar nach der Kapitulation übernahmen die Besatzungstreitkräfte die Kontrolle über das japanische Transportsystem, das zuvor fast ausschließlich von der Regierung betrieben oder kontrolliert worden war. Die Pläne zur Wiederherstellung von Eisenbahnanlagen, zu Reparatur und Neubau von Waggons, Omnibussen, Lastwagen und zur Fertigstellung bereits begonnener Schiffsneubauten sahen auch die Beseitigung des monopolistischen Kontrollsystems vor.

Mit solchen Planungen, die das erste Besatzungsjahr ausfüllten, sollte die Wirtschaft Japans auf bescheidenem Niveau wieder in Gang gesetzt werden. Im Juli

1947 war etwa ein Drittel der Eisenbahnausbesserungskapazität wiederhergestellt, die Rekonstruktion des Eisenbahnnetzes dagegen war wegen des großen Materialmangels noch nicht weit vorangekommen. Der Wiederaufbau der Handelsmarine wurde als langsam, aber kontinuierlich dargestellt. Im Herbst 1945 waren 526 Schiffe mit mehr als 100 t in Dienst, zwei Jahre später waren es 777, die Gesamttonnage war von 736 000 auf über eine Million gestiegen. Die Ergebnisse des gesamten Rekonstruktionsprogramms im Transportwesen entsprachen den amerikanischen Erwartungen nicht.

Die Economic und Scientific Section von SCAP konnte berichten, daß für alle Einzelbereiche wie Arbeit, Industrie, Außenhandel, Finanzen, Preiskontrolle, Rationierung, Dekartellisierung und Entflechtung usw. Demokratisierungsprogramme im Laufen seien, mit denen die vier Grundforderungen der Besatzungspolitik – Verhinderung eines neuen Angriffskrieges, Reform und Demokratisierung der Wirtschaftsstruktur, Wiederaufbau der japanischen Wirtschaft bis zur Erreichung der Selbstversorgung und Sicherung des Rechts der Japaner auf eine friedliche Existenz – realisiert werden sollten.

Während das japanische Bank- und Finanzwesen anfangs durch Kontensperren u. a. Maßnahmen unter strikter Kontrolle gehalten wurde, nicht zuletzt um den Transfer von Werten aus ehemals besetzten Ländern zu verhindern, begannen die Amerikaner schon gegen Ende des ersten Besatzungsjahrs mit der Reorganisation der Finanzwirtschaft. Ausländische Banken und Unternehmen erhielten in gewissem Umfang die Erlaubnis zu Geschäften, eine Bank zur Finanzierung des Wiederaufbaus wurde errichtet, und Bankinstitute und Versicherungen begannen wieder zu arbeiten. Die öffentlichen Finanzen, einschließlich des kaiserlichen Haushalts, wurden ebenso wie das japanische Steuersystem von SCAP überwacht. Eine Kapitalabgabesteuer und eine Kriegsschädensteuer hatten den Zweck, private Vermögen zugunsten öffentlicher Fonds zu zerschlagen und Ansprüche auf Ersatz von Kriegsschäden zu verhindern. Zu Beginn der Besetzung waren 46 Institutionen (mit einem zu Buche stehenden Wert von insgesamt 176 Milliarden Yen<sup>36</sup>) liquidiert worden, die der wirtschaftlichen Durchdringung der besetzten Länder oder zur Stärkung der japanischen Kriegswirtschaft gedient hatten. Im zweiten Jahr wurden weitere 113 Kriegsgesellschaften beseitigt.

Wichtigstes Instrument der Dekartellisierungspolitik war die „Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC)“, die zunächst 41 Konzerne mit 1200 unter deren Einfluß stehenden Unternehmungen untersuchte und der Kontrolle von SCAP unterstellte. Nach Überprüfung von weiteren 2000 Gesellschaften wurde die japanische Regierung angewiesen, alle Holdinggesellschaften aufzulösen und alle Gesetze, die ihr Wachstum begünstigt hatten, aufzuheben. Die

<sup>36</sup> Zwischen Yen und Dollar galten folgende Paritäten: September 1945 1 US-\$ = 15 Yen, März 1947 = 50 Yen, Juli 1948 = 270 Yen, April 1949 = 360 Yen.

HCLC übernahm Vermögenswerte von 67 Holdinggesellschaften in sehr beträchtlicher Höhe. Die Regierung wurde auch aufgefordert, die amtliche Außenhandelsgesellschaft der Kriegszeit („Koeki Eidan“) zu liquidieren und an ihrer Stelle einen staatlichen „Board of Trade“ (Boeki Cho) zu errichten, der den gesamten Außenhandel dirigieren sollte. Im zweiten Jahr der Besetzung rückten die Zaibatsu, Konzerne in Familienbesitz, in den Vordergrund des Interesses<sup>39</sup>. Zwei der mächtigsten Familienkonzerne, Mitsui und Mitsubishi, erhielten am 3. Juli 1947 den Befehl zur sofortigen Liquidation. Mit der Antitrustgesetzgebung, die 1947 in Gang kam, war der Höhepunkt der Entflechtungspolitik erreicht und auch schon überschritten. Inneramerikanische Kritik und außenpolitische Konstellationen führten 1948 zur Revision der Dekartellisierungspolitik<sup>40</sup>, die schließlich unter Joseph M. Dodge, dem 1949 als Wirtschaftsberater nach Japan entsandten Detroit Bankier, ganz eingestellt wurde. Von der japanischen Regierung ermuntert, begann 1950 der Re-Konzentrationsprozeß in der japanischen Wirtschaft<sup>41</sup>.

Im April 1946 kam, nicht unerwartet, eine Ernährungskrise zum Ausbruch, die eine Verstärkung der Rationierung und Preiskontrolle und gleichzeitig den Import von Lebensmitteln nötig machte. Die im August 1946 entstandenen Behörden „Economic Stabilization Board“ und „Price Board“ konnten nicht genug ausrichten, da ihnen – so die Klage der Amerikaner – sowohl Mittel wie Unterstützung durch die japanische Regierung fehlten. Versuche, den Schwarzen Markt auszuschalten, gingen mit Erhöhungen der offiziellen Rationen (1240 Kalorien pro Kopf 1947 gegenüber 1042 im Oktober 1945) und der Bekämpfung des Reishamsterns Hand in Hand. Ab Anfang Juli 1947 wurden sogar alle nicht lebenswichtigen Restaurants für 6 Monate geschlossen.

Zur Bezahlung der Importe aus Amerika durch japanische Güter wurde ein Außenhandelskonto eingerichtet, das den Warenverkehr ohne Devisentransaktionen und unabhängig von Wechselkursen ermöglichte. Dem Wert nach wurden 1946 Waren (hauptsächlich Lebensmittel) für 305 Millionen Dollar aus USA importiert und vor allem Rohseide für 72 Millionen Dollar nach USA exportiert. Als beträchtliches Stimulans gewertet wurde die am 13. August 1947 beschlossene Maßnahme, Gold und Silber aus japanischem Besitz im Wert von 137 Millionen Dollar in Devisen umzutauschen, um eine Kreditbasis für den Außenhandel zu schaffen.

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. SCAP, *Transfer of Zaibatsu Family Properties to Holding Company Liquidation Commission*, SCAPIN – 1563, 26. Nov. 1946, in: SCAP, GHQ, SCAPINS. Supreme Commander for the Allied Power's Instructions to the Japanese Government issued by Economic and Scientific Section from 4 Sept 1945 to 8 March 1952, Tokyo 1952, S. 532 ff. S. a. FRUS 1947, Vol. VI, S. 520.

<sup>40</sup> Kolko, a. a. O., S. 518f.

<sup>41</sup> Seifert, S. 125 f.

Im September 1945 hatte sich die japanische Industrie wegen Rohstoff- und Kohlenmangels, fehlenden Importen und Transportschwierigkeiten dem Stillstand genähert. SCAP bemühte sich um das Wiederingangkommen und setzte bescheidene Produktionsziele. Die Fernostkommission in Washington legte dann für die künftige Industrieproduktivität Japans den Durchschnitt der Jahre 1930–1954 als Obergrenze fest (dieser Durchschnitt schloß zwei Rezessionsjahre ein). Im August 1947 betrug die Produktion etwa ein Drittel davon, gemessen an 1943 waren es nur 15–20 %. Daß die Produktion so weit hinter den Möglichkeiten und dem Bedarf zurückblieb, hatte viele Gründe: Arbeitskräftemangel, zerschlossene Anlagen, finanzielle Schwierigkeiten, schlechte Ernährung und unzulängliche Wohnungen. Die Hauptanstrengung von SCAP galt außer der Förderung und dem Transport von Kohle daher dem Wohnungsbau. Im August 1947 wurde die Wiederherstellung eines Viertels der im Krieg zerstörten Häuser Tokios berichtet. Hervorgehoben wurden auch die Erfolge in der Kunstdüngerproduktion.

Für die Textilindustrie galt im wesentlichen das gleiche wie für die übrigen Wirtschaftszweige: wenig Rohstoff und zu wenig Energie. Im Juni 1946 kamen die ersten Lieferungen von Rohbaumwolle aus den USA in Japan an, 80% der daraus hergestellten Erzeugnisse gingen in den Export (die Vermutung liegt nahe, daß die amerikanischen Baumwollgeschäfte in erster Linie unter dem Gesichtspunkt der billigen Verarbeitung getätigt wurden)<sup>42</sup>. Die Produktion von Kunstseide lag bei nur 5 % des Vorkriegsstandes, und auch auf dem Wollsektor konnten die vorhandenen Kapazitäten nur zu einem winzigen Bruchteil ausgenutzt werden.

Von den vier Zielen, die für die Arbeitspolitik im ersten Besatzungsjahr aufgestellt worden waren, wurde nur eines als erreicht gemeldet: die Herstellung der Bedingungen für die Entwicklung einer freien und demokratischen Arbeiterbewegung in Japan. Nach der Auflösung der „Arbeitsfront“-Organisationen der Kriegszeit, der Wegnahme der Arbeitsverwaltung aus der Zuständigkeit der Polizei und durch die Aufhebung der Gesetze, die die Entwicklung freier Gewerkschaften verhindert hatten, bestanden immerhin die Voraussetzungen für das weiter Angestrebte: ein kollektives Tarifvertragsrecht zwischen den Sozialpartnern, eine demokratische Arbeits- bzw. Sozialgesetzgebung und der wirksame Einsatz des japanischen Arbeitskräftepotentials.

Im August 1946 waren 3 Millionen Japaner Gewerkschaftsmitglieder, ein Jahr später hatte sich diese Zahl fast verdoppelt. Da das Streikrecht mit Rücksicht auf

<sup>42</sup> Vgl. dazu den Baumwollvertrag zwischen der US-Militärregierung und den süddeutschen Ländern vom 2. 7. 1946. Walter Vogel, *Westdeutschland 1945–1950. Der Aufbau von Verfassungs- und Verwaltungseinrichtungen über den Ländern der drei westlichen Besatzungszonen*, Teil II, Boppard 1964, S. 71; *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bd. 1, September 1945–Dezember 1946, bearb. v. W. Vogel u. C. Weisz, München 1976, S. 262, 479, 787.

die Bedürfnisse der Besatzungsmacht eingeschränkt war, gab es im ersten Besatzungsjahr wenig Streiks; ein angekündigter Generalstreik wurde durch Intervention von SCAP verhindert. Der starke Nachdruck, mit dem die Amerikaner die Gewerkschaften förderten – die japanischen Gewerkschaften sind übrigens weitaus überwiegend Betriebsgewerkschaften –, wurde angesichts des kommunistischen Einflusses in den Arbeiterorganisationen im Zeichen des Kalten Krieges von großer Skepsis abgelöst. Zu Beginn des Koreakrieges drängten die Amerikaner auf Säuberungen, die von der japanischen Regierung sehr gerne durchgeführt wurden, die Gewerkschaftsbewegung erlitt einen quantitativ empfindlichen Rückschlag.

Zur administrativen und legislativen Absicherung der Arbeitspolitik betrieb SCAP die Errichtung eines Arbeitsministeriums, das Kompetenzen vom Wohlfahrtsministerium übernahm und außerdem neue erhielt. Gesetze zur Regelung der Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern, über Arbeitsbedingungen, Unfallversicherung sowie ein Seemannsgesetz hatten 1946 und 1947 den Reichstag passiert, ein Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz war im August 1947 eingebracht worden.

Naturwissenschaftliche und technische Forschung war wegen ihres Beitrags zu den japanischen Kriegsanstrengungen im Oktober 1945 durch die SCAP-Direktive Nr. 3 verboten worden. Alle Aktivitäten auf diesem Gebiet waren im ersten Besatzungsjahr gründlich untersucht worden; als sich herausstellte, daß die Sicherheit der Besatzungsstreitkräfte durch die Tätigkeit von Forschern und Technikern nicht bedroht war, wurden die Restriktionen gelockert und Überlegungen angestellt, daß der Wiederaufbau Japans schwerlich ohne eigene technologische Bemühungen vonstatten gehen könne. Großer Wert wurde dagegen darauf gelegt, die von den Amerikanern als besonders schmerzlich empfundenen Mängel auf statistischem Gebiet in Japan zu beheben.

Die ohnehin knappen natürlichen Ressourcen Japans waren bei Kriegsende ziemlich erschöpft. Zur Kohlen- und Brennholzkrise kam der Treibstoffmangel für Fischereifahrzeuge und der Rückgang der Reisproduktion 1945 auf 68 % des Vorkriegsstandes. Die Fischerei mußte über die im November 1945 gezogenen Grenzen ausgedehnt werden, die Amerikaner mußten mit Treibstoff, Kunstdünger, Saatgut aushelfen, gleichzeitig kümmerten sie sich um die Wiederaufforstung der kahlgeschlagenen Wälder, um die Suche nach Bodenschätzen, um Landgewinnung in großem Stil. SCAP ermöglichte auch – gegen beträchtlichen internationalen Widerstand<sup>48</sup> – eine japanische Walfangkampagne in der Antarktis.

Der wahrscheinlich größte Erfolg der Besatzungspolitik war die Bodenreform, die nicht nur aus den Pächtern (die in Wirklichkeit eher Landarbeiter waren) selbständige Bauern machte, sondern auch deren Lebensstandard entscheidend

<sup>48</sup> Vgl. FRUS 1947, Vol. VI, S. 179, 205, 212, 214 ff.

verbesserte. Hier war der Reformeifer der Amerikaner mit japanischen Initiativen zusammengetroffen. Das erste Bodenreformprogramm der Japaner vom Dezember 1945 war allerdings von SCAP und vom Allied Council noch als unzulänglich empfunden worden; an seine Stelle trat das Gesetz vom 21. Oktober 1946. Danach war im Durchschnitt in ganz Japan nur noch der Besitz von 3 cho<sup>44</sup> (in Hokkaido 12 cho) Bauernland erlaubt. Bis 1950 traten 2,341 Millionen Grundbesitzer an etwa 4,748 Millionen Pachtbauern rund 2 Millionen cho Agrarland ab. Die Entschädigung der Großgrundbesitzer war so geregelt, daß sie an die Regierung verkaufen mußten, die das Land an die Pächter weiterveräußerte<sup>45</sup>.

Von Reparationsleistungen blieb Japan – wenn man von den Gebietsabtretungen, dem Auslandsvermögen und Arbeitsleistungen absieht – in den ersten beiden Nachkriegsjahren verschont. Das war keineswegs durch mangelnde Pläne verursacht, vielmehr eine Folge der Uneinigkeit unter den 11 Mitgliedsnationen der Fernostkommission, vor allem der Differenzen zwischen USA und der Sowjetunion<sup>46</sup>. Im zweiten Besatzungsjahr hatten zwar alle elf Mitgliedstaaten Reparationsdelegationen nach Japan entsandt, die unter dem Vorsitz des Leiters der Reparations Section von SCAP einen gemeinsamen Ausschuß bildeten, Washington hatte aber lediglich der Demontage und dem Abtransport von 30 % der für die Reparationsleistungen vorgesehenen Produktionsanlagen im Rahmen eines „Sofortprogramms“ zugunsten von China (15 %), Philippinen, Niederländisch-Ostindien und den Kolonialgebieten Großbritanniens (je 5 %) zugestimmt. Die Demontagen begannen erst Ende 1947; bis zum Demontagestop im Mai 1949 wurde das im Sofortprogramm festgelegte Volumen in etwa erreicht<sup>47</sup>.

### Dokument III

#### TWO YEARS OF OCCUPATION – ECONOMIC CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS

*First Year:* In the first year the primary job in the communications field was demilitarization. All fixed radio stations and telegraph and telephone offices of the former Japanese Army and Navy were closed and dismantled, or converted to the use of the Occupation Forces, the Japanese Demobilization Board, or the domestic communications system. Stocks of equipment and supplies were inventoried and distributed to the public communications offices. The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, which is the sole broadcasting agency, had been a propaganda weapon of the militarists. It was relieved of undesirable personnel and thoroughly reorganized as a free and democratic institution.

<sup>44</sup> 1 cho = 10 tan = 2,45 acres bzw. 0,99 Hektar.

<sup>45</sup> R. P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan*, London 1959.

<sup>46</sup> Vgl. FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, S. 471 ff.; FRUS 1947, Vol. VI, S. 345 ff. und vor allem Hubertus Seifert, *Die Reparationen Japans*, Opladen 1971.

<sup>47</sup> Seifert, a. a. O., S. 120.

SCAP ordered the Japanese Government to strictly control all radio stations, through licensing, assignment of frequencies, and increased surveillance of operations. In order to speed the work of repatriation, radio broadcasts were beamed to Japanese nationals outside the home islands, and other radio services were provided to repatriation officials.

At the same time radiotelegraph newscasts from Japan to the outside world were inaugurated and radiotelegraph circuits between Japan and the U.S. and London were set up for press messages. Other inter-national radiotelegraph circuits were opened and submarine telephone and telegraph circuits were maintained.

The work of rehabilitation began during the first year and the Japanese Government appropriated one billion yen for communications construction. Actual and budgeted expenditures were carefully scrutinized so that they would result in services for the Occupation Forces or the domestic internal economy.

Production of communications equipment was set into motion. Current requirements of the postal, telecommunications and broadcasting systems were met. Production of vacuum tubes, which would be used by radio owners in all parts of Japan, was particularly emphasized.

From an administrative point of view, the most important development of the first year was the elevation of the government agency managing communications to Cabinet level, thus assuring the newly-named Ministry of Communications, an amalgamation of enterprises whose operation entailed the employment of 400,000 persons, of adequate status to present to the Cabinet the needs of the Japanese civil communications systems.

*Second Year:*

*Administration:* In order to continue democratization of the Japanese communications system, SCAP encouraged the setting up of a Temporary Legal Committee, which framed eight new communications laws concerned with postal, telephone, telegraph, and radio operations. The new laws are being introduced in the current session of the National Diet.

Two monopolies, the International Telecommunications Company and its principal subsidiary, the Japan Telegraph and Telephone Construction Company, both highly autocratic in their structure and policies and forming an obstacle to the democratic integration of the communications system, were placed in the process of liquidation, by a SCAP directive issued 25 March. At the peak of its power, the ITC had investments in Korea, Formosa, Mongolia, Manchuria, Central China, the East Indies, Singapore, Hongkong, Hainan and Palao. The ITC had managed its far-flung interests through a group of interlocking directorates. Liquidation of these companies is being accomplished through the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, which called in all stocks of other companies owned by the ITC and JT & T. These stocks will be sold to the public by that commission. The operation of the facilities of the companies was taken over by the Japanese government, which became the employer of the former personnel of these companies.

SCAP also brought about improvements in the accounting and budgetary procedures of the Ministry of Communications. In December, 1946, for the first time in its history, the Ministry of Communications itemized by projects its budget for the fiscal year ahead before submitting it to the National Diet. The practice previously had been to secure a lump sum appropriation and then to allocate it to various uses.

A new accounting system for the Ministry, whereby the financial status of its enterprises might be determined separately, was installed to replace the cash system

previously in use. On 1 April 1947 the Diet passed the Communications Enterprises Account Law, which provided for the change to a modern accrual accounting system.

A further reform of the Ministry of Communications accounting system is the establishment of a depreciation reserve. A program to secure data on which depreciation accounting procedure may be based has been initiated, and the year ahead should see this project brought to fruition.

Much remains to be accomplished, however, in the implementation of the plan for the integration of operations at present performed by the Japan Telephone Equipment Company, whose functions are being assumed by the Ministry of Communications. This company has maintained approximately 196,000 privately-owned telephones. The Ministry plan is to acquire these instruments, through donation or purchase, and maintain them. It is estimated that entire integration will require from three to five years.

[. . .]<sup>48</sup>

*Postal Services:* The standard which has been set for the rehabilitation of the Japanese postal system is that which will meet the minimum requirements of a democratic country and people.

One of the most important problems was the reestablishment of international mail service between Japan and all other countries of the world. These arrangements were completed 10 September 1946 when the first international postal service in Japan since the end of hostilities was inaugurated.

Until January 1947 only personal and family communications on postal cards in the regular international mails to and from Japan, and relief parcels to Japan were allowed. At that time international service was expanded to include non-transactional letters to and from Japan and all countries of the world. The opening of international airmail, the increasing of the weight limit of international parcel post relief parcels, and the addition of other postal services in operation before the war are at present being studied.

Investigation of the domestic postal system has brought to light a multiplicity of feudalistic and paternalistic allowances and commissions in its wage structures. One beneficial result has been the abolition to a great extent of the giving of the so-called „Free Fund“ allowances which had been abused by the chiefs of special post offices, who are not subject to all accounting provisions of regular post offices.

Faster handling of mail has resulted from the adoption of modern methods of mail handling and distribution, from improvements in railway mail cars and from revision of mail dispatch schedules.

Investigation of the Japanese Postal Transfer system also has resulted in a marked increase in efficiency through revision of laws, increases in fees, and new budgeting methods. A survey of accounting procedures for receipts and disbursements at post offices has effected many improvements, among which are adequate measures for the protection of funds. Methods to curb illegal practices of postal employees such as embezzlements and the cashing of frozen checks have been instituted to protect the public.

<sup>48</sup> Die Abschnitte „Telephone and Telegraph“, „International Radio“, „Broadcasting“, „Communications“, „Equipment Manufacturing“, „Research and Development“ (S. 2-4 des Berichts) sind nicht abgedruckt.

A survey of the Japanese Post Savings system, the „poor man's checking account“ in Japan, brought about a reorganization which has not only increased its efficiency of operation but its reliability. Services and safeguards necessary for the democratic tradition, which were discontinued by the Japanese during the war, have been reintroduced, and many autocratic practices have been eliminated.

The tangible achievements during the past year have consisted in the further freeing of the Japanese communications system from undemocratic influences and practices through the destruction of a powerful telecommunications monopoly, the inauguration of modern accounting procedures, the rehabilitation of telecommunications lines, the reopening of international communications - including international postal services, the improvement of quality and the raising of the production of communications equipment to essential levels.

#### CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN

During the first year of the occupation, the Japanese Government was instructed relative to the custody and disposition of the property of foreign nations and their nationals which included those of the United Nations, enemy nations and property which the Japanese had looted from all parts of their former empire, plus certain miscellaneous property.

SCAP also took over the control of certain Japanese domestic property which included those of ultranationalistic and terroristic organizations, suspected war criminals and large quantities of Japanese Government precious metals and gems. At the same time, investigation of the foreign exchange assets of Japan was begun and thousands of external assets were codified and tabulated.

The collection of diamonds seized from the Japanese Government and stored in the vaults of the Bank of Japan was inventoried, classified and evaluated. Experts of the Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D. C., were brought out to do the job. Substantial amounts of previously unreported property were uncovered as the result of investigations and audits.

During the past twelve months much has been accomplished in the task of control, custody and especially the disposition of foreign property in Japan.

Approximately Yen 150,000,000 of United Nations' and their nationals' property has been restituted in fifteen separate cases.

A wider recognition is now given through powers of attorney to persons seeking restitution of property for persons who can not come to Japan at this time. Localized responsibility is still with the Japanese Government for the continued protection and preservation of United Nations' property scattered throughout the islands.

German property, such as movable assets of the German Government and repatriated German nationals has been placed in four warehouses under United States Eighth Army supervision and the movable assets of German enterprises are placed under Japanese custodians.

Authority has been granted to dispose of movable property for the internal economy of Japan or for the export program where it is spoiling, deteriorating and depreciating. To date accomplishments include the disposition of medical supplies of the German Naval Hospital, the sale of dyestuffs for Yen 37,000,000 and the disposition of stocks of three German corporations.

German real estate valued at approximately Yen 22,000,000 and representing 150 units of real estate is being administered and a policy for the rental and payment of insurance, taxes and maintenance charges is being formulated.

There are 78 enterprises in Japan of vested German interest with gross assets estimated at approximately Yen 133,000,000. With the exception of five corporations and partnerships, none of these enterprises are operating. Japanese custodians have been appointed where necessary.

The status of three very large Japanese concerns with mixed German interests is pending determination as to either liquidation of assets or sale of shares and participation in annual profits. Pending this determination, measures have been taken to hold in escrow, under SCAP, a total of about Yen 10,000,000.

Looted property is that which can be identified as having been located in an Allied country at the time of occupation of that country and which was removed by fraud, force, or duress by the Japanese or their agents. The fact that payment was made is disregarded unless there is conclusive evidence that fraud, force, or duress did not take place.

During the year, 86 individual claims have been received from the United Kingdom Reparation and Restitution Delegation, plus 1,333 individual ship claims.

A total of 105 claims has been received from the Philippine Reparation and Restitution Delegation.

A total of 89 claims has been received from the Chinese Reparation and Restitution Delegation.

A total of 137 claims has been received from the Netherlands Reparation and Restitution Delegation.

Restitution for the year amounted to a total of 41 as follows:

<b>Ships:</b>	15 (China 4, Korea 9, United Kingdom 1, Netherlands 1)
<b>Automobiles:</b>	5 (Philippines 3, British 2)
<b>Cultural Objects:</b>	13 (Netherlands 4, Korea 1, Scotland 1, China 2, Solomon Islands 1, Philippines 2, United Kingdom 2)
<b>Industrial Equipment:</b>	2 (British 2)
<b>Miscellaneous:</b>	6 (China 3, Netherlands 1, British 1, Philippines 1)

Miscellaneous property involved the property of neutral nations and „special status“ nations. In this field an investigation was conducted as to illegally possessed foreign films in Japan. About 2,500 foreign films were taken into custody.

Data has been secured on all property in Japan of the various puppet governments. An effort was also made to ascertain the source of the funds with which this puppet property was purchased. Procedure for disposition of this property is under consideration.

On 18 October 1946, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers sent out invitational letters to the eleven member nations of the Far Eastern Commission requesting the appointment of permanent five-man Reparation and Restitution Delegations to be stationed in Tokyo.

Since that date, all nations have sent Reparation and Restitution Delegations to Japan with the exception of India. The Delegation from that country is expected to arrive in the near future.

## CIVIL TRANSPORTATION

1. *Transportation Status at Time of Surrender.* At the time of surrender, Japanese transportation facilities were in poor condition. The Merchant Marine, with less than one million operable gross tons, was at less than one-fifth of its immediate prewar strength. The majority of usable vessels had been built during the war to sub-standard specifications and were badly deteriorated due to lack of proper main-

tenance and to initial use of sub-standard materials. Although the railways had suffered comparatively little actual war damage, lack of maintenance to permanent right of way, rolling stock, and communications, coupled with failure to rehabilitate actual damage on a current basis, had caused gross deterioration of efficiency. Municipal transportation was seriously disrupted due to bombings. Over fifty per cent of the bus and trolley equipment was totally destroyed or badly damaged. Highway transportation was at a low ebb due to deterioration, both of roads and vehicles.

2. Practically all transportation was operated or controlled by the Japanese Government through the Ministry of Transportation, with private enterprise and initiative almost completely stifled. Two-thirds of the railway system is government owned and operated. During the war, the government took over from private interests the entire operation of the merchant fleet.

3. Immediately after the surrender, the Occupation Forces assumed supervisory control of portions of the transportation system. The Eighth Army, through the 3rd MRS<sup>49</sup> exercised supervisory control over land transportation to the extent necessary to serve the Occupation Forces. A Shipping Control Authority for Japan (SCAJAP) was established to supervise the operation of the merchant fleet. SCAJAP, now functioning under the Commander, Naval Forces Far East, directs the activities of the Civilian Merchant Committee (CMMC) which is the operating agency of the Japanese Government functioning under the Ministry of Transportation. In September of 1946, a Civil Transportation Section was established in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to advise on policies relating to use and rehabilitation of water and land civil transportation facilities of Japan.

4. *Target Programs.* Programs for rehabilitation were set up to accomplish restoration of plant and equipment necessary to sustain a minimum level of economy. For the railways, the programs include reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing and building facilities, of equipment, and of permanent way. Programs for municipal and highway transportation include construction of trucks, buses, streetcars, etc. necessary to replace worn-out and destroyed equipment. Programs for the merchant fleet include plans for salvage, major repairs and completion of construction of new vessels whose keels have already been laid. Other programs to improve efficiency of operations were established at the same time. These include planned maintenance and repairs consistent with the availability of materials, labor and funds. Programs for effecting changes in forms of control of transportation include plans for breaking up of monopolistic controls and restraints, means of financing the costs of salvage and major repairs, and the re-establishment of a normal pattern of rates. These programs involve considerable legislative reform.

5. Although marked progress was made against rehabilitation programs during the first year of the occupation, the major accomplishment was the formation of the programs themselves and the establishment of goals. For the railways, first priority was given to restoration of equipment and buildings necessary to eliminate bottle-necks restricting operating efficiency. With regard to the Merchant Marine, first consideration was given to rehabilitation of vessels which could most economically and speedily be put into serviceable condition. Due to the low level of industry and commerce, immediately after surrender, the traffic load on municipal and highway transportation was light. Early restoration of minimum operations

<sup>49</sup> Military Railway Service.

was fairly rapid due to utilization of critical supplies released from Japanese Army and Navy stocks. Street and highway repair programs, however, progressed slowly due to shortages of paving and repair materials.

6. *Progress in Rehabilitation of Railroads.* By July 1947, approximately one-third of the railway repair capacity had been permanently restored. The repair program itself, however, is behind schedule due to critical shortages of materials such as steel, coke, carbide, etc. It is estimated that approximately fifty percent of housing and building reconstruction is completed. There remains considerable work to place the railway system in a reasonably normal condition for continued operation, but with an improvement in the supply of essential materials, it is believed that the program will keep abreast of the general economic recovery of the nation. Rehabilitation of railway communications is progressing satisfactorily and much of the program will have been completed by the end of the Fiscal Year 1948. Progress of railroad rehabilitation is reflected by the daily average of gross ton kilometers, which have increased 26.3 percent over 1945. Gross tons per train have increased 34.2 percent and coal consumption has decreased from 96 kilograms to 90 kilograms per 1,000 gross ton kilometers.

7. *Progress in Rehabilitation of Merchant Fleet.* Progress of the program of rehabilitation of the merchant fleet has been slow but steady. At the time of surrender, the Japanese reported 526 steel vessels of over 100 G/T, a total of 736,000 gross tons in active service. A recent figure for Japanese steel vessels over 100 G/T under SCAJAP control shows 777 operating ships with a gross tonnage of over one million tons. The salvage program is approximately one-half completed. Progress is necessarily retarded by lack of materials and funds. It is estimated that the salvage and major repair program can be completed by the end of the fiscal year 1951 provided materials, labor, and funds can be made available as required.

8. Because of acute shortages in materials, maintenance programs are below desired levels. In order to conserve materials, emphasis is being placed on essential maintenance, but in many instances work which should be done on a current basis is being deferred.

9. *Progress in Democratization of Transportation Management and Control.* Considerable progress has been made in programs for democratization of forms of management and control. Obstacles are rapidly being overcome and positive results are looked for within the current year. Laws have been or are in process of being enacted to accomplish reforms in land and harbor transport, also to provide and protect an orderly and democratic framework within which a Merchant Marine can be re-established. Because of gross distortions brought about by the war and subsequent disturbed economic conditions, a normal pattern for tariffs cannot yet be formulated, but studies now in progress are calculated to point out and provide a means of regaining normal freight rates both for land and water transportation.

#### ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC SECTION

In the first two years of the Allied Occupation of Japan, SCAP's activities in economic matters have been directed toward eradicating the old imperialistic, non-democratic economic pattern of life and replacing it with a new framework which should lead Japan into democracy and rightful membership among the community of nations. In each of the specific fields of labor, industry and industrial reparations, foreign trade, finance, price control and rationing, science and technology, anti-trust and cartels, and in the basic economic research necessary for an understanding

of the several fields, a guided democratizing program is under way. The purpose is fourfold, to insure that Japan will not again wage aggressive war, to reform and democratize the Japanese economic structure, to restore the Japanese economy on a sound self-supporting basis, and to assure the Japanese people of their right to a peaceful, fruitful existence.

### FINANCE

Within the field of finance, SCAP set out on one hand to destroy those aspects of the Japanese financial structure that were used to promote the war. On the other hand, the program was intended to maintain and strengthen those aspects which could contribute to the earliest possible recovery of Japan in its new and modified setting.

In money and banking the first year's program was one of issuing superimposed regulations to control repatriates' funds, to prevent repatriates from removing the capital assets of once conquered countries, to block and segregate bank accounts, financial instruments or other property that later might have had value as foreign exchange assets, to place stringent restrictions on bank withdrawals, to institute a system of credit rationing and to authorize a currency conversion. Toward the end of the first year certain regulations were relaxed to encourage reorganization and reopening of financial institutions, as well as industrial and commercial concerns. Systems for reporting the condition of all commercial banks were also established.

In the second year, while many of the controls continue, reorganization is the keynote. A program of licensing foreign banks to operate on a limited scale and of authorizing selected types of foreign businesses to operate, has been developed. A Reconstruction Finance Bank has been established and a general reorganization of all corporate and financial institutions, including insurance companies, is progressing. In the final months of the second year the financial aspects of reopening large scale foreign trade has become a paramount responsibility.

In the field of public finance a system of control, supervision, and approval of governmental budgets was established in the first year. Control over the finances of the Imperial Household was also established and maintained and supervision over the tax structure was instituted. Two extraordinary tax laws were enacted. The Capital Levy Law had the twofold objective of deconcentrating private fortunes and of providing funds for the Government, while the War Indemnity Tax had as its objective the cancellation of war damage claims.

The second year in public finance saw the reform of governmental accounting procedures, the power of the Diet over public finance increased by virtue of the new constitution, the establishment of procedures for the disposition of State-owned property, and the reorganization of the ordinary tax structure, including the „pay-as-you-go“ tax plan.

Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of financial reorganization has been in the field of „liquidation“. In the first year of the Occupation, 46 institutions were closed, principally financial colonization and wartime development companies which were used to spearhead the economic penetration of conquered areas or to tighten control on the home front. The total book value of assets of the 46 institutions within Japan was Yen 176 billion. During the first year proceeds of the sale or collection of certain of these assets totaled Yen 1.8 billion and payment of domestic claims was Yen 0.6 billion.

During the second year, 113 additional wartime institutions were closed, including domestic control associations and subsidiaries and affiliates of institutions pre-

viously closed. Total assets of the 159 closed institutions are estimated at Yen 209 billion and liquidation proceeds have been Yen 8.8 billion and payment of domestic claims has been Yen 7.4 billion.

### ANTITRUST AND CARTELS

The initial step in this field was to direct the creation of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, a juridical person empowered to liquidate the major holding companies and to deconcentrate the control held over them by individuals.

During the first year the activities of 41 holding companies and their approximately 1,200 first-line subsidiaries were investigated and designated as „restricted“ concerns. These companies were prohibited from engaging without prior SCAP approval, in any act not construed to be in the normal course of business. This enabled SCAP to maintain surveillance so as to preclude the dissipation of assets until dissolution or reorganization could be achieved. Approximately 200 applications for exception to the prohibitions above were reviewed, investigated, and acted upon during the year.

In addition to the holding companies investigated, more than 2,000 control companies, associations, and unions were investigated during the first year. As a result of these investigations, the Japanese Government was directed to dissolve all control associations and to repeal all laws and regulations which had fostered their growth. On the positive side the newly organized Japanese Economic Stabilization Board was directed to create agencies to allocate materials to specific industries. The Japanese Government was directed to dissolve the Koeki Eidan, the war-time foreign trade agency, and to establish in its stead a Japanese Board of Trade as the exclusive government agency to handle all foreign trade transactions. Finally, the Japanese Government was directed to prepare legislation prohibiting international cartels and the execution by Japanese firms of restrictive international contracts.

The activities of the second year consisted of supervising the work of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission and of designating 67 corporations as holding companies. The Holding Company Liquidation Commission designated 56 members of Zaibatsu families and commenced investigations of 27 additional families to determine if their members should be designated. The real and personal property of designated family members is controlled. All companies designated by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission were directed to effect measures to protect and preserve securities and other properties in such companies owned by foreign nationals since 7 December 1941.

Late in the second occupation year liquidation plans were submitted by the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and Fuji Holding Companies. On 3 July 1947, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, the two largest and most powerful trading companies in Japan, were ordered by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission to liquidate immediately.

The 67 designated holding companies had 150.8 million shares of stock with a par value of about Yen 6.3 billion. The HCLC also took custody of over Yen 500 million in bonds held by the 67 designated companies and the voting rights of the shares of 4,085 subsidiary and affiliated concerns.

Antitrust legislation was initiated in the second year and became law on 31 March 1947. A Fair Trade Commission was appointed on 14 July 1947, to carry out the intent of the legislation.

In the direction of restricted companies, more than 2,000 applications request-

ing permission to perform acts not construed to be in the normal course of business were reviewed and acted upon in the second year. Expenditures of more than Yen 4 billion were authorized for the rehabilitation of industries essential to the economic recovery of Japan.

### PRICE CONTROL AND RATIONING

In the field of price control and rationing SCAP has directed the activities of the Japanese Government in the planning and execution of the economic controls necessary to assure the equitable distribution of food, production materials, and consumer goods, and through price control, to minimize inflation.

At the war's end Japan's indigenous food stocks were very low and the wartime controls had broken. It was obvious that a severe food shortage would develop by the spring of 1946. In October 1945 the 2.1 go (1042 calories) staple food ration was reinstated; this ration, although effective the previous July, had been allowed to lapse. About the same time the first food requirements study was made.

The anticipated food crisis began in April of 1946, and in May the Japanese government under SCAP supervision placed in effect an „emergency food deficit transfer plan“. This plan brought out hoarded stocks and forced them into legal distribution channels at legal prices. Further to relieve the crisis, imported foods were released throughout the summer. While these actions did not result in an adequate diet for the Japanese people, they did prevent widespread starvation and unrest. Without controls and planning, large numbers of Japanese would probably have starved and inflation would undoubtedly have become rampant.

In August 1946, on the basis of plans drawn in the spring and early summer, the Economic Stabilization Board, a central economic control agency, was created in the Japanese Government. A Price Board was also established. Both agencies, however, suffered from a lack of funds and from inadequate governmental support.

The continued short food supply has necessitated various emergency measures during the second year. In an effort to break the black market and to lessen the danger of mal-distribution, the official ration was raised to 2.5 go (1240 calories) and the Japanese were instructed to take vigorous action to improve the food distribution system and control the black market.

In February 1947, SCAP took vigorous action through the Japanese government to improve rice collections. Collections, though 104 percent of the initial quota set, were short of the 110 percent revised goal. In the winter and spring 267,000 tons of imported foods were released for distribution while an equivalent amount of rice was withdrawn from distribution to be made available during the critical summer months. This rice is currently being released. While current supply does not meet the needs of the Japanese people, the deficit is being spread so that there will be a maximum shortage of five days ration per month until the 1947 harvest is in. The effective per capita distribution this year is 62.5 go per month as compared with 63.0 go per month in 1946. In view of the millions of returned repatriates, the total volume is actually larger than a year ago.

In June 1947 the new Cabinet announced an 8-point economic stabilization program. It included plans for increasing the supply of food, distribution at equitable prices, allocations control of critical items, and a new price policy. In July the new Cabinet announced a price stabilization program setting prices at a maximum of 65 times the base period 1934-1936. The new program must be effectively integrated if the new higher wages are to be effective in purchasing basic necessities.

In June 1947 the old neighborhood associations were abolished and a new demo-

cratic food distribution method was established. To help curb the black markets, all non-essential restaurants were closed on 5 July for a period of six months. Under the new „link“ distribution system the producer is enabled to purchase farm implements, fertilizer, fish nets, and clothing at official prices, provided he sells his produce through the official distribution organization.

In July 1947 the Japanese Government announced a coordinated nationwide distribution and anti-blackmarket program to support the price stabilization program, to assure equity in the distribution of scarce necessities, and to reduce the real cost of living by minimizing the dependence of the population on blackmarket supply sources. The program is intended to eliminate the sources of blackmarket goods, to control transportation of essential commodities, and to redirect goods into legal channels at official prices. It further aims to improve the official procedures and increase the efficiency of distribution.

### FOREIGN TRADE

Two basic objectives are involved in the foreign trade policy of the Occupation; they are, first, the creation of a balanced trade position for Japan and, second, a volume of foreign trade to bring the Japanese economy to the average 1930-1934 level. Japan requires imports of food and essential raw materials and must be able to reach a situation in which either her goods or her services can be exchanged for the necessary imports.

SCAP's first action with respect to foreign trade was to limit the activities of the Koeki Eidan, the war-time import-export agency of Japan which was one of the tools of Japanese aggression. The Koeki Eidan was abolished and the Japanese Government was directed to establish a new agency to handle foreign trade. This agency, Boeki Cho, in November 1945 established a yen revolving fund to pay Japanese producers for their supplies. To further aid the Japanese, SCAP established a foreign trade account to pay for American goods from the proceeds of the sale of Japanese goods. Both nations were thus in position to resume some trade even without the formal establishment of foreign exchange rates.

Primarily the Japanese have shipped raw silk to the United States and received foods from the U. S. By January 1946, an overall import-export program for the calendar year was established and approved in Washington. In March 1946 the U. S. Commercial Co. became the commercial agency for SCAP in the U. S. For the year 1946 imports were \$ 305 million and exports were \$ 72 million.

A new program was developed for 1947 before the year began. Progress to date indicates that imports will be approximately as in 1946 while gross exports will be more than three times as great as 1946. The overall volume of both is still insufficient, however, and the lag in the import program is indicative of the need for further attention. Mere balance of trade, even if it could be achieved, does not make up for volume.

Of tremendous potential stimulus to Japan's foreign trade was the decision on 13 August to use approximately \$ 137,000,000 worth of Japanese-owned gold and silver as a base for acquiring foreign exchange. This „gold pot“ will be utilized as a credit base against which private or governmental financing institutions of Allied or neutral countries will be asked to advance funds or commodities to activate their trade with Japan. The fund will serve as a credit base for loans which could eventually total upwards of \$ 500,000,000.

Additional impetus to foreign trade can be anticipated as private traders re-enter Japan on 15 August 1947.

## INDUSTRY

In September 1945 Japanese industry had virtually ground to a halt. In the face of rapidly disappearing stockpiles of essential raw materials and the virtual lack of imports for many months prior to surrender, Japan's industrial remnants were disintegrating rapidly. For a considerable period the rail lines and equipment had received only that maintenance absolutely necessary to keep the dwindling stocks rolling. Stocks of ingots and pig iron were at the vanishing point, and actually would have been non-existent had the Japanese been able to furnish the fuel to fire their open hearth furnaces.

The immediate tasks of SCAP were to remove the war potential of Japanese industry and to aid in the rehabilitation of Japan's industry to pre-determined allowable limits. War potential was removed through directives ordering the destruction of arsenals, aircraft factories, and other war making machinery. Following surveys in November, 1945, initial production goals which eventually would become industrial levels were established for the Japanese. Later the Far Eastern Commission set the production level of the years 1930 to 1934 as the top limit for Japanese industry. That period included approximately two years of Japanese depression.

Following the early reforms, SCAP directed the Japanese Government to replace Industrial Control Companies and Industrial Control Associations with public agencies and with a publicly managed system of materials allocation designed to facilitate recovery. Concurrently SCAP directed attention to technological improvement in food processing industries to aid the Japanese in achieving greater self-sufficiency in food. The shipbuilding industry was rapidly converted to peacetime activities and trawlers and fishing vessels of all types became its chief product.

At present Japan's productive level is approximately one third of the limit set by the Far Eastern Commission and only 15 to 20 percent of her peak wartime output of 1943.

The major efforts of SCAP have been the fight to increase coal production and to distribute the production most effectively. Although 36 million tons of coal per year are regarded as essential to Japan's minimum economy, only small quantities were coming from the pits at the close of the war. At the end of the second year of occupation the rate of coal production is approximately 26 million tons per year; intensive efforts continue to achieve increased production. Labor shortages, labor skills, worn out tools, financial difficulties, and inadequate housing all play a part in the failure thus far to achieve the minimum production goal. Production of many other commodities kept pace with the coal output and distribution. In the field of construction and reconstruction desperately needed housing facilities were made available. Allocations of lumber, cement, glass, nails, copper wire, and other essentials for housing were made by the Japanese Economic Stabilization Board. The allocation system was buttressed by a system of building permits intended to halt non-essential construction while giving priority to the essential. The black-market in building materials and construction was finally throttled though not broken. By August 1947 one-fourth of the war-destroyed houses in Tokyo had been replaced. Substantial progress has been reported from other bomb damaged cities.

Fertilizer production increased over the two year span by more than 400 percent and the industry now appears to have the best reconversion record. Because a ton of fertilizer means more than three additional tons of food (within limits), the fertilizer program is vitally important to the food-short Japanese.

In August 1946 SCAP selected industrial plants in nine industrial categories

which would be subject to reparations removal. These selections were designed to reduce the surplus industrial capacity above the specified limits within which Japan's future economy will be contained. Above the level as designated by the Far Eastern Commission, all machine tools, ball bearing plants, caustic soda plants, shipbuilding facilities, sulphuric acid plants, soda ash plants, chlorine plants, munitions plants, and thermal electric plants were designated for reparations.

### TEXTILES

The recovery of the textile industry has been complicated by shortages in raw materials, raw cotton and wool, and by the shortage of coal required for processing. Nevertheless, during the past eight months, production of the key textiles reached progressively higher levels. Generally, the post war highs varied from one fourth to one eighteenth of the pre-war production records. The post war gains have been made in the face of dwindling stockpiles of fuel and of raw materials. Virtually all the textile industries are living on day-to-day deliveries of coal, since stockpiles were reduced considerably below an emergency operating level in the last quarter of 1946.

Production in the key textile industries has increased from five to 15-fold since the beginning of the Occupation:

#### TEXTILE PRODUCTION COMPARISON

	Jan. 1946	Post-war Peak	(month)	Monthly Average Pre-war Peak Year
Cotton Yarn (lbs.)	1,885,000	27,394,000	(Apr '47)	130,000,000 (1937)
Rayon Yarn (lbs.)	206,000	1,356,000	(Jun '47)	27,500,000 (1937)
Woolen and Worsted Yarn (lbs.)	1,292,000	2,700,000	(Dec '46)	13,000,000 (1937)
Raw Silk (bales)	2,957	10,834	(Mar '47)	60,000 (1934)

The production trend in the textile industries during the next six to twelve months will depend almost entirely on quantities of coal which will be mined in Japan. Even if SCAP's program for the import of raw wool and raw cotton are fulfilled to the point where all operable capacity may be utilized, coal will be the limiting factor in the output.

Production of rayon requires more coal per unit output than other industries and therefore is more seriously affected by the coal shortage. Attempts have been and are being made to import high grade rayon pulp and caustic soda. If additional coal were made available through expanded domestic production or imports, the chemical industry and the rayon pulp industry could provide enough raw materials to operate the rayon mills at capacity.

Cotton spinners have been rehabilitating war-damaged and stored machinery steadily since the first shipments of American cotton arrived in Japan in June 1946. On June 1, 1946, there were fewer than 2,500,000 cotton spindles operable, and only a quarter of these were in operation. A year later, there were 2,700,000 spindles operable of which 2,200,000 were operating. Further rehabilitation up to the

4,000,000 spindle limit set by the 11-nation Far Eastern Commission will be determined by the quantities of raw cotton which are made available. The presurrender peak of cotton spinning capacity in Japan had been 12,500,000 operable spindles of which 8,000,000 were operating.

Eighty per cent of the cotton goods produced since June 1946 has been made available for export, with the result that sufficient cotton goods have been provided to liquidate the Commodity Credit Corporation debt, when the goods are sold. In addition, significant quantities have been made available for distribution to the essential coal mining, food producing and processing, transportation, and communication industries. The quantity thus far made available for general distribution to the Japanese people has been very small.

The goal for monthly production of raw silk was set last year at 10,000 bales. This level was achieved late in 1946 and production has been stabilized at around these levels ever since. Emphasis has been placed on types most desired in the export market. Plans have been formulated for diversion of a considerable proportion of silk production into the weaving industry where, it is believed, an important export potential lies. This field, and the field of manufactured silk articles, will be exploited more fully when private buyers arrive in Japan.

The rayon industry has progressed slowly but steadily in the past six months and has reached several successive postwar production peaks. The gains in production volume have been small when compared with the operable capacity of the industry. Only one-half the effective operable production capacity of the filament branch and 15 percent of the capacity of the staple branch are actually being utilized. *Production volume is only 5 percent of prewar peaks.*

The industry must depend entirely on scarce indigenous supplies of coal, pulp, and caustic soda. Efforts have been made to increase production of these materials and to make larger allocations to the rayon industry.

The production trend in the woolen and worsted industry has been irregular since the end of the war. A considerable stockpile of raw wool, originally built up to supply the Japanese army and navy, existed when the Occupation began. The woolen industry has conserved this stock and consumed it slowly, stabilizing production at about the present levels in order to keep the mills in operation as long as possible. The supply is now approaching the vanishing point. The first postwar shipments of Australian wool arrived in Japan early in June, but the quantity of 7,481 bales is negligible when compared with the 300,000 bale capacity of the industry, or with the consuming potential of both the domestic and export markets.

Export markets are being investigated for linen products, since the fiber is grown in Japan and no imported materials are required. Production has been small, pending determination of the export potential.

Supplies of jute, hemp, and other industrial fibers were at an extremely low level at the end of the war and have so continued as a result of inability to import significant quantities. Small imports of cordage fiber have been received from China, the Philippines, and the United States.

## LABOR

In the field of labor, the first year of the Occupation was concerned primarily with four main objectives: (1) creation of conditions under which a free and democratic labor movement could develop; (2) encouragement of sound labor relations through collective bargaining; (3) creation of democratic labor legislation; and (4) effective use of Japan's manpower resources. Only the first of these objectives

was accomplished during the first year, but important beginnings were made with respect to the others.

The first objective was achieved by dissolving the wartime „laborfront“ organizations, by divorcing the police from labor administration, and by the ordered elimination of the repressive labor laws which had blocked the development of labor unions through free self-organization. The Trade Union Law of December, 1945, established the framework of basic labor rights and provided for the creation of 48 tripartite Labor Relations Committees to handle labor disputes. By August 1946, 3,000,000 Japanese workers were labor union members. While the rights of workers to strike were abridged in those instances where the interruption of services would be inimical to the objectives of the military occupation, work stoppages were few and of short duration and in no case was intervention by occupation troops necessary.

During the first year, an Advisory Committee on Labor, consisting of 12 American experts in labor legislation, surveyed the labor policies, programs, and agencies of the Japanese Government and prepared detailed recommendations. Discrimination because of race, nationality, or social status was forbidden by SCAP directive. Finally, initial steps were taken toward the „rationalization“ of the extremely complex and cumbersome Japanese wage structure.

In the manpower field, a public works program was created to handle the problem of unemployment and to speed reconstruction of public works. Special recruitment programs were undertaken to staff the textile and mining industries. Initial steps were taken for the reorganization of public employment exchanges and beginnings were made toward the abolition of Japan's malignant „labor boss“ recruitment system.

The labor policies and programs of the first year were continued and successfully extended in the second year. Union membership nearly doubled and both the federations of labor and the employer organizations took definite shape, with unions giving increasing attention to internal democracy. While labor disputes increased in number most of them were settled by direct negotiations or by the successful attention of the Labor Relations Committees. A proposed general strike was averted, however, only by SCAP intervention.

Within the Japanese Government the labor administration agencies were strengthened and several new agencies were created. By August 1947 the new Ministry of Labor had three old Welfare Ministry Bureaus, Labor Administration, Labor Standards, and Employment Security; and two new Bureaus, a Women's and Minor's Bureau and a Bureau of Labor Research and Statistics.

By the end of the second year, the general framework had been completed for a system of modern labor legislation which compares favorably with those of progressive democratic countries. Important new laws included the Labor Relations Adjustment Law (September 1946), the Labor Standards Law (April, 1947), the Workmen's Accident Insurance Law (April, 1947), the Seaman's Law (April, 1947), and the Employment Security Law (August, 1947). Legislation providing for unemployment insurance was introduced in the Diet in August, 1947.

Throughout Japan both employer and labor education was greatly expanded during the year and material progress was made by both national and prefectural Labor Relations Committees in their organization and operation.

In the manpower field major second year objectives have been: (1) to develop an effective system of free public employment office, (2) to eliminate archaic and un-

democratic labor recruitment practices, (3) to promote full use of Japan's manpower resources in activities supporting economic rehabilitation, and (4) to encourage effective unemployment measures.

The public employment exchanges were stripped of their last vestiges of wartime labor controls and emphasis directed toward service to workers and employers. Steps were taken to eliminate labor bosses from labor organizations and to prosecute cases bordering on indentured service. Special recruitment programs raised total employment in the coal mines from 232,000 to 410,000 and in the textile industry from 173,000 to 283,000. The public works program became effective during this year and at its peak gave employment to some 1,300,000 persons and plans were laid to make the program more effective in urban areas. The Katayama Cabinet announced unemployment insurance as one part of the Government's eight-point reconstruction program.

#### SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

In October 1945, SCAP's Directive No. 3 broadly prohibited scientific and technical research in Japan and required monthly reports from Japanese scientists. The purpose of the initial approach was to break the former subservience of scientific endeavor to the Japanese war effort.

During the first year, SCAP conducted continuous and intensive investigations of Japanese scientific research activities. These investigations showed that Japanese science and technology no longer offered a threat to the safety of the occupation forces. Hence restrictive control was virtually eliminated and the policy changed to one of cooperative encouragement of peaceful scientific investigation. A new directive authorized research to be undertaken provided such activities were not directed towards war-like purposes, aeronautics, or certain aspects of nuclear physics. Semi-annual reports replaced the monthly reports previously required.

Toward the end of the first year a basic policy was developed concerning the general attitude toward scientific work in Japan. Cognizance of research activity was to be maintained by requiring research to be reported and by making routine and special investigations in the field. Pure and applied research were viewed as activities of value to the rehabilitation of Japan and, by the natural inclinations of scientists in search of truth, an important agent in a democratic society for establishing and maintaining a feeling of friendship between nations. A remodeling of the scientific structure in Japan was to be brought about to make it fit a democratic society released from domination by nationalistic and reactionary personalities and thinking, as well as dogmas related to age, political power, and social level. Such hopes for new freedom and democracy in Japanese science were to be achieved by the Japanese themselves, with SCAP offering guidance and help.

During the second year of Occupation the reorganization of the Japanese science structure progressed to the point where a deliberative group was formed, to meet in August, 1947. This group purported to be representative of all scientific fields, geographical areas, and personalities characterized by relation to industry, government, or academic institution. It was claimed by the Japanese that this group had the intellectual stature and national prestige to prepare and recommend to the Japanese people an effective and acceptable plan for the incorporation of the Japanese scientific community into the economic and social life of Japan. The group's aim was to meet not only the scientific and engineering needs of reconstruction, but also to provide a vigorous segment of Japanese life which would continue to contribute to the preservation of democracy, and to establish and maintain the respect

of all high-principled peoples of the world. To assist SCAP in the formulation of policy in this regard, arrangements were made for a group of six American scientists from the National Academy of Science to visit Japan in July and August, 1947.

In the reparations program nearly all the laboratory equipment from Japan's Army and Navy establishments has been collected and put in order to await final disposition to claimant nations. Work has continued on evaluation of the equipment and standards for packing.

Detailed information on scientific and technical establishments, organizations, and personalities has been collected and tabulated. There are approximately 500 organizations in Japan whose research or engineering work warrants consideration, including 13 universities doing work in all fields. A report on the activity in each field of scientific and engineering endeavor, based upon reports by the Japanese of their research work, has been prepared.

Other projects, most of which have long range implications, have progressed to varying degrees. Some 3,700 abstracts of Japanese scientific publications issued during the war have been made. Considerable effort has been directed to the problems of standards so important in research, in manufacturing, and more particularly in connection with foreign commerce. Work continues on plans for the Japanese to stimulate standardization for domestic progress and to achieve more ready acceptance of their products in foreign markets.

Even the scientists failed to escape some activity connected with the Zaibatsu, for the latter organizations were involved in research activities as well as in manufacturing, banking, and trading. The Institute of Chemical and Physical Research was divested of its Zaibatsu control and the groundwork has been laid for its rehabilitation and independent future aided by a substantial government loan.

Finally a program to foster the simplification of technical and scientific terminology in the Japanese language has been undertaken. Nationally recognized groups have been formed in each field to study and recommend appropriate action.

## RESEARCH AND STATISTICS

The inadequacy of the Japanese Government's statistical system and the dependence of the Government upon data from private sources showed the need for a statistical mission from the United States. The Mission was composed of seven top-flight statisticians and economists, headed by Dr. Stuart A. Rice of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget. The Mission made numerous recommendations and suggestions for improving the organization and operation of the Japanese statistical system.

The Japanese Government, cognizant of its statistical shortcomings, established a central coordinating and planning group called the Statistics Committee. With the passage of the Statistics Law at the latest session of the Diet, the Committee has control over statistical surveys and for the organization of Japanese statistical agencies. Even before the arrival of U. S. Statistical Mission and before establishment of the Statistics Committee and the Statistics Law, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was directed to establish a Bureau of Research and Statistics. The appropriation for this purpose for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1948 is Yen 8.3 million.

While the Statistical Mission was in Japan, considerable effort was directed toward the development of plans for an allocation system to be administered by the Economic Stabilization Board of the Japanese Government. The Board has been

required to take over the function of distribution of critical materials, formerly performed principally by control associations and control companies.

[...]<sup>50</sup>

### NATURAL RESOURCES

The economic rehabilitation of Japan, within the limits allowed by the Potsdam declaration, depends in the ultimate analysis on the use which is made of her domestic resources.

Early in the occupation comprehensive surveys in the fields of mining and geology, agriculture, fisheries and forestry were made. These surveys revealed the extent to which utilization of Japan's meager natural resources had been dislocated by the war, and the urgent need for basic long range reforms and emergency measures in each of these fields.

The most pressing problems were the material shortages. At war's end Japan faced a major coal and fuel wood crisis. Rice production had dropped during 1945 to approximately 68 percent of average pre-war levels. Production of timber to rebuild shattered cities was virtually at a standstill.

To avoid the threat of starvation a number of emergency measures were recommended by SCAP to increase the indigenous food supply. Fishing areas were extended beyond the original boundaries set in November of 1945. To further increase fisheries production quantities of netting, cotton, rope, wire, fishing vessels and other equipment were made available from Japanese sources. Arrangements were made through other SCAP sections for the purchase by the Japanese Government of surplus U. S. fuel oil for the use of fishermen. A total of 237,386 kiloliters of petroleum products was imported for fishing vessels in 1946 and distributed through the „link system“, which provided for the exchange of fuel oil for fish in established proportions.

Exhaustive checks were made of fish landing reports. As an incentive to channeling fish catches into the legitimate market, fishermen were given extra rice allotments above their ration for obtaining specified quotas of fish catches.

Fertilizer materials, seeds and farm tools were made available to Japanese farmers, lands formerly used for military purposes were converted into farms. Agrarian economists compiled data for all Allied agencies concerned with food import problems. Food production, collection and consumption in the 1945 rice year were analyzed, and forecast analyses were made for the next three years. The methods used by the Japanese government in crop reporting and food collection were investigated by field check and appraised. Recommendations designed to minimize opportunities for under reporting crops, and for the upward revision of collection quotas as well as for streamlining the whole collection machinery were made. Responsibility for solving the problem of feeding Japan's millions rests primarily with the Japanese government. Since this was and is still the most urgently critical single problem in Japan today, SCAP has exercised close surveillance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in administering the food collection program, and in encouraging production.

Arrangements were made for increasing the production and importation of fertilizer in Japan. Recommendations were made to the Japanese government for in-

<sup>50</sup> Nicht abgedruckt ist der Bericht (S. 21) des „General Procurement Agent“, in dem die administrativen Prozeduren erläutert werden, mit denen die Besatzungsarmee Requisitionen durchführte.

creasing domestic fertilizer production and improving distribution. Food crops were given high priority in fertilizer allocations. Plant disease specialists advised and helped Japanese Ministry of Agriculture officials in developing methods for controlling plant diseases.

Second only to the food problem in importance was the fuel supply, upon which depends the industrial recovery of Japan. Field investigations of mining methods, capacities and reserves as well as labor and material requirements were used as a basis for recommendations for improving technical procedures. Conferences were held with Japanese cabinet ministers to stimulate governmental action. From November 1945 to October 1946 the production of coal was tripled, although it still remained below minimum requirements. The distribution system for coal, coke and lignite was revised.

The latter half of the first year of the occupation brought a gradual shift from emergency operations to long range planning for improvements in technological procedures and for the conservation of Japan's dangerously depleted natural resources.

Before the arrival of the occupation forces, Japan was twenty years behind the rest of the world in the field of mineral exploration. SCAP experts in the field of mining and geology conducted a painstaking search, both within and outside Japan proper for potential sources of raw materials necessary for rehabilitating Japanese economy. For the first time in Japanese history a regional survey of all oil producing strata was undertaken as a primary step to full exploitation of petroleum reserves. Although the Japanese petroleum industry produces in one year what the oil wells of Texas produce in one day, it is an integral part of Japan's economy. Through the efforts of SCAP engineers it has been put through a much needed reorganization both from the standpoint of operations and geological practices. At SCAP suggestion a Petroleum Exploration Advancement Committee composed of Japanese scientists, was created for the purpose of locating new sources of oil in Japan. Under the auspices of the committee 59 geological survey projects and 12 geophysical projects were planned for 1947.

SCAP forestry experts began during the first year of the Occupation to conduct equally extensive surveys of all forest areas in Japan. These surveys revealed that Japan had been cutting two, possibly three times the amount of timber growing in her forests, and that at the same time about 14 percent of the forest areas was unused because of the lack of roads. To put timber production on a sustained yield basis, the Japanese government was assisted in carrying out a reforestation program which calls for planting nine billion seedlings, enough to reforest 10 million acres in the next five years. SCAP has encouraged replanting of Japan's overcut protection forests for erosion control. To bring unused forest areas into production, 276 miles of forest roads were built which opened up 270,000 acres of forest supporting a timber volume of more than 500,000 cubic feet of lumber.

Lumber is a key commodity in the industrial and physical recovery of Japan from the ravages of war. During World War II the whole lumber industry was under the complete control of the Japanese Government which exercised its authority through the Japan Lumber Company, SCAP faced the problem of retaining necessary control to insure proper distribution of lumber while at the same time allowing for the rebirth of free enterprise throughout the industry. This was accomplished by the dissolution of the Japan Lumber Company, and the establishment of democratic forest industry associations, ordered by SCAP directive on June 26, 1946. The Japan Forest Industry Association established by the Japanese

in implementation of the directive, is now composed of 35 prefectural associations and one national association.

One of Japan's major problems has been the pressure of a large agrarian population on a limited area of arable land. The Japanese government has made repeated attempts during the past 70 years to increase this area by reclaiming and improving submarginal lands. During the first year of the occupation, SCAP specialists reviewed critically the latest Five-Year Land Reclamation program, and made numerous revisions in procedures. Besides bringing new land into cultivation a program for improving 8,750,000 acres of present cultivated land by proper drainage, irrigation and flood control was undertaken. The whole development program has as a goal an eventual increase of 25 percent in the cultivated acreage of Japan and the establishment of a million new farms. Since the beginning of the Occupation approximately 500,000 acres of land have already been reclaimed for cultivation. This is more than half the land reclaimed between 1910 and 1939. During the first year of the Occupation, SCAP experts investigated the possibilities for increasing pasture and forage utilization to increase livestock production, and started a reconnaissance soil survey project to be used as a basis for future agricultural planning.

At the beginning of the second year of the Occupation arrangements were completed for Japanese whalers to participate in Antarctic whaling for the first time since Japan's entry into the war. The expedition made up of twenty-one vessels owned by two fishing companies, was authorized by SCAP directive on August 6, 1946 as an emergency measure to increase Japan's meager food supply by vitally needed proteins. Two SCAP representatives accompanied the fleets as observers to insure compliance with prescribed regulations. In approximately four months of whaling operations in the Antarctic, the expedition returned to Japan with a total of 1,175 whales. These provided over 21,000 metric tons of salted and frozen meat and 50 tons of salted livers for distribution to the Japanese people, the equivalent in food value of approximately 40,000 tons of wheat. It also provided 12,000 tons of whale oil and 11 tons of vitamin A and D which is in short supply all over the world, and worth six million dollars in foreign exchange. A second Antarctic whaling expedition authorized on June 21, 1947 by the Supreme Commander pursuant to instructions from the United States government is now being organized.

The second year of the Occupation brought Japan's downtrodden tenant farmers one step closer to freedom from the economic bondage of a feudalistic agrarian system. The first assault on this system came on December 9, 1945, when SCAP directed the Japanese government to undertake a program of agrarian reform which would redistribute the land equally among Japan's five and a half million farm families. The program was translated from plan to reality with the promulgation of the Land Reform Law on October 21, 1946, drawn up by Japanese legislators in response to the directive.

The main objectives of the Law are to transfer land ownership to those who actually till the soil, remove the yoke of high rents and improve the conditions of tenancy for those farmers who will continue to rent the land they cultivate. These objectives are to be accomplished through purchase by the government of from 70 to 80 percent of the tenant cultivated land of Japan for resale to tenant farmers within a two-year period ending December 31, 1948. Some five million acres of land, or one third of all Japan's farm lands will be involved in the transfer. Compensation of the landowners is at legally established price levels. Resale of the land to tenant cultivators after consolidation into economic farm units will be at the

same prices. Tenant payments may be made in equal annual installments over a 24-year period, will never exceed one third of the gross income of the land, and may be reduced, delayed or cancelled by the government in case of crop failure or a drop in farm prices.

In accordance with provisions of the law, every immediate member over 20 years of age of farm families owning or cultivating one or more tan (.245 acres) of land was registered in categories of owner, owner-cultivator or tenant by November 30, 1946.

Responsibility for administering the purchase program rests with the local and prefectural land commissions democratically elected by and from among Japan's farmers. The local land commissions, made up of five tenants, three owners and two owner-cultivators, were elected on December 31, 1946. The prefectural land commissions, made up in parallel ratio, were elected by and from among members of the local land commissions on February 25, 1947.

The Central Land Commission, which decides on broad policies, was appointed by the Cabinet on March 26, 1947.

As provided by law, farmers dissatisfied with the actions of their representatives on the commissions may petition for their removal and schedule recall elections. The number of recall elections of rural land commissioners throughout Japan (1100) resulting from tenant demands for more effective action is an indication of the increasing awareness on the part of the most downtrodden elements of the Japanese agrarian population.

The program is now in full swing. The overall purchase plan for the transfer of land from landlords to tenant farmers provides for periodic purchases at fixed dates within the two-year period. The first land purchase date was set for March 31, 1947, at which time 129,000 cho of land were bought by the local commissions. The second occurred July 2, 1947, and brought about the purchase of a total of approximately 219,000 cho. These two purchases have exceeded by almost 50,000 cho the goal set by the Japanese government for purchase to date.

Also available for resale to tenants are the 193,603 cho of land turned over to the government by landowners in lieu of cash tax payments. The total of 541,889 cho amounts to more than one third of all the land estimated to be available for purchase and resale by the land commissions to the tenant farmers.

To accomplish the maximum consolidation without disturbing production, government acquisition of the land has been expedited while resale to the tenants has been deferred. The first sale of lands to tenant purchasers, however, has already begun during the month of July. In many cases, the actual transfer of land to tenants will be a technicality, since tenant-purchasers will bid to buy the land they are already cultivating.

The task of altering the basic structure of Japan's agrarian economy requires more than the creation of the administrative machinery of reform. It entails also the re-education of the great mass of Japanese farmers as to their newly acquired democratic rights and privileges. In order to set the rural land reform program in motion, and to insure its effective accomplishment, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, with the assistance and encouragement of SCAP has launched an extensive campaign of education on land reform through the press.

## REPARATIONS

1. *First Year's Work* - The preparatory work for reparations removals which was accomplished during the first year of the occupation consisted largely of in-

ventorying metalworking equipment in arsenals and aircraft plants. This was performed by the Reparations Branch in the Economic and Scientific Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which was subsequently transferred and established separately as a Reparations Section.

2. *Second Year's Work* – Most of the work of this year has consisted of inventorying and evaluating a large proportion of the facilities taken into custody for reparations.

3. During the second year, all 11 member nations of the Far Eastern Commission established Reparations and Restitution Delegations under the operational control of the Supreme Commander to handle all reparations and restitution matters for their respective governments.

4. In accordance with a directive from the United States Government, the Supreme Commander on 21 May 1947 established the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of the respective Reparations and Restitution Delegations, and headed by the Chief of the Reparations Section, to assist him in an advisory capacity in the development of procedures for the orderly removal of reparations facilities.

5. Towards the latter part of the second year, the United States Government announced an interim directive under provision of the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission, authorizing the Supreme Commander to make limited deliveries of reparations goods to China, Philippines, the Netherlands (for the Netherlands East Indies), and to the United Kingdom (for Burma, Malaya, and other Far East colonial possessions). In accordance with the interim directive, the Supreme Commander on 9 July 1947 announced the availability of metalworking equipment in Army and Navy arsenals and synthetic rubber plants which were to be allocated as soon as administratively possible. No allocations were made, however, by the end of the second year.

6. The complete job of physical removal of reparations equipment is accordingly still to be accomplished.

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